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Executive Summary
Criminal courts play an important function in post-conflict societies in reaffirming 
moral values and establishing the rule of law. In the face of mass atrocities over 
decades, no amount of punishment is going to undo the harm caused, but a tailored 
and comprehensive transitional justice system, including criminal trials that provide 
proportionate punishments can force those perpetrators to confront their responsibility 
and for the rest of society to be edified by the performance of justice. For victims, trials 
and reparations can serve as processes to end impunity of the crimes they have suffered, 
by receiving public acknowledgement of their harm and forcing those individuals who 
committed such harm to correct the imbalance in the relationship between them. While 
no one country’s experience can be replicated exactly in another (or should be), this 
report seeks to provide some lessons learned and guidance to better inform the Special 
Jurisdiction for Peace’s (JEP) approach to alternative sanctions, victim participation 
and reparations. This report follows on from engagements with the JEP in September 
2018 and February 2019 that hope to start a dialogue on these issues. As such, it reflects 
the start of the conversation to broadly set out the contours of the issues, but we expect 
more specific comments and questions to deepen our discussion. 
This report approaches these issues under four headings: restorative justice; victim 
participation; international standards on sentencing; and alternative sanctions, 
reparations and accountability. With the first of these, restorative justice has been 
practiced in some transitional societies. However, often the use of restorative justice 
has been for low-level perpetrators and associated with truth recovery processes and 
criminal trials. That said restorative justice could more finely attune criminal trials to be 
more responsive to victims’ views and concerns in proceedings, and to better shape 
justice outcomes through dialogue with perpetrators. It must be noted that restorative 
justice takes time, there can be a number of drawbacks including power imbalances, 
pressure on participants to satisfy external goals, insincerity of perpetrators, and lack of 
attention to gender perspectives and harms.
With regards to victim participation, the report outlines the practice of international 
criminal justice bodies, in particular the International Criminal Court. It highlights the 
human rights jurisprudence and the literature on procedure justice, which emphasises 
the importance of victims’ voices being heard in judicial proceedings, respected and 
reflected in decision making. Given that international crimes involve thousands of 
victims, there is increasing practice to collectivise the representation of victims, but 
this brings its own issues of how well victims are communicated with, their voices 
represented, and how conflicting voices are managed. The section also reflects on the 
practice of victim participation in other bodies, as well as opportunities for victims to 
appear in person to give their views and concerns. Final part of this section highlights 
some of the provisions and challenges of victim protection and psychological support 
in coming forward to international criminal bodies.
In terms of international guidance on sentencing for international crimes, there 
is no stipulated penalty schedule in international criminal law. However there are a 
number of principles to guide sentencing that correspond to traditional domestic 
penology, in particular proportionality. The jurisprudence of international criminal law 
and regional human rights courts supports that states do have some discretion to 
mitigate sentences where perpetrators make contribution to reparations to victims, 
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 X The JEP should make use of process and outcome indicators to measure the 
impact on victims and affected communities on its work;
 X Alternative sanctions should be viewed as a way to find a proportional punishment 
to repair the relationship of the perpetrator with society and more reparative 
measures to repair the relationship or at least civic trust of victims; 
 X Reparations ordered by the JEP should not include compensation, but make the 
most of the JEP’s position in facilitating measures of satisfaction and community 
service from perpetrators in consultation with victims. Victims should be signposted 
to other reparations available through the Victims Unit;
 X The JEP cannot undo all the harm of the Colombia conflict, but it can make a 
modest contribution to re-establishing morals and human rights values.
reconciliation and the peace process. These lessons can be applicable to the alternative 
sanction regime, drawing upon the lessons of the international criminal justice bodies 
and their use of pleas, mitigation and reparation for international crimes. The use of 
alternative sanctions is a means to strike a proportionate balance of punishment and 
restoration by engaging in communication with the perpetrator on the wrongfulness 
of their actions. By allowing perpetrators to mitigate the harm they have caused 
through incentivising confessions and certain forms of reparations, it can help to 
break the silence of impunity, but also communicate norms and reaffirm the rule of 
law. Ex-combatants can make an important contribution to dealing with the past and 
should be provide with a framework to resolve some of the victims’ moral harm and 
unanswered questions. Consideration should also be made of complex victims, or 
victimised perpetrators, in how they can fit into the JEP process in terms of restorative 
justice and reparations.
The report finishes on a number of recommendations:
 X The JEP should establish principles on victim participation, reparations and 
alternative sanctions to ensure coherence and consistency across its cases and 
demonstrate some certainty to participants and the wider public;
 X The JEP should ensure that victims are informed of their choices to participate and 
engage, this may involve collective and individual in person participation;
 X Effective outreach activities should be conducted to encourage dialogue with 
victims and affected communities – this is a two way communication;
 X Victim participation should be supported by psychological services and support-
persons;
 X Efforts should be made to avoid instrumentalising victims, instead their agency 
and choice should be respected, allowing them to accept or reject meetings, 
apologies or acknowledgements by responsible actors – forgiveness is a personal 
choice;
 X The use of restorative justice should be made clear as to what this entails and does 
not rediscover or manipulate traditional practices, with the use of traditional justice 
only used where it is relevant and done in cases with the consent and design of 
indigenous or Afro-Colombian communities;
 X Using restorative justice to address large scale atrocities should make the most 
of its principles of active participation, encouraging the parties to together find 
solutions, making the use of private spaces to encourage dialogue, staging of 
engagement and conditionality of any agreement in case it is broken;
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Introduction*
* Written by Luke Moffett, Cheryl Lawther, Kieran McEvoy, Clara Sandoval, and Peter Dixon. Thanks to 
Siofra Corr for her background research and Adriana Rudling for her comments.
1 See Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to 
Combat Impunity (hereafter Impunity Principles), E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005, p. 6.
2 See Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, Beacon Press (1998), p16.
3 Jamie O’Connell, Gambling with the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights Violators Console their 
Victims? Harvard International Law Journal 46 (2005) 295–345, p310.
4 Article 17(2).
5 Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms versus Righting Wrongs: The Goals of Retribution, University 
California Los Angles Law Review 39 (1991–1992) 1659–1702, p. 1663; and see also George P. Fletcher, The 
Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, Buffalo Criminal Law Review 3 (1999–2000) 51–64.
1. Transitional justice offers a toolkit for each country to craft their own solutions to 
mass atrocities within their own particular circumstances and in light of domestic 
and international legal obligations. International law obliges states to effectively 
investigate, prosecute and remedy international crimes and gross violations of 
human rights to ensure that there is not impunity for such atrocities.1 This reflects 
that impunity is silence – the failure to speak out and for society to confront the 
atrocities of the past, enables perpetrators to deny they occurred and for victims 
to be left with the burden of harm.2 As such, efforts to investigate, prosecute 
and remedy are intended to prevent impunity of such crimes as the ‘opposite of 
justice’, as impunity serves to repudiate victims’ suffering and access to redress.3 By 
blocking victims from seeking recognition and an appropriate remedy, impunity 
can implicitly signal that such individuals, groups, and communities deserved to be 
harmed. Accordingly, taking a victim-centred approach is a way to seek restoration, 
recognition of their suffering and assigning responsibility to those who caused it.
2. International law does not prescribe the way in which states should punish or the 
processes in which investigations and remedy must take place, just that gross 
violations are effectively, promptly and transparently investigated with appropriate 
redress to victims and proportional punishment for perpetrators. The Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court can only exercise its jurisdiction over a state 
party where it is admissible on the grounds that the state is unable or unwilling 
to investigate and prosecute international crimes. Unwillingness is determined 
on whether or not domestic proceedings are being used to shield a person from 
criminal responsibility, unjustified delay or proceedings not being conducted in 
an independent or impartial manner to bring the concerned person to justice.4 
Alternative sanctions do not fall within this definition, as it is a not preventing the 
establishment of criminal responsibility, there is no unjustifiable delay and it is 
being conducted in an independent and impartial manner.
3. At their core, criminal courts aim to provide retribution, not as vengeance (i.e. 
lex talonis), but as proportional punishment that recognises the rights of all the 
parties involved (victims, perpetrators and society), with punishment through 
sentencing as a means to ‘right the wrong’.5 No amount of punishment can undo 
or equate with international crimes, given its ‘radical evil’ that ‘explode[s] the limits 
of the law’.6 Instead the contribution of perpetrators to victims and society through 
reparations, peace building, reconciliation efforts and community service can be 
seen as a way to mitigate the severity of the punishment. Criminal courts can also 
serve utilitarian goals, not to ‘torment’ the offender or to undo the crime, but to 
achieve its aims of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation so as to enhance 
social utility, thereby fulfilling society’s interests by preventing future crimes.7 
4. Criminal courts can also play an important expressive function, in that they convey 
moral or normative messages by condemning those who have breached society’s 
values.8 Duff suggests that punishment as a communicative process can result in 
repentance, reform and reconciliation of perpetrators, by imprisoning them to show 
the errors of their ways and to repair the damage they have caused so as to prevent 
their repetition in their future behaviour.9 This shares some aspects of reintegrative 
shaming discussed further below on restorative justice, that courts can offer a 
forum to reprimand behaviour and encourage perpetrators to confront their 
wrongdoing and remedy it. However for unresponsive perpetrators who reject the 
moral messages being communicated by a court, punishment can serve to educate 
the public by imposing ‘shame, sanction, and stigma’ on offenders.10 The role of the 
JEP as a retributive, expressive and restorative court, places it in a unique position 
to respond to extraordinary violence by re-establishing values in Colombian society. 
The use of alternative sanctions is a means to strike a proportionate balance of 
punishment and restoration by engaging in communication with the perpetrator 
on the wrongfulness of their actions. By allowing perpetrators to mitigate the 
harm they have caused through incentivising confessions and certain forms of 
reparations, it can help to break the silence of impunity, but also communicate 
norms and reaffirm the rule of law. This reflects that after protracted conflict and 
gross violations of human rights, no amount of punishment can undo the harm 
done, but criminal courts can be wielded in a way to re-establish moral values in a 
society, which for too long has permitted and incentivised violence.
Report Layout
5. This report sets out the experience of other transitional societies in responding 
to mass atrocities. This is not to suggest that their processes and successes can 
be replicated or should be, but rather it is indicative of how other countries have 
developed context specific responses to atrocities. It begins in the first section by 
outlining the use of restorative justice as an approach to dealing with the past, 
by involving victims, perpetrators and the community to come together in a safe 
and supportive space, facilitated by an impartial mediator, to negotiate amongst 
6 L. Kohler and H. Saner (eds), Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers: Correspondence: 1926–1969, (Harcourt 
Brace International 1992), p54; and Carlos S. Nino, Radical Evil on Trial, (Yale University Press 1998), 
p135–137.
7 Cesare Bonesana di Beccaria, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, (W.C. Little & Co. 1872), Ch. 12 
‘Of the Intent of Punishments’; and Richard S. Murphy, The Significance of Victim Harm: Booth v 
Maryland and the Philosophy of Punishment in the Supreme Court, University of Chicago Law Review 
55(4) (1988) 1303–1333, p1310.
8 See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, The Monist, 49(3) (1965), 397–423; and Tim 
Meijers and Marlies Glasius, Trials as Messages of Justice: What Should Be Expected of International 
Criminal Courts? Ethics & International Affairs, 30(4)(2016) 429-447.
9 Antony Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community. Oxford University Press (2000), p91-92.
10 Mark Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, Cambridge University Press (2007), p175.6 7
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8. Restorative justice therefore attempts to find imaginative ways of shifting the 
‘ownership’ of past harms away from being the sole preserve of the state and to 
involving perpetrators, victim and communities affected by those harms in an effort 
to improve social cohesion.13 Criminal justice punishment can be ‘disintegrative’ 
inflicting more damage on society14 and ‘ruptures familial and social bonds ... 
generates further animosity and antagonism, and often engulfs the parties in 
bitter, never-ending hostilities.’15 In contrast restorative justice is intended to restore 
relationships between the parties and promote personal ‘active responsibility’16 of 
the offender to make amends to the victim for the harm they have caused by righting 
their wrongs.17 The offender can contribute to alleviating the victim’s suffering 
through acknowledging responsibility for their actions, facing the consequences 
of the harm he/she has caused, empathising with the victim, offering a sincere 
apology, and (where possible) making restitution or paying compensation.18 In 
this way, the offender can be better reintegrated back into community having 
attempted to address their past harms, which in turn makes their likelihood of 
re-offending significantly less likely. While they can be compelled or incentivised 
into such a process, it should not aim to humiliate offenders, instead offering them 
a way to be resocialised and reincorporated into society as a citizen.19 This process 
has been described by the Australian criminologist Braithwaite as ‘reintegrative 
shaming’ – a shift away from the stigmatisation of the offender. Braithwaite 
described the difference as, 
‘Reintegrative shaming communicates disapproval within a continuum of 
respect for the offender; the offender is treated as a good person who has done 
a bad deed. Stigmatization is disrespectful shaming; the offender is treated as 
a bad person. Stigmatization is unforgiving - the offender is left with the stigma 
permanently, whereas reintegrative shaming is forgiving … Put another way, 
societies that are forgiving and respectful while taking crime seriously have low 
crime rates; societies that degrade and humiliate criminals have higher crime 
rates.’20 
 A restorative justice process can provide a more informal space for affected parties 
to recover the truth, by enabling victims to discuss with the perpetrator the 
nature and motivations for the harm. This can allow participants “to tell the ‘whole 
truth’ as they see it”, without evidential rules and procedures that limit them to 
13 Ezzat A. Fattah, Gearing Justice Action to Victim Satisfaction: Contrasting Two Justice Philosophies: 
Retribution and Redress, in H. Kaptein and M. Malsch (eds.), Crime, Victims and Justice: Essays on 
Principles and Practice, Ashgate (2004) 16-30, p28.
14 Lucia Zedner, Reparation and Retribution: Are They Reconcilable? Modern Law Review 57(2) (1994), 
228-250, p250.
15 Ezzat Fattah, A Critical Assessment of Two Justice Paradigms: Contrasting the Restorative and 
Retributive Justice Models, in E. Fattah and T. Peters (ed.), Support for Crime Victims in a Comparative 
Perspective, 99-110, p101.
16 John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation, Oxford University Press (2002), p129.
17 Christa Obold-Eshleman, Victims’ Rights and the Danger of Domestication of the Restorative Justice 
Paradigm, Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 18 (2004) 571-603, p572.
18 See Heather Strang, Repair or Revenge: Victims and Restorative Justice, (OUP 2002); and John 
Braithwaite, Crime, Shame, and Reintegration, (CUP 1999).
19 Kieran McEvoy and Louise Mallinder, Amnesties, Punishment and the Calibration of Mercy in 
Transition, Journal of Law and Society 39(3) (2012) 410-440, p430.
20 See Braithwaite n.18.
themselves ways to deal with the consequences of the crime. While using 
informal or traditional forms of justice to repair the social fabric and relationships 
in communities can be more inclusive, there are dangers and challenges in such 
an approach, such an unequal power relations, lack of procedural protections and 
scaling restorative justice up to address mass violence. 
6. In section two provisions on victim participation are detailed, in particular 
noting the challenges of using a formal legal process in international criminal 
proceedings. This includes notions of procedural justice, victim application process, 
representation and voice, the different modalities victims can participate and the 
importance of protection and psychological support measures. The third section 
outlines the international legal standards on sentence reduction, amnesties 
and pardons used in exchange for incentivising truth recovery, non-recurrence 
of violence and reconciliation. The final section discusses the contribution ex-
combatants can make to transitional justice processes, in particular how providing 
a legal space through a restorative informed retributive criminal justice can 
incentivise individuals and organisations to be more responsive in providing 
reparative measures to victims. The report concludes with some reflections on how 
the experiences in other jurisdictions could help relevant stakeholders in Colombia 
reflect on these issues along with some recommendations for the JEP.
11 Tony F. Marshall, Restorative Justice: An Overview (Home Office 1999), p5.
12 Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, British Journal of Criminology 17(1) (1977) 1–15.
Restorative Justice
7. Restorative justice is ‘a process whereby parties with a stake in a specific 
offence collectively resolve how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its 
implications for the future.’11 In particular, restorative justice processes emphasise 
the restoration of relationships between offenders, victims and communities 
rather the punishment of perpetrators. Criminal justice has long been criticised 
for instrumentalising victims by prioritising the prosecution of perpetrators or 
‘upholding the rule of law’ rather than focusing on the needs of victims, which may 
be more complex than measuring the degree of retribution or ‘jail-time’ received 
by offenders. For some restorative justice advocates, the state is sometimes 
involved in ‘stealing the conflict’ between victims and perpetrators through a 
depersonalised process, using victims’ suffering to further a retributive agenda, 
wherein criminal justice professionals and politicians can portray themselves as 
being ‘tough on crime’.12 Retributive processes may not only ignore the needs of 
victims, but also leave perpetrators with a sense that they have been victimised 
by a punitive justice system (thus allowing the offenders to take avoid taking real 
responsibility for past actions) and remove the broader community of any of its 
responsibilities for healing damaged relations, because it has become the job of 
the state. 
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the community he or she has injured by his or her offence. This is a far more 
personal approach, which sees the offence as something that has happened to 
people and whose consequence is a rupture in relationships. Thus we should 
claim that justice, restorative justice, is being served when efforts are being 
made to work for healing, for forgiveness and for reconciliation.’28 
 In other contexts, there has been some practice of informal processes to adjudicate 
international crimes and political violence that can be termed as restorative. 
Indeed the inclusion of provisions on victim participation (discussed in the next 
section) and reparations within the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) have even been seen as a ‘restorative turn’ in nuancing retributive 
justice in addressing international crimes, but this may be more rhetorical given 
what can realistically be delivered within a criminal justice framework.29 At the 
ICC, while victim provisions promised restorative justice, it very much connected 
to the trial and punishment of perpetrators, as seen with the limited participation 
opportunities of victims to directly engage and question accused persons, as 
well as reparations being limited to convicted persons.30 Victims can present 
their views on punishment, including the length of sentence and mitigating and 
aggravating factors. More generally, alongside the use of conditional amnesties 
and immunities, transitional justice mechanisms have been able to create a space 
where individuals can come forward to speak without fear of self-implication.31 
11. There are of course some challenges. Restorative justice cannot restore 
relationships or victims to their position before the violation or conflict and victims’ 
expectations of any justice process (retributive or restorative) need to be managed 
accordingly. Moreover, in some contexts where the state has been a protagonist in 
the conflict, there may be suspicions of the state’s motivations in seeking to frame 
past violence as only involving the perpetrators and victims, thereby obscuring its 
own past culpability.32 For example, this has certainly been the case in Northern 
Ireland wherein discussions of the conflict that focus only on past violence between 
Catholics and Protestants, while ignoring the role of the British state, are treated 
with great suspicion.33 In contexts where there is residual suspicion towards the 
state, a facilitator who is perceived as impartial from the state, by commanding 
respect and following clear restorative justice values, can help to build trust 
amongst participants in proceedings. Indeed, the use of a neutral facilitator 
who is distinct and independent from the state may help to demonstrate a shift 
from punitive approach to responding to violence (both criminal and structural) 
of the past. There are a number of context specific practices of using restorative 
justice processes to address international crimes alongside other transitional 
justice mechanisms. These experiences reflect the social, political and cultural 
circumstances of the country in transition. That said, they provide some lessons 
28 Desmond Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness, Rider (1999), p51. The South African experience is 
discussed further below.
29 Sara Kendall, Beyond the restorative turn: The limits of legal humanitarianism, in C. De Vos, and S. 
Kendall, and C. Stahn (eds.), Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal 
Court Interventions. Cambridge University Press (2015), 352-376.
30 Luke Moffett, Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court, Routledge 2014, p89-90.
31 See discussion below on Amnesty and Pardon.
32 McEvoy and Mallinder n.19, p428.
33 See Cheryl Lawther, Truth, Denial and Transition: Northern Ireland and the Contested Past, 
Routledge (2014).
narrating the facts relevant to a criminal court.21 The involvement of the victim and 
community in restorative conferencing can encourage the active responsibility of 
these actors in ‘putting things right’ and the prevention of recurrence of violations.22 
By focusing on the social and personal context of the harm, the participants and 
the consequences, restorative justice hopes to provide contextual justice rather 
than consistent justice in sentencing.23 
9. There are of course shortcomings and challenges in using restorative justice 
processes, such as the lack of proper procedural safeguards and emotional support 
that can cause further suffering to participants,24 the dominance of certain groups’ 
interests over others, pressure on participants to facilitate more collective goals of 
healing and restoration or diversion priorities of the state to avoid court proceedings 
and to ease pressure on prisons,25 or not responding sufficiently to victims’ needs.26 
The restorative potential of such informal justice meetings can be compounded 
by non-engagement by victims or offenders, or insufficient funding by the state, 
leaving voluntary organisations to find or supply the capacity and resources to 
support such processes. The 2000 UN Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice 
Programmes in Criminal Matters suggest that to overcome these issues well-
trained facilitators can help to ensure a safe and appropriate environment for 
treating the participants with dignity and impartiality, as well as being sensitive to 
vulnerable participants.27 
Restorative Justice and Transitional Justice
10. In relation to transitional justice, restorative justice is increasingly relied upon as a 
theoretical and practical framework within which to situate less retributive facing 
approaches to past crimes. For example, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, former chair 
of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), described the 
work of the TRC in the following terms,
‘Retributive justice – in which an impersonal state hands down punishment 
with little consideration for victims and hardly any for perpetrators – is not the 
only form of justice. I contend that there is another kind of justice, restorative 
justice, which was characteristic of traditional African jurisprudence. Here the 
central concern is not retribution or punishment but, in the spirit of ubuntu, 
the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken 
relationships. This kind of justice seeks to rehabilitate both the victim and the 
perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into 
21 Jonathan Doak, Victims’ Rights, Human Rights and Criminal Justice: Reconceiving the Role of 
Third Parties, Hart (2008), p264; and Martha Wright, Justice for Victims and Offenders: A Restorative 
Response to Crime, (Waterside 1996), p138.
22 Braithwaite n.16, p129.
23 Lode Walgrave, Restorative justice and the law, Willan (2002), p158.
24 Rob Mawby and Sandra Walklate, Critical Victimology: International Perspectives, Sage (1994), p68.
25 Margarita Zernova, Aspirations of restorative justice proponents and experiences of participants in 
family group conference, British Journal of Criminology 47(3) (2007) 491-509. p506.
26 Janice Evans, Integrating Victims into Restorative Justice, Practice 18(4) (2006) 279-289, p285; and 
Brian Williams, Victims of Crime and Community Justice, (Jessica Kingsley 2005) p79.
27 Principles 17-20, Basic principles on the use of restorative justice programmes in criminal matters, 
ECOSOC Res. 2000/14, U.N. Doc. E/2000/INF/2/Add.2 at 35 (2000).10 11
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justice, is a retributive mechanism intended to deal with mid-level and rank and 
file perpetrators of the genocide. 
14. The Rwandan government intended that the punishment of those involved in the 
genocide would help to facilitate their reintegration into their old communities.43 
The gacaca court system was intended to incentivise perpetrators by offering a 
reduced sentence (halved) if they made a plea guilty, showed remorse through 
truth telling and apologised to the victims, and engaged in community service or 
victim compensation, allowing them to rebuild trust with members of their old 
community and victims.44 However, such community service was often conducted 
far from victims and their community, providing them with little direct benefit. 
Confessions were partially made, for minor offences, placing greater blame on 
those who had been killed or where in exile or to settle a score, with allegations 
that perpetrators colluded in their confessions to hide evidence and limit their 
responsibility.45 Perpetrators were often indigent, unable to pay compensation 
or return property they had stolen after years in prison, causing some victims to 
abandon the gacaca process. Others negotiated directly with perpetrators to obtain 
money and buy their silence.46 Apologies were seen by some victims as lacking 
sincerity and as instrumental in allowing perpetrators to get a lighter sentence.47 In 
addition, the gacaca courts failed to integrate a gender perspective, although the 
government was proactive in including women as judges (inyanamugayo); rape 
was only added in 2008 despite being a feature of the genocide; and there was 
an uneasy balance with victims coming forward in front of their own community 
with in camera (confidential in private) hearings for sexual violence crimes that 
seemed contradictory to the goals of gacaca in encouraging public debate and 
community participation.48 
15. The prison and community service experience has had mixed results. Community 
service work was determined based on the needs of the region, but included 
activities such as repairing roads, rebuilding homes of victims, building bridges 
or planting trees. While most of the community service is conducted through the 
Rwandan government’s Travail d’Intérêt Général (TIG – works of public interest), 
it halves their sentence where they confessed and recognised their crime. This 
meant that someone convicted of 20 years could have their sentenced reduced to 
10 years, serving 50% i.e. five years in full time community service. Those who do 
community service ‘tigistes’ are required to work three days per week, and where 
they are staying in a camp their days are combined. The institution the tigistes 
work for provides them with medicine, food and accommodation, with clothes and 
education supplied by the Rwandan Correctional Service.49 According to Brehm 
et al, 29% (91,556) of cases dealt with by the gacaca courts involve community 
43 Phil Clark, The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda Justice without 
Lawyers, CUP 2010, p249.
44 Clark ibid., p251.
45 Penal Reform International, Eight Years On ... A Record of Gacaca Monitoring in Rwanda (2010), p36; 
and Clark, p209.
46 PRI ibid., p46; Clark, p179; HRW p80.
47 Clark n.43, p250.
48 Pietro Sullo, Beyond Genocide: Transitional Justice and Gacaca Courts in Rwanda: The Search for 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation, Springer (2018), p212-213.
49 Presidential Order No.66/01 of 02/11/2012 Determining the Modalities of Implementation of 
Community Service as an Alternative Penalty to Imprisonment.
on the successes, tensions and challenges in moving beyond retributive justice to 
engage in more restorative and informal processes to redress victims’ harm and 
improve social cohesion.
Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts
12. In response to the genocide in Rwanda there three mechanisms were established 
– the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,34 national courts,35 and the 
community level gacaca (‘on the small grass’) courts.36 The 12,000 gacaca courts 
in Rwanda were created to enable rapid prosecution and trials, aimed not only 
in providing punishment, but to assisting in ‘reconstituting Rwandan society’ 
by providing penalties that allow convicted persons to ‘amend themselves and 
to favour their reintegration’.37 Based on the traditional gacaca model of informal 
dispute resolution in the community, modern gacaca courts intended to look 
beyond punishment alone and the reintegration of offenders through community 
work in a process that involved victims, perpetrators and community members. 
13. In terms of process, while victims were given a participatory role, like others in 
the community hearings, they often remained silent providing only their witness 
statement.38 Over time participation dropped as most community members 
were peasants, who could not afford to spend one day a week at the hearings, 
became ‘trial fatigued’ with little incentive beyond curiosity to participate in 
another hearing, or cases were too individualised, failing to tackle broader or 
more complex narratives of the period, such as war crimes by government forces 
(RPF) against Hutus.39 Others were discouraged from participating or appearing 
as a witness due to intimidation, ostracism from the community, or being falsely 
accused.40 Yet in practice there remains an unequal relationship that impacts 
upon individuals participating in the gacaca courts. The traditional role of the 
judge (inyangamugayo) shifted from being a mediator to being an arbiter on guilt 
and punishment. Perpetrators appeared at the gacaca courts in pink jumpsuits 
under armed guard, without legal representation. Accusations were encouraged 
to uncover those responsible and the truth,41 and guilt was established on a prima 
facie burden of proof.42 The system itself while building on traditional community 
34 Which dealt with 93 leaders, military commanders and senior perpetrators.
35 Addressing 10,000 high level or most responsible perpetrators.
36 To deal with 1.2 million low level participants in the genocide.
37 Preamble Organic Law n° 40/2000 of January 26, 2001 amended by Organic Law N° 16/2004 of 
19/6/2004.
38 Penal Reform International (PRI), The contribution of the Gacaca jurisdictions to resolving cases 
arising from the genocide Contributions, limitations and expectations of the post-Gacaca phase, 
(2010), p17.
39 Lars Waldorf, Rwanda’s failing experiment in restorative justice, in D. Sullivan and L. Tiff (eds.) 
Handbook of Restorative Justice: A Global Perspective, Routledge (2006), 422-435, p429; and PRI 2010, 
p18.
40 See Justice Compromised The Legacy of Rwanda’s Community-Based Gacaca Courts, Human Rights 
Watch, p86-98; and PRI 2010, p17-18.
41 Rosemary Nagy, Traditional Justice and Legal Pluralism in Transitional Context: The Case of Rwanda’s 
Gacaca Courts, in J. Quinn (ed.), Reconciliation(s): Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies, McGill-
Queen’s University Press (2009), 86-115, p93-94.
42 Nicholas A. Jones, The Courts of Genocide: Politics and the Rule of Law in Rwanda and Arusha, 
Routledge (2009), p70.12 13
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remorse and reintegration.59 Although confession, apology and remorse were 
integral to the gacaca system, enabling such reintegrative shaming requires a 
‘sufficiently coherent and engaged community to have the capacity to reintegrate 
a wrongdoer.’60 As a result, the ‘gacaca has always been an uneasy mix of 
restorative and retributive justice’ which over time became ‘less participatory and 
more coercive’.61 
Northern Ireland
19. In Northern Ireland, there are a number of informal restorative processes have 
been led or contributed to by former combatants: community restorative justice; 
search for the disappeared; and a number of truth recovery initiatives. The first 
of these have been efforts over the past twenty-five years to transform violence 
within communities by paramilitaries, who often carried out punishment attacks 
against alleged anti-social offenders as part of their ‘policing’ activities in working 
class areas.62 When the paramilitary cease-fires were called in 1994, such ‘policing 
activities’ continued. Thereafter, engagement between human rights and civil 
society actors and the Republican and Loyalist armed groups ultimately led to the 
creation of community based restorative justice programmes as alternatives to 
violence. These non-violent and lawful projects, many of them staffed by former 
combatants, were shaped by the principles and practices of restorative justice.63 
These projects benefitted from former combatants, along with local community 
members, acting as volunteers to provide moral authority and legitimacy to a non-
violent approach in mediating disputes, which followed restorative justice values 
with a flexible process.64 While the number of attacks has markedly dropped within 
communities, such attacks do continue by dissident republican and loyalist groups.65 
However, mainstream IRA punishment violence has completely stopped. In 1996 
there were 302 punishment shootings by loyalist and republican groups, which 
by 2006 had dropped down to 49.66 Such ex-combatant restorative processes did 
have the effect of transforming community dispute resolution, reducing distance 
between victim, offenders and the community,67 and at the same time facilitated 
59 Clark n.43, p205.
60 Martha Minow, Breaking the Cycles of Hatred: Memory, Law, and Repair, Princeton University Press 
2002, p75.
61 Waldorf n.39, p422-423.
62 Such as drug dealing and burglaries. Such attacks involved a range of punishments from warnings, 
beatings, shootings and exile. See Anna Eriksson, Restorative Justice in the Northern Ireland 
Transition, Wilan (2009), 341-361, p344.
63 Kieran McEvoy and Peter Shirlow, Reimagining DDR: Ex-combatants, leadership and Moral Agency 
in Conflict Transformation, Theoretical Criminology 13(1) (2009) 31-59, p37; and Kieran McEvoy and 
Harry Mika, Restorative Justice and the Critique of Informalism in Northern Ireland, British Journal of 
Criminology, 43(3) (2002) 534-563.
64 Eriksson n.62, p345.
65 Henry McDonald, Northern Ireland ‘punishment’ attacks rise 60% in four years, The Guardian, 12 
March 2018.
66 For a discussion see Tim Chapman and Hugh Campbell, Working across frontiers in Northern Ireland: 
The contribution of community-based restorative justice to security and justice in local communities, 
in K. Clamp (ed.), Restorative Justice in Transitional Societies, (2016) 115-132, p119. See recent statistics 
since 2003 here: https://www.psni.police.uk/inside-psni/Statistics/security-situation-statistics/security-
situation-statistics-archive/
67 Ibid.
service obligations.50 In their assessment of sentencing, Brehm et al found that 
the high level perpetrators (Category 1) who were ineligible for community 
sentence were convicted of 19 years on average, excluding life sentences, whereas 
mid level perpetrators who committed murder, rape and torture (Category 2) 
were convicted of 15 years on average.51 Category 3 perpetrators who committed 
property crimes served no prison time or community service, but were instead had 
fines imposed (90%) on them averaging at $11 USD or agreement with victims, with 
some (9%) initiated by the perpetrator who wished to be forgiven and returned the 
victims’ property.52 
16. There is some research to suggest that for ex-prisoners who engaged in the 
gacaca courts and worked in the community service through TIG have remained 
embarrassed or silent about their role during the genocide once being released, 
particularly with their family, entrenching denial.53 The impact of perpetrators 
removal from their family has also caused marital problems, as they are unable 
to contribute to their wealth and wellbeing, partners remarried, and there were a 
number of tigistes committing suicide within the TIG camps or they left the country 
upon release, rather than returning home to their community.54 Other tigistes 
have found the community service useful in giving them new skills and work 
experience, or at least more liveable conditions than prison with less surveillance 
and contact with the outside world.55 
17. For victims they were divided on the TIG, some worried that tigistes would settle 
old scores at night, but these concerns did not materialise as tigistes often worked 
far away from their home communities and had no reason to leave the camp at 
night as relatives and friends were too far away.56 This is not to negate that victims 
feared the proximity of former genocidiaries in the community and the community 
service did not mitigate this for all.57 For some victims seeing tigistes rebuilding 
their house or working alongside them in the fields helped to alleviate some of 
their fears. More generally society in Rwanda initially perceived early release and 
community service as a ‘trick’, but with those who did not confess remaining in 
prison overtime society’s perceptions began to change along with sensitisation 
programmes by the state, and welcomed the opportunity for economic benefits 
from the TIG in communities.58 
18. The gacaca court process provided a forum to confront the widespread 
involvement of individuals in the genocide, position the community to shame 
perpetrators through their confessions, express moral values to contribute to 
preventing its repetition, while allowing some recovery of truth, expression of 
50 Hollie Nyseth Brehm, Christopher Uggen, and Jean-Damascène Gasanabo, Genocide, Justice, and 
Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 30(3) (2014) 333–352.
51 Brehm et al ibid., p344.
52 Ibid. p340-341.
53 Théoneste Rutayisire and Annemiek Richters, Everyday suffering outside prison walls: A legacy of 
community justice in post-genocide Rwanda, Social Science and Medicine 120 (2014) 413-420, p417.
54 Ibid.
55 PRI Monitoring and Research Report on the Gacaca Community Service (TIG): Areas of reflection, 
March 2007, p22-23.
56 See ibid.
57 PRI 2007, p35.
58 PRI 2007, p28-31.14 15
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magazine.74 However such informal engagements have become more difficult 
for ex-combatants over fear of self-incrimination and prosecution, after testimony 
provided by now deceased members of paramilitary organisations were published 
as part of a Boston College project, resulting in the tapes being subpoenaed by the 
Northern Ireland police and the arrest of living comrades implicated in the stories.75 
Thus informal information sharing can pose a danger for all parties involved.
South Africa
22. Established in 1996 to deal with the horrors of apartheid and with the ambitious 
goal of ‘reconciling a nation’, the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) adopted a language of healing, forgiveness, reconciliation and 
restorative justice.76 Restorative justice is premised upon the belief that crime or 
anti-social behaviour is ‘a violation of people and relationships’ rather than simply 
lawbreaking.77 As a result, restorative approaches seek to identify the ‘harms’ 
caused by the offenders’ actions to individual victims, the wider community and 
the harm caused by the punishment and stigmatization to offenders themselves.78 
23. Eschewing retribution, the TRC sought to restore relationships between victims 
and perpetrators and repair the damage suffered by both parties.79 As noted above, 
for the Chair of the TRC Archbishop Desmond Tutu, this emphasis on restorative 
justice chimed with traditional African approaches to conflict transformation – 
‘western justice is largely retributive’.80 The TRC’s restorative focus also resonated 
with the traditional concept of Ubuntu as ‘humaneness’ and respect for human 
dignity in the move from violence to reconciliation.81 These sentiments were 
shared by the South African Constitutional Court in its examination of the National 
Reconciliation Act 1995 that established the TRC, 
‘by encouraging these survivors and the dependants of the tortured and 
the wounded, the maimed and the dead to unburden their grief publicly, to 
receive the collective recognition of a new nation that they were wronged, and 
crucially, to help them to discover what did in truth happen to their loved ones, 
where and under what circumstances it did happen, and who was responsible. 
That truth, which the victims of repression seek so desperately to know is, in 
the circumstances, much more likely to be forthcoming if those responsible for 
74 See Ron Dudai, Closing the gap: symbolic reparations and armed groups, International Review of the 
Red Cross 93(883) September 2011, 783-808.
75 Boston College tapes: Truth-recovery pie in the sky as long as shadow of arrest looms, Belfast 
Telegraph, 30 January 2015.
76 Charles Villa-Vicencio, Restorative Justice: Dealing with the Past Differently, in C. Villa-Vicencio and 
W. Verwored (eds), Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of South Africa, University of Cape Town Press (2000).
77 Howard Zehr, Doing Justice, Healing Trauma: The Role of Restorative Justice in Peacebuilding, South 
Asian Journal of Peacebuilding 1 (2000) 2-16.
78 Braithwaite n.16.
79 Kerry Clamp and Jonathan Doak. More than Words: Restorative Justice Concepts in Transitional 
Justice Settings, International Criminal Law Review, 12 (2012) 339-360.
80 Cited in Minow n.2, p.81
81 umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu – ‘people are people through other people’. TRC Volume 1, Chapter 5, 
p127.
a common usage of human rights language to allow participants and the state 
engage in decision making from the ‘bottom-up’.68 Fears that such restorative 
processes would extend paramilitaries ‘control’ over their community during 
peace or to exclude state system have proved unfounded.69 Instead community 
restorative justice has provided ‘scaffolding’, which enables a safe, neutral space 
and a process of dialogue between people affected by conflict to engage with the 
other constructively.’70 
20. Engagement by paramilitaries in finding solutions to the harm they caused is also 
apparent in two other respects. During the Northern Ireland conflict, 16 people 
were disappeared by non-state armed groups (principally the IRA). To help facilitate 
the recovery of victims’ remains, the Independent Commission for the Location of 
Victims’ Remains (ICLVR) was established by the British and Irish governments 
in 1999.71 In the attempt to incentivise information retrieval, the ICLVR offers a de 
facto amnesty for those individuals who come forward with information relating to 
the recovery of the disappeared. The offer of immunity from prosecution is entirely 
pragmatic and reflects the reality that without the input of those directly involved 
in the act of disappearance, the recovery of victims’ remains would be highly 
unlikely, if not impossible. Of course, given the guarantee of non-prosecution, 
there was little scope for the Republican movement to fail to co-operate with the 
recovery of the remains of the disappeared. At the end of 2018, the remains of 
13 of the 16 disappeared have been recovered and returned to their families for 
burial. However, the ICLVR has concentrated on the single goal of determining 
the location of remains of those victims who were disappeared – broader goals 
of truth and acknowledgement were not built into the commission. Indeed, such 
objectives may have run contrary to the ‘quiet’ nature of its operation.72 Building 
on the model of the ICLVR, more recently, and as part of the 2014 Stormont House 
Agreement, a truth recovery body - the Independent Commission for Information 
Retrieval has been proposed on a similar legal basis, which would allow victims to 
privately seek and receive information about the death of their next of kin from 
ex-combatants.73 
21. Outside of this legal framework some victims have directly engaged with 
paramilitary groups to uncover further information of the death of their loved 
ones through more informal back channels. Notable examples include the 
work of several victims’ organisations who have acted as interlocutors between 
victims’ families and former members of paramilitary organisations in the quest to 
answer questions of significance to family members and the rehabilitation of the 
reputation of informers killed by the IRA, wherein investigations were internally 
conducted and apologies made to the families and later published in a republican 
68 See Kieran McEvoy and Anna Erikson, Restorative Justice in Transition: ownership, leadership, and 
‘bottom-up’ human rights, Handbook of Restorative Justice (2006) 321-337.
69 Kieran McEvoy and Harry Mika Punishment, policing and praxis: Restorative justice and non‐violent 
alternatives to paramilitary punishments in Northern Ireland, Policing and Society: An International 
Journal, 11(3-4) (2001), 359-382, p376-377.
70 Chapman and Campbell n.66, p117.
71 The Northern Ireland (Location of Victims’ Remains) Act 1999 was passed by the British government, 
and the Criminal Justice (Location of Victims’ Remains) Act 1999 was passed by the Irish government.
72 See Lauren Dempster, ‘Quiet’ Transitional Justice: ‘Publicness’, Trust and Legitimacy in the Search for 
the ‘Disappeared’, Social & Legal Studies (2019) 1–27.
73 Stormont House Agreement. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/390672/Stormont_House_Agreement.pdf16 17
R
es
to
ra
ti
ve
 J
u
st
ic
e Restorative Ju
stice
in the Amnesty Committee hearings.85 Victims’ rights included the right to be 
notified of the hearings and to be present, to provide evidence (oral or written 
statements) that were taken into consideration, to give formal testimony (under 
oath and subject to cross-examination), to question amnesty applicants (in person 
or through their counsel), as well as apply for a judicial review of amnesty decisions.86 
In addition, and in exceptional cases following a victim request, the hearings 
were accompanied by ‘behind the scenes interpersonal dialogues’ between 
victims and perpetrators, facilitated by TRC staff. As well as helping to contribute 
to the restoration of victims, engagement in truth telling helped to promote the 
reintegration of ex-combatants into society, contributed to the development of 
richer, more inclusive narratives on which a shared history could be formed and 
assisted to promote social understanding of the causes of violence.87 
26. That said, a number of critiques have been made of the restorative capacity of the 
TRC. First, the legal nature of amnesty committee hearings often left victims as 
spectators of legal debates between their own and other lawyers in the hearings.88 
Informal meetings facilitated by TRC staff and lawyers, offered a more direct way to 
obtain truth and assess the sincerity of the perpetrator’s remorse. However, these 
were not organised by the TRC and the timeframe of the hearings may have been 
too soon for victims to engage in such processes.89 
27. Second, the amnesty hearings did not require perpetrators to express remorse or 
an apology, just the truth, though perpetrators did at times express regret and 
sympathy, others entered a rote apology and some even justified their actions.90 
28. Third, the separation of the committees on amnesty, violations and rehabilitation 
and reparation, limited the relational aspect of sharing information between 
perpetrators and victims. Although the committees allowed information to be 
transferred between them and provided opportunities for victims to engage 
with perpetrators, the system was not set up to facilitate detailed discussions on 
truth, such as the location of those disappeared.91 Numerous investigators were 
involved in the amnesty committee to verify facts and identities as well as to trace 
victims, but this was a substantive amount of work and time to collect and collate 
such information.
29. Fourth, perceptions of the TRC being more ‘perpetrator friendly’, in particular 
the amnesty commission, were not helped by the TRC being able to resolve a 
85 Jeremy Sarkin, Carrots and Sticks: The TRC and the South African Amnesty Process, Intersentia 
(2004).
86 See Antje du Bois-Pedain, Transitional Amnesty in South Africa, Cambridge University Press (2007).
87 See McEvoy and Mallinder n.19.
88 Timothy Sizwe Phakathi and Hugo van der Merwe, The Impact of the TRC’s Amnesty Process 
on Survivors of Human Rights Violations, in A. Chapman and H. van der Merwe (eds.), Truth and 
Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC Deliver?, University of Pennsylvania Press (2007) 116-142, 
p136.
89 Sizwe Phakathi and van der Merwe ibid., p138-139.
90 Madeleine Fullard and Nicky Rousseau, Uncertain borders: The TRC and the (un)making of public 
myths, Kronos 34(1) (2008), 215-239, p223.
91 477 disappearances were recognised by the TRC in part based on information provided by 
perpetrators and has been used as a starting point for their recovery and reburial by the Missing 
Persons Task Team. See Jay D. Aronson, The Strengths and Limitations of South Africa’s Search for 
Apartheid-Era Missing Persons, International Journal of Transitional Justice 5 (2011), 262–281.
such monstrous misdeeds are encouraged to disclose the whole truth with the 
incentive that they will not receive the punishment which they undoubtedly 
deserve if they do. Without that incentive there is nothing to encourage such 
persons to make the disclosures and to reveal the truth which persons in the 
positions of the applicants so desperately desire. With that incentive, what 
might unfold are objectives fundamental to the ethos of a new constitutional 
order. The families of those unlawfully tortured, maimed or traumatised 
become more empowered to discover the truth, the perpetrators become 
exposed to opportunities to obtain relief from the burden of a guilt or an anxiety 
they might be living with for many long years, the country begins the long and 
necessary process of healing the wounds of the past, transforming anger and 
grief into a mature understanding and creating the emotional and structural 
climate essential for the “reconciliation and reconstruction” which informs the 
very difficult and sometimes painful objectives of the amnesty…’82 
24. The restorative approach articulated by the TRC can be divided into four aspects: 
a. ‘seeks to redefine crime: it shifts the primary focus of crime from the breaking 
of laws or offences against a faceless state to a perception of crime as violations 
against human beings, as injury or wrong done to another person; 
b. is based on reparation: it aims at the healing and the restoration of all concerned 
– of victims in the first place, but also of offenders, their families and the 
larger community; 
c. encourages victims, offenders and the community to be directly involved in 
resolving conflict, with the state and legal professionals acting as facilitators; 
d. supports a criminal justice system that aims at offender accountability, full 
participation of both the victims and offenders and making good or putting 
right what is wrong.’83 
25. The importance of the full participation of former combatants and their contribution 
to truth recovery was also framed within a restorative lens: 
‘that the accountability of perpetrators be extended to making a contribution 
to the restoration of the well-being of their victims. …The fact that people are 
given their freedom without taking responsibility for some form of restitution 
remains a major problem with the amnesty process. Only if the emerging truth 
unleashes a social dynamic that includes redressing the suffering of victims will 
it meet the ideal of restorative justice.’84 
 For these reasons, the TRC, through the Amnesty Committee hearings offered a 
conditional amnesty to former combatants who engaged in the truth recovery 
process. Some scope was provided for the presence and participation of victims 
82 Mahomed DP, Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and Others v President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others, (CCT17/96) [1996] ZACC 16; 1996 (8) BCLR 1015; 1996 (4) SA 672 (25 July 1996).
83 TRC Volume 1, Chapter 5, p126.
84 TRC Volume 1, Chapter 5, p131.18 19
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having mixed contemporary use by individuals, have been sought out the former 
combatants and victims to assist in reintegrating and normalizing their place in the 
community. These traditional ceremonies are framed on restoring harmony in the 
community through the clan taking responsibility for the actions of its members, 
whether through internal reconciliation ceremonies or external with other clans.99 
Nyouo tong gweno (stepping on an egg on top of an opobo twig) is a cleansing 
ritual used to purify those who have been away from home for a long time, and 
is applied in welcoming back former child soldiers.100 There are also reburial rites 
like inko cogo (reburial of the bones) and area cleansing has facilitated appropriate 
burials, family reunions and for some members of the community to return from 
displaced persons camps, by removing bad spirits caused by the spilling of blood 
on the land during the war. 
32. One of the most discussed traditional ceremonies in Acholi is mato oput (drinking 
the bitter root), where warring parties are reconciled after the responsible party or 
clan acknowledges their wrongdoing in front of the community, provides a truthful 
account, makes compensation to the victim’s clan (culo kwor) to atone for the harm, 
and then both clans share a meal together. Where clans are warring amongst 
each other, mato oput ceremony can be linked to negotiations on appropriate 
reparations for the damage caused, and followed by the gomo tong (bending 
of spears) to prevent recurrence of violence. Cultural and religious institutions 
have also played a key role in promoting healing and reconciliation amongst the 
affected communities.101 Nonetheless, these mechanisms do not provide official 
acknowledgement of responsibility or harm and there are little corresponding 
reparations from the state for victims. While one off reintegration packages are 
provided to amnesty reporters (USD $70 and tools), there is no corresponding 
support for victims. As one northern Uganda interviewed by the team stated, “I 
am a victim, but I do not have the benefits of a perpetrator, who is also a victim.”102 
33. Similarly in Timor Leste, there were three mechanisms to deal with the occupation 
and liberation war, from the truth commission (CAVR), Serious Crime Unit (CRU) to 
deal with senior perpetrators, down to the grassroots Community Reconciliation 
Process (CRP). Offenders would voluntarily make a written application to the CAVR, 
which would be sent to the Office of the General Prosecutor for review if it needed 
to go before the CRU, otherwise it would go before the CRP. The CRP invoked 
traditional community mediation to reintegrate over 1,000 perpetrators, due 
to the devastation caused by the occupation and conflict to the criminal justice 
system.103 The CRP or nahe biti bo’ot (‘stretching the big mat’ where perpetrators, 
victims and elders sit) involved mediation between the aggrieved party and the 
perpetrator in the form of a panel from the community. This process culminated in 
a one-day ceremony, but usually required three months pre-negotiation to reach 
99 Joanna R. Quinn, What of Reconciliation? Traditional Mechanisms of Acknowledgment in Uganda, in 
J. Quinn (ed.), Reconciliation(s): Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies, McGill-Queen’s University 
Press (2009), 174-206, p190-191.
100 Quinn ibid., p188.
101 See Erin K Baines, The Haunting of Alice: Local Approaches to Justice and Reconciliation in Northern 
Uganda, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 1(1)(2007), 91-114.
102 Interview, Gulu, Northern Uganda, July 2011.
103 1,371 perpetrators completed a CRP. See Chega! Part 9: Community Reconciliation, para.6.
perpetrator’s legal situation by confirming or denying them an amnesty, whereas 
despite making recommendations for reparations, victims had to await years for 
implementation by the state.92 Despite the promise of restoration, reparations 
were limited in scope to those victims who testified before the TRC, falling within 
its definition of gross violations of human rights, and by the subsequent partial 
implementation by the South African government. 
30. Expectations can widely vary amongst victims from confronting those 
responsible, finding the truth or location of the remains of a loved one, obtaining 
acknowledgement and reparation or an apology, or to contribute to healing 
and reconciliation of the country.93 In terms of justice and reparations, victim 
engagement was a way to highlight their interests in economic rehabilitation, 
such as education or skills development, as a means to assert their dignity after 
living under the repression of apartheid.94 Counselling was not provided by the 
TRC, but through other groups, such as Khulumani Support Group; however, such 
groups did not have the capacity to provide services to thousands of victims and 
other participants.95 The South African experience offered innovation in exploring 
truth and offender-victim engagement, but without supportive services, it failed 
to inform victims of what they could expect from an early stage, provided a narrow 
focus on specific gross violations and the partial and delayed reparations offered 
missed an opportunity to ensure a more joined up response to dealing with the 
past. Moreover, having an acknowledgement ceremony or truthful revealing 
account by a perpetrator may not by itself contribute to healing. This may reflect 
a broader trend of expectation outstripping the capacity of any one commission, 
requiring modesty on what such mechanisms can do in the face of mass atrocities. 
Other contexts
31. The use of restorative justice or traditional rituals in addressing conflict-related 
crimes is apparent in a number of other contexts.96 In Northern Uganda, traditional 
Acholi practices were incorporated into the Juba peace agreement between the 
Lord’s Resistance Army and the Ugandan government, alongside the creation of a 
war crimes division to provide an ‘overarching justice framework’ through formal 
and ‘complementary alternative justice mechanisms’.97 Despite the final peace 
agreement not being formally signed by the LRA, a range of traditional ceremonies 
are engaged with to facilitate community cohesion and mediate conflicts. Other 
measures which have been enacted, such as the 2000 Amnesty Act that provides 
a blanket amnesty to anyone in rebellion, has no conditions for an individual to 
contribute to truth, accountability or reparations.98 In the absence of a joined up 
comprehensive process to deal with the past, traditional ceremonies, although 
92 SATRC, Vol. 6, p84.
93 Sizwe Phakathi and van der Merwe n.88, p122.
94 Ibid., p126.
95 Ibid., p127.
96 Such as Kenya, Somalia, Mozambique, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Angola. 
See Louise Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions: Bridging the Peace and 
Justice Divide, Hart 2008, p187.
97 Clause 5.3 of the Agreement and clause 19 of the Annexure.
98 The blanket nature of the amnesty has been reinterpreted by the Ugandan Supreme Court in 2015.20 21
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truth commission noted that the grassroots CRP had the effect of deepening and 
broadening the reach of efforts to tackle impunity, by reaching across the country, 
at the local level, incentivising perpetrators to acknowledge their crimes, take 
responsibility for their wrongdoing and make efforts to remedy the harm caused 
to victims and their community.115 Yet for those perpetrators most responsible for 
serious crimes, including sexual violence, they were able to slip across the border 
to West Timor, escaping justice before the CRU and CRP.116 
115 CAVR Part 9, paras.143-144.
116 Braithwaite n.104, p212.
117 Such as the ECCC, EAC, STL and Kosovo. Art. 17 STL Statute; Art. 22 Law on Specialist Chambers and 
Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, 3 August 2015.
118 See Claude Jorda and Jérôme de Hemptinne, The Status and Role of the Victim, in A. Cassese, P. 
Gaeta, and R.W. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary 
(Oxford University Press 2002) 1387–1419; and Sergey Vasiliev, Article 68(3) and Personal Interests of 
Victims in the Emerging Practice of the ICC, in C. Stahn and G. Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of 
the International Criminal Court (Brill 2009) 635–690; and Moffett n.30, 86-142.
119 See Articles 52 and 706–742 of the French Criminal Code; Articles 85–91, 371–375, and 418–426 of the 
French Code of Criminal Procedure.
120 Sections 397 and 403–406 of the Strafprozessordnung of the German Criminal Code.
121 Hossein Esmaeili and Jeremy Gans, Islamic Law across Cultural Borders: The Involvement of Western 
Nationals in Saudi Murder Trials, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 28 (1999–2000) 
145–174, p149–150.
122 In the United Kingdom, Section 6 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 governs private 
prosecutions. See Jonathan Doak, Victims’ Rights, Human Rights and Criminal Justice: Reconceiving 
the Role of Third Parties (Hart 2008), p124-130.
Victim Participation 
36. The participation of victims in proceedings involving international crimes has 
been growing since its inclusion in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court.117 This inclusion within the Rome Statute reflects the frustrations of civil 
society and victims with previous tribunals’ neglect of victims’ interests.118 It also 
coincided with domestic developments, which increasingly included victims in civil 
law countries, such as partie civile or Nebenklage. The partie civile procedure in 
French-speaking countries enables victims to initiate prosecutions, participate as a 
party in proceedings, and bring ancillary claims for damages on the prosecution’s 
case.119 In the German-speaking countries the Nebenklage procedure permits 
victims to appoint their own counsel to act as a private accessory prosecutor, who 
can inspect files, present their case in a trial, question witnesses, object to judges’ 
orders and questions, apply for evidence to be taken, and make statements.120 In 
addition, victims in Islamic law countries have the right to prosecute privately an 
offender and to claim compensation.121 In some common law countries, victims can 
also bring private prosecutions and make impact statements during sentencing.122 
37. Involving victims in decision-making processes can help them to express their 
voice on issues that affect them, providing them with some ownership based on 
an agreement, which would help restore the balance between the spiritual and 
the physical world, disturbed by the wrongdoing.104 
34. The ceremony itself drew from traditional rituals of lisan and was opened by a 
prayer from a Catholic priest in the local language.105 The offender would make a 
statement on their responsible acts, with questions from the CRP panel, victims 
and community members. This often did not result in interrogation of their 
accomplices, instead victims’ questions concentrated on ‘idiosyncratic issues’ 
important to them.106 Where an agreement was reached, it would be read out 
and signed by all the participants, whereby the perpetrator would apologise 
to the community, pay a fine to the victim or give symbolic reparations (such 
as jewellery or tais (textiles)), or community service (property reconstruction, 
cleaning or infrastructure repair) and renounce all forms of violence for political 
ends. Thereafter they would be welcomed back and immunity granted from civil 
and criminal liability.107 These ‘acts of reconciliation’ were not intended to ‘burden’ 
perpetrators with obligations beyond their means.108 For those who broke their 
commitments to the victim or community, they faced up to a year in prison or a 
US $3,000 fine.109 Where an agreement was not reached it would be referred to the 
police. Most of the perpetrators before the CRP were low-level individuals, who had 
mostly committed theft.
35. For victims, the CRP enabled them to confront their perpetrator and ascertain 
some form of truth, or at least it distilled some information from the rumour, 
exaggeration and lies during the chaos of the war.110 Victims’ capacity and ability 
to engage in the process was limited, as they were not supported by the CAVR or 
briefed on what to expect. Victims also had less time to prepare than the perpetrator 
who made the request, further compounding their frustrations. Many victims were 
unable to participate in hearings due to sickness, lack of transportation or being 
unable to afford taking a day off work in the fields; this had a gender dimension 
for women who were often excluded by male family members or had to look after 
children.111 Perpetrators only provided token reparations, and the state has yet to 
pass the 2012 reparation bill. In addition, victims reported feeling pressurised by 
the community to reconcile with the offender.112 Victims participation in the CRP 
did not automatically mean that they wanted to reconcile with a perpetrator, some 
felt it was a personal choice,113 others felt that there was an imbalance in favour of 
the interests of the perpetrator to ensure fast reconciliation.114 That said, the CAVR 
104 John Braithwaite, Hilary Charlesworth and Adérito Soares, Networked Governance of Freedom and 
Tyranny: Peace in Timor-Leste, Australian National University E-Press (2012), p206.
105 Braithwaite ibid., p205-206.
106 Nancy Combs, Guilty Pleas in International Criminal Law: Constructing a Restorative Justice 
Approach, Stanford University Press (2006), p221.
107 Elizabeth Stanley, Torture, Truth and Justice: The Case of Timor-Leste, Routeldge 2008, p113-114; and 
CAVR Part 9, paras. 80-83.
108 CAVR Part 9, para.80.
109 Stanley n.107, p114.
110 CAVR Part 9, para.122.
111 Stanley n.107, p116-117.
112 CAVR Part 9, para.132.
113 Piers Pigou, Crying Without Tears: In Pursuit of Justice and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste: Community 
Perspectives and Expectations, ICTJ (2003), p43.
114 Stanley n.107, p120-121.22 23
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husband and stigmatised by her community to remain silent in case they were 
attacked again by the military.
39. For victims expressing their views and concerns, while recognising their value, 
agency and dignity, is not a one-way process. The value in voicing concerns is 
only shared by participants where a decision maker, such as a judge, considers 
their views in decision-making, in particular how they directly communicate 
and explain their decisions.130 Clarity and certainty of the role of victims and how 
they are being heard and its impact on decision-making, can help to mitigate 
frustration at negative outcomes, as a victim making a statement for sentencing 
can help to affirm their dignity and self-worth.131 There can still be value expressive 
benefits where a victim’s input has no effect on the outcome, but participants 
appreciate being given the opportunity to voice their concerns. It is very important 
in restorative and procedural justice approaches to criminal justice to inform 
victims of what they can expect from the process, wherein modesty of what is 
deliverable with the framework of the institution is key. This can be greatly assisted 
by engaging victims through a process that is clear and certain in how, why and 
when they will be engaged with. For instance the victim lawyers in the Kenyatta 
case at the ICC, while often hundreds of miles away and victims faced security 
issues, kept victims informed of proceedings through phone calls every 6-8 weeks 
as well as to communicate their views and concerns. Civil society actors can 
play a key role in support these process, from not only carrying out community 
sensitisation, but also filling out forms, provide legal advice or covering costs for 
victims to attend hearings or workshops.
40. An example of this process has been developing in Northern Ireland with victim 
impact statements.132 These statements are often letters written by victims on how 
the harm of the crime has affected them or expert reports from psychiatrists. Similar 
practice is now well established in the United States, New Zealand and Australia, 
and more recently the UK.133 For some victims writing these reports can offer some 
catharsis, by putting down their harm on paper, but by itself it is not enough to 
amount to closure. The effectiveness of a victim statement depends on the skill 
of the statement taker and how articulate a victim is in explaining the impact of 
the harm on them. However these statements have become quite legalised with 
intermediaries, mainly family liaison officers in the police and the prosecution, 
ensuring that victims do not implicate the defendant in other crimes not subject 
to the case. At the moment in Northern Ireland, the statement is just written but 
in the rest of Ireland and the UK victims can orally read out their statement to the 
court if they choose, this does not undermine the rights of the defendant as it is 
usually after the judge has decided the sentence, but before it is pronounced. In 
some cases of a single person being killed, a number of family members may want 
130 Tom R. Tyler, Conditions Leading to Value-Expressive Effects in Judgments of Procedural Justice: A 
Test of Four Models, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52(2) (1987) 333-344, p342.
131 Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, Crime and Justice 30 
(2003) 283– 357, p350.
132 See Luke Moffett, Victim personal statements in managing victims’ voices in sentencing in Northern 
Ireland: taking a more procedural justice approach, Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 68(4) (2017) 555-
576.
133 See K. Kennard, The Victim’s Veto: A Way to Increase Victim Impact on Criminal Case Dispositions, 
California Law Review 77(2) (1989) 417-453; and J. Roberts J., and M. Manikis, Victim Personal 
Statements A Review of Empirical Research, Report for the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses 
in England and Wales (2011).
feelings of respect, in that their voices are valued.123 Social psychologists have long 
conducted research on participants on the fairness in decision-making and judicial 
process. Their research indicates that participants who were able to exercise their 
voice in procedures which affected them and influenced decision-making had 
greater satisfaction than those who were unable to express their views.124 Tyler 
clarifies these in respect to consistency, representation and accuracy; consistency 
is based on comparison to prior decision, representation on the extent to which 
participants can make their case, and accuracy in how decisions are reached 
taking into account participants’ input.125 The benefits for victims in participating 
in proceedings can vary depending on whether they are directly presenting their 
views and concerns before a court, appearing as a witness, or more indirectly by 
being named in proceedings on their harm or represented through their lawyers. 
For those directly participating in proceedings, it can validate their experience of 
victimisation and make them feel empowered through the law. However, it can also 
be stressful and psychologically strain victims where proceedings are long.126 For 
those who participate through their lawyers or see their perpetrator convicted, it 
can acknowledge their suffering, provide some physical protection by imprisoning 
responsible perpetrators and reveal some truth as to the atrocities committed 
against them.127 For some victims participating directly can be a mixed experience, 
as one victim interviewed by the authors in Guatemala, who participated in the 
trial of former Guatemalan president Rios Montt, stated, 
“[When I went to] give my testimony and now I was very happy because Rios 
Montt was going to jail. Finally – justice. I was happy. I told him in front of him 
‘you are the one who killed my kids. I am happy I already met you and I can 
see your face because I don’t know you, I didn’t have any problems with you, 
whenever you came to our village, you burned everything, you killed everyone. 
I don’t owe you anything’, I told him. I told him that ‘I’m happy that I’m here, 
that I met you and you’re going to pay for this and tell me, what did you do with 
my kids?’ and he answered ‘You’re lying’ and I said ‘No, I don’t lie, I’m saying the 
truth, they died and you killed them, because I’m a survivor, I saw what you did, 
I saw what the whole military did, I remember what happened because after 
that, life was very sad…”128 
38. Although only the perspective of one individual, it reflects the mixed emotions 
of participating in person in criminal proceedings. Moreover, it illustrates the 
confrontational nature of criminal proceedings, where victim and accused 
are disputing their own versions and justifications of the past. In the end Rios 
Montt died before his second trial of genocide could be completed. Such visible 
participation can also result in victims facing intimidation and social ostracism.129 
Indeed the victim quoted above was subjected to domestic violence from her 
123 See Jo-Anne Wemmers, Victims in the Criminal Justice System (Kugler 1996).
124 John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, California Law Review 66 (1977) 541-566.
125 Tom R. Tyler, What is procedural justice? Criteria used by citizens to assess the fairness of legal 
procedures, Law and Society Review 22(1) (1988) 103-135, p107.
126 O’Connell, n.3, p301.
127 Ibid., p300.
128 Interview with project team, G20, Ixil region, Guatemala, May 2018.
129 O’Connell, n.3 p301.24 25
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being just anonymous or a statistic. In Northern Ireland, judges failed to capitalise 
on the victim statements by not acknowledging them in their sentencing remarks 
or judgements, which disincentivised victims from making them and frustrated 
third parties, such as the police and civil society groups, from helping victims or 
promoting them.
43. Courts can also benefit from the insights of victims. Victim participation can 
help to humanise and make their suffering more visible. Victims as witnesses of 
violence can contribute to truth recovery through a more comprehensive account 
of what happened by involving those primarily affected.138 Victim participation 
can also encourage greater levels of transparency and accountability making the 
international criminal justice more legitimate in the eyes most affected.139 That 
said, victims while key stakeholders in justice processes, are one of a number 
of interested parties in criminal proceedings whose rights and views have to 
balanced.140 Victims do not speak with one voice, they can contradict and compete 
with each other. Their needs and interests can change over time. Those who are 
seriously injured or disabled, mentally impaired, elderly or very young may not be 
able to speak on their own behalf or be able to engage as much as they would like 
in processes. In such cases, provisions should be put in place to ensure they are kept 
informed and that their views and concerns are effectively presented to decision 
makers, such as allowing them to designate a representative or legal guardian.
44. It is worth outlining how the process of victim participation works for international 
crimes. While a formal legal process, distinct from restorative proceedings above, 
it does offer lessons on a lawyer dominated process. The rest of this section begins 
by outlining the application process at the International Criminal Court, before 
turning to discuss the legal representation of victims and challenges of ensuring 
the accuracy of their voice in legal proceedings. The following sub-section 
examines the modalities of victim participation at the ICC in how their views and 
concerns are represented and practice before the Court. Given that there are tens 
of thousands of victims before the ICC, there is increasing collectivisation of their 
participation through legal representatives, which is explored in the subsequent 
section and contrasted with the few occasions victims have participated in person. 
The final sub-section highlights the rules and practice of victim protection and 
psychological support before international criminal justice bodies.
Application Process 
45. At the International Criminal Court (ICC) the Victims Participation and Reparation 
Section (VPRS) in the Court’s Registry facilitates access for victims by receiving, 
collecting and processing their application into a secure database. Application 
forms are reviewed on whether or not they provide sufficient information on the 
incident and personal details of the individual applicant, which the VPRS will try to 
138 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2127, paras 28–29.
139 Jonathan Doak, Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials: Prospects for Participation, Journal of Law and 
Society 32(2) (2005) 294-316, p312; and Tatjana Hornle, Distribution of Punishment: The role of a victim’s 
perspective, Buffalo Criminal Law Review 3 (1999-2000) 175-209, p318.
140 Ian Edwards, The evidential quality of victim personal statements and family impact statements, 
International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 13(4) (2009), 293-320, p299.
to submit an impact statement. A collective form for families has been introduced,134 
but this has not been used much and uptake of the victim personal statement 
(VPS) in general is quite low. That said while there may be multiple statements for 
each victim, it does not detract from the pluralistic harm experience by families in 
the aftermath of loss that a judge can express in their sentencing remarks. Yet if 
victims’ voices are collectivised by taking away the uniqueness of a victim’s story, 
emphasizing different aspects, or representing victims’ harm in generic terms, it 
may understate impact of the crime or undermine the communicative function of 
the victim’s statement.
41. In practice in Northern Ireland and the UK, the VPS is framed under headings to 
give it some shape and ensure it is more helpful to judges, and also to minimise 
it being a rant at the defendant. This very much reflects the use of the VPS as a 
statement to judge on the consequences of the harm of a victim, rather than a 
direct engagement with a defendant. There are disclosure issues – some victims 
do not want the defendant to know the extent of their suffering, in particular 
where they live in the same community or family, for fear it could be used against 
them in emotional abuse or future attacks, which has the effect of silencing or 
disincenitivising victims from coming forward or detailing all their suffering. Cross-
examination on such statements can have a similar effect. At the same time there 
needs to be some control or verification of the extent of harm, as some victims 
made statements that were not true, can exaggerate their harm (or self-diagnose), 
may be quite volatile in the severity of the punishment of the defendant or may 
risk prejudicing the judge. For example one victim, whose son had been murdered, 
said he had been beaten to a pulp in her VPS, but this was not true.
42. The VPS can also send moral messages about the defendant’s responsibility in a 
crime as a way of ‘shaming’ them by laying bare the harmful consequences the 
crime has had on the victim and their next of kin. This is not to suggest that VPS 
can always provide a sort of restorative justice forum in criminal sentencing, but 
it can help to return some of the victim’s agency and identity undermined by the 
defendant during the crime by confronting them and the court with the harmful 
effects.135 The VPS can have therapeutic benefits through the victim’s harm being 
publicly acknowledged. This reflects both the practice of emoting (i.e. publicly 
sharing their emotions) and the role of procedural justice in how victims’ voices 
are accurately respected and considered by the criminal justice system. Lens et 
al suggest that there are no direct therapeutic effects from making a VPS, but 
feelings of anxiety can decrease where the victims feel satisfied by how they were 
respected and treated.136 The VPS can offer a way of acknowledging the victim’s 
suffering through their inclusion in the sentencing process. Judges reading out 
the VPS alongside their sentencing remarks can publicly acknowledge the victim’s 
experience, making their suffering official and giving a valued place for their 
voice.137 Acknowledgment can help to give the victim a human face, rather than 
134 Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2015, s.33(2).
135 See Jonathan Doak, and Louise Taylor, Hearing the Voices of Victims and Offenders: The Role of 
Emotions in Criminal Sentencing, Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly (2013) 64(1), 25–46.
136 K. Lens, A. Pemberton, K. Brans, J. Wageningen, S. Bogaerts and E. Lahlah, Delivering a Victim Impact 
Statement: Emotionally Effective or Counterproductive?, European Journal of Criminology (2015) 12(1), 
17– 34, p30–31.
137 Jonathan Doak, Ralph Henham and Barry Mitchell, Victims and the Sentencing Process: Developing 
Participatory Rights? Legal Studies 29(4) (2009) 651-677, p668.26 27
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common legal representative and would not have to go through the application 
procedures under Rule 89 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Instead these 
collective victims would be registered and the VPRS in conjunction with the legal 
representative would prepare and submit reports on the victim population.148 This 
collective approach aims to mitigate the cost and time spent on the application 
procedure, while protecting the rights of the defendant from undue delay and 
allowing victims to present their interests. Furthermore, the Chamber stated that, 
‘registration does not imply any judicial determination of the status of the 
individual victims. Moreover, when assessing any submissions or requests 
made by the common legal representative, the Chamber will be mindful of 
the fact that the represented victims have not been subject to an individual 
assessment by the Court.’149 
49. As a result of the number of victims applying before international criminal 
justice bodies, at the outset information require from them is reduced in order to 
facilitate administration; for victims who want to participate in proceedings further 
information and verification is required. For reparation proceedings the application 
is only useful for mapping out general sentiments to assist the Registry to have a 
certain idea of victims’ views, who will have to go through another application or 
at least verification with the Chamber and Trust Fund for Victims if proceedings do 
arise on conviction of the accused.
50. Intermediaries have played an important part in extending the reach and capacity 
of the ICC in engaging with victims, especially in areas of ongoing conflict. These 
civil society actors, community leaders or international NGOs, usually have a pre-
existing relationship of trust with victimised communities, speak their language 
and understand the local context, enabling them to explain developments and 
procedures of a court into words that victims can understand.150 However, such 
engagement can be time and resource intensive for local civil society actors, 
especially when the ICC is usually unwilling to pay them for their time over concerns 
of impartiality. Intermediaries can become frustrated at the Court neglecting their 
input into proceedings as they do not have legal standing, or they can become 
frustrated at delays or lack of acknowledgment of their contribution in organising 
victims and collecting applications.151 None of the international criminal justice 
bodies that allow victim participation provide legal aid to allow victims to complete 
their applications. Some lawyers work pro-bono, but vast majority of victims are 
reliant on intermediaries to assist them in providing relevant information and 
evidence for their applications.152 Victims can also become fatigued in being 
mobilised and engaged by civil society and international actors, without seeing any 
substantive change to their situation, causing them to disengage. Intermediaries 
can also face intimidation and security threats, and may not be in the best position 
to explain messages from the Court or counsel to victims, particularly where it 
148 Ibid., paras 24 and 38.
149 Ibid., para 37.
150 Mariana Pena, The Role of Intermediaries and Third Parties in Victim Participation, in K. Tibori-Szabó 
and M. Hirst (eds.), Victim Participation in International Criminal Justice, Asser (2017), 81-109, p95.
151 See Rachel Killean and Luke Moffett, Victim Legal Representation before the ICC and ECCC, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 15(4) (2017), 713-740, p737.
152 Megan Hirst, Legal Representation of Participating Victims, in K. Tibori-Szabó and M. Hirst (eds.) 
Victim Participation in International Criminal Justice, Asser (2017), 111-169, p119.
verify this information and a prima facie analysis of the applications veracity.141 The 
Victims Support Section (VSS) in the ECCC performs a similar function of both the 
ICC’s Office of the Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV) and VPRS, in collecting and 
screening applications, as well as providing legal aid and advice to victims.142 There 
were proposals to merge the OPCV and VPRS into a Victims’ Unit at the ICC as part 
of the ReVision programme to make the administration more efficient, but this 
was strongly resisted by staff of the Court and has since been dropped.
46. Victims apply to participate at the ICC through an application form. Initially 
this was a 17 pages document, then reduced to 7, and is now only one double-
sided page. However, it is only in English, French and soon Sango (CAR II), so it 
has to be translated into the local languages of victims by intermediaries, i.e. 
local civil society organisations. The move to a one- page application is intended 
to expedite the application process, with one side collecting information on the 
victim’s personal details and connection to incidents/crimes, with the back page 
dedicated to collecting basic views on appropriate reparations if proceedings do 
arise. In contrast, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) 
has a standard five page application form available on the ECCC website in English, 
French and Khmer.143 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon has a 9 page application 
form, available on the Tribunal’s website in French, Arabic and English.144 
47. In 2012 the ICC collectivised its application process in the Gbagbo case, victims 
could collectively apply through a group application form with participation to be 
facilitated by an individual victim representative. In turn they would be represented 
by a single Victim Legal Representative (VLR).145 The ICC Registry has noted that a 
flexible approach is need as, 
‘it is not always be feasible or advisable to bring together groups of victims 
physically for the purposes of an application process. In some cases the security 
context may not be conducive for such meetings, in others not all victims feel 
comfortable speaking in front of groups, whether due to the nature of the 
harm suffered (such as victims of sexual violence) or generally due to tensions 
within a community, fear of stigmatisation, or other reason.’146 
48. In the subsequent Muthaura and Kenyatta case, Trial Chamber V took a tiered 
approach to victim applications, in order to ensure victims’ views and concerns could 
be heard before the commencement of the trial.147 The Chamber distinguished 
between individual and collective applicants, individuals could still appear before 
the Court and have their applications individually assessed. The majority of 
victims under the collective participation application would be represented by a 
141 Mélissa Fardel and Nuria Vehils Olarra, The Application Process: Procedure and Players, in K. Tibori-
Szabó and M. Hirst (eds.), Victim Participation in International Criminal Justice, Asser (2017), 11-43, 
p13-14.
142 Rule 12, ECCC Internal Rules.
143 https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/forms
144 https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-stl/5885-application-for-victims-to-participate-in-the-proceedings
145 Prosecutor v Gbagbo, Organization of the Participation of Victims, ICC-02/11-01/11-29- Red, 6 February 
2012.
146 Registry Observations in Compliance with the Decision, ICC-01/04-02/06-54-Conf, 6 May 2013, para.8.
147 Prosecutor v Muthaura and Kenyatta, Decision on Victims’ Representation and Participation, ICC-
01/09-02/11-498, 3 October 2012.28 29
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53. Decisions on participation are determined on a case-by-case basis, leading to 
diversity in the practice of appointing legal representatives. The case of Thomas 
Lubanga saw seven VLRs representing 129 victims, whereas in later cases there 
were fewer counsel - only two VLRS (assisted by field assistants) representing 5229 
victims, though from January 2014 victims in the Bemba case were represented by 
one VLR following the death of the other appointed representative. The Registry of 
the Court also has an independent Office of the Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV), 
which is responsible for providing legal research and advice to participating 
victims, as well as appearing before the Chambers on specific issues, or to act as 
legal counsel for unrepresented victims.162 The Court’s Rules assert that victims 
‘shall be free to choose a legal representative’,163 but the Chamber can request that 
victims or groups of victims choose a common legal representative(s).164 If victims 
are unable amongst themselves to choose a common legal representative(s) 
within the time limit set by the Chamber, then the judges can decide or ask the 
Registry to choose one or more legal representatives, which have increasingly 
been the OPCV. Given that cases before the ICC involve a few thousand victims, 
victims’ legal agency is limited to collective and indirect participation through a 
common legal representative.
54. In the Gbagbo case, the Court appointed the OPCV as the principal common legal 
representative, as well as a team member based in the field and a case manager.165 
The Court held that this approach was the ‘most appropriate and cost effective 
system at this stage as it would enable to combine understanding of the local 
context with experience and expertise of proceedings before the Court, without 
causing undue delay in the case at hand’.166 A similar approach has been adopted 
in the Ntaganda case where two counsel from the OPCV have been appointed 
to represent two victim groups, supported by two or more legal assistants.167 This 
is despite 213 victims signing power of attorney to six lawyers.168 This organisation 
of legal representation through two lawyers of the OPCV was to ensure victims 
could be effectively legally represented at an early stage.169 Such developments 
can signal an apparent preference for trial practicality over respecting victims’ 
legal agency, to ensure that the experience of lengthy interlocutory appeals and 
administration of victim participation do not delay trial proceedings.
55. The ICC has recognised the need for lawyers appointed for victims to understand 
the local context or be from the same country so as to promote effective and 
meaningful common representation. They are appointed on criteria that lend 
themselves to being more associated or empathetic to victims by sharing with 
them‘(i) the language spoken by victims [and the legal representative], (ii) links 
162 Regulations 80 and 81, ICC Regulations.
163 Rule 90(1) RPE.
164 Rule 90(2) RPE.
165 Gbagbo, Decision on Victims’ Participation and Victims’ Common Legal Representation at the 
Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in the Related Proceedings, (ICC-02/11-01/11-13804-06-2012), Pre-
Trial Chamber I, 4 June 2012, para.35.
166 Ibid.
167 Ntaganda Decision Concerning the Organisation of Common Legal Representation of Victims, (ICC-
01/04-0,2/06-160), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 2 December 2013, para 10, 23.
168 Ibid. para.11.
169 Ntaganda, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision Concerning the Organisation of Common Legal 
Representation of Victims, ICC-01/04-02/06-160, 2 December 2013, paras.20–21.
involves rejection or collapse in a case.153 Only the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(STL) provides for the possibility of a temporary victims’ legal representative to 
represent victim’s views in specific proceedings, such as appealing decisions on 
the rejection of a victim’s application.154 
Representation and Voice
51. Legal representation can allow victims’ interests to be more effectively conveyed 
by a lawyer who understands legal procedure and norms.155 Legal representatives 
can act as information conduits between victims and legal processes, translating 
their interests into legal submissions, procedures and appeals, removing the 
burden and stress of victims participating themselves.156 There is a danger that 
in relying on lawyers to present victims’ interests their views become simplified, 
filtered, reinterpreted or compromised to reflect the diverging views among the 
victim group, inhibiting victims’ voice and agency.157 The use of legalese158 can 
inhibit victims from becoming active participants in proceedings. In addition, 
victims who are able to participate may not be representative of all victims or 
their inclusion may have lead to the exclusion or marginalisation of other voices. 
Justice demands can be driven by ‘urban elites and high-profile victims, who have 
a strong moral voice and an ability to clearly articulate demands.’159 The ICC in the 
Cote d’Ivoire cases had to request the Registry to reengage affected communities, 
as participation was dominated by males and certain and ethnic groups, with very 
few participants who had been the victims of sexual violence, including victims 
of rape.160 
52. At the ICC, victim participation is mostly provided through Article 68(3), which 
enables victims to provide their views and concerns where their personal interests 
are affected. Such ‘views and concerns’ are usually presented by the legal 
representatives of the victims (VLRs) ‘where the Court considers it appropriate’. 
The Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) distinguish this further by 
only entitling VLRs to attend and participate in proceedings, thereby giving the 
representatives ‘enhanced’ procedural rights, rather than the victims themselves.161 
This is a largely pragmatic development; given the large numbers of victims that 
would be eligible to participate in a case, allowing each individual to personally 
appear before the Court would be unworkable. 
153 Pena n.150, p96.
154 STL Directive on Victims’ Legal Representation, Article 18(A).
155 See Killean and Moffett n.151, p716.
156 Kieran McEvoy and Kirsten McConnachie, Victims and Transitional Justice: Voice, Agency and Blame’, 
Social and Legal Studies 22 (2013) 489-513.
157 Killean and Moffett n.151, p717; McEvoy and McConnachie ibid., p495.
158 The technical and formal use of legal language.
159 Hugo van der Merwe, Reparations through Different Lenses: The Culture, Rights and Politics of 
Healing and Empowerment after Mass Atrocities, in J. Wemmers (ed.), Reparation for Victims of 
Crimes against Humanity, (Routledge, 2014) 200, p201.
160 Situation in Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, ICC-02/11-14, 15 November 2011, para.211.
161 Rule 91(2) RPE. Elisabeth Baumgartner, Aspects of Victim Participation in the Proceedings of the 
International Criminal Court, International Review of the Red Cross (2008) 90(870) 409, p430.30 31
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evidence through three participation modalities of: (1) submitting evidence; (2) 
asking questions; and (3) calling witnesses. These modalities do not appear in the 
Statute, RPE, or Regulations, but are based on Article 69(3) of the Rome Statute, 
which enables the Court to request all relevant ‘evidence that it considers necessary 
for the determination of the truth’. This indicates that victims’ role is to aid the 
Court in the clarification of facts rather than determination of the responsibility 
of the accused. Nevertheless, the Court has held in the Kenyan cases that the 
defendant has to be present for victims’ questions and statements, emphasising 
that defendants’ attendance during victims’ presentation of evidence requires the 
cooperation of the accused to make it meaningful, suggesting a more restorative 
function of victim participation beyond clarifying the truth.179 
59. On the first modality on submitting evidence, the Court has recognised that VLRs 
can submit incriminating evidence on the defendant’s guilt as long as it satisfies 
three admissibility criteria, namely (1) relevant material, (2) probative value, and 
(3) probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.180 Allowing VLRs to submit 
evidence can present an opportunity to highlight facts that the prosecution or 
the defence have overlooked or neglected. 181However, on the two occasions 
where evidence was submitted by the VLRs, the judges rejected their submissions 
as they repeated evidence already before the Court or lacked probative value.182 
Submitting evidence has so far not engendered a conflict between the rights of 
the victims and the defendant, but the Court retains very strict control of the ability 
VLRs to do so. 
60. The other two modalities of questioning and calling witnesses have been more 
contentious and required a more delicate balancing of rights by the Court. With 
regards to VLRs questioning witnesses, the Court has established that in order to 
achieve a balance between the rights of the victims and the defendant, a number 
of criteria must be adhered to: questions must be neutral in nature (i.e. they must 
not be a cross-examination or ‘combative’); relevant to victims’ personal interests; 
and not be leading or closed questions.183 The Court has emphasised that VLRs 
are not auxiliary prosecutors to prove the guilt or innocence of the accused as in 
civil law countries, but rather assistants to help the judges determine the truth, 
therefore having a more neutral role.184 
179 See Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for 
Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, ICC-01/09-01/11-777, 18 June 2013.
180 Rule 91(3)(a); Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, paras 108–109; Lubanga, ICC-01/04- 01/06-1432, para.104; 
Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2135, paras.21–22; Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788, paras.81–85; 
Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-807-Corr, paras.30–32.
181 Katanga and Chui, Directions for the Conduct of the Proceedings and Testimony in Accordance with 
Rule 140, ICC-01/04-01/07-1665, 20 November 2009, para.82; and Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-
1788, paras.102–103.
182 See Lubanga, Decision on the Request by the Legal Representative of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06, 
a/0003/06, a/0049/06, a/0007/08, a/0149/08, a/0155/07, a/0156/07, a/0404/08, a/0405/08, a/0406/08, 
a/0407/08, a/0409/08, a0149/07, and a/0162/07 for Admission of the Final Report of the Panel of 
Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo as Evidence, ICC-01/04-01/06-2135, 22 September 2009; Katanga and Chui, 
Décision relative à trois requêtes tendant à la production d’éléments de preuve supplémentaires, ICC-
01/04-01/07-3217-Conf, ICC-01/04-01/07-3217-Red, 4 January 2012.
183 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2127, paras 28–30; Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-1665, paras 82 and 
90–91; Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788, paras 72–75; Bemba, ICC- 01/05-01/08-807-Corr, paras 
30–32; Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-474, para. 135.
184 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2127, paras 28–29.
between them provided by time, place and circumstances, (iii) the specific crimes 
of which they allege to be victims, (iv) the views of victims, and (v) respect of local 
traditions’.170 The Registry’s criteria for legal representatives were set out in the 
Ntaganda case as being able to ‘also demonstrate abilities to communicate easily 
and to establish a relationship of trust with victims’.171 
56. In representing victims, the judges in a Chamber have oversight in ensuring VLRs 
consider the ‘views of the victims, and the need to respect local traditions and 
to assist specific groups of victims’.172 The Court has been careful to guarantee 
effective communication between VLRs and victims by requiring counsel to come 
from the victims’ area and to speak the same language.173 In addition, the Court 
has established support teams in The Hague and the field to ‘facilitate regular 
exchanges’ between victims and their VLRs.174 The ICC Registry also notifies victims, 
and conducts outreach to affected communities to inform them of the work and 
progress of the Court as well as their ability to participate in proceedings.175 The 
Court has acknowledged that without notification, victims’ rights would ‘remain 
little more than a theoretical exercise’.176 
Modalities of Victim Participation
57. For the Court, victims’ interests are affected in criminal proceedings against the 
accused owing to their rights to truth and justice.177 In order to present victims’ 
‘views and concerns’ the Court has established that VLRs can participate in 
proceedings through eight different modalities: to attend hearings; make oral 
motions, responses, and submissions; file written submissions; access evidence; ask 
questions; submit evidence; call witnesses; and to be notified.178 These modalities 
are discretionary owing to the protection of other interests before the Court, such 
as the rights of the defendant, meaning that victims do not automatically have the 
right to participate.
58. Trial Chamber III has allowed victims to present evidence on the responsibility of 
the accused. The general approach by Court has been to enable victims to present 
170 Bemba, Fifth Decision on Victims’ Issues Concerning Common Legal Representation of Victims, (ICC-
01/05-01/08-322), Pre-Trial Chamber III, 16 December 2008, para. 9.
171 Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06-141-Conf-Exp), para.19.
172 Regulation 79(2), ICC Regulations.
173 Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-1328, para. 15; Prosecutor v Bemba, Decision on Common Legal 
Representation of Victims for the Purpose of Trial, ICC-01/05-01/08- 1005, 10 November 2010, para.10.
174 Ibid., ICC-01/04-01/07-1328, para.17; ibid., ICC-01/05-01/08-1005, paras.24–27.
175 See ICC Outreach Reports 2007–2010, Public Information and Documentation Section, Outreach Unit.
176 Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-101, para.164.
177 Prosecutor v Katanga and Chui, Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights Attached to Procedural 
Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, ICC-01/04-01/07-474, 13 May 2008, paras.31–44; 
Prosecutor v Bemba, Fourth Decision on Victims’ Participation, ICC- 01/05-01/08-320, 12 December 
2008; Prosecutor v Abu Garda, Decision on the 34 Applications for Participation at the Pre-Trial Stage 
of the Case, ICC-02/05-02/09-121, 29 September 2009, para. 3; Prosecutor v Al Bashir, Decision on 
Applications a/0011/06 to a/0013/06, a/0015/06, and a/0443/09 to a/0450/09 for Participation in the 
Proceedings at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, ICC-02/05-01/09-62, 15 December 2009, paras 4–5.
178 Rules 91–92 and 144; see Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119; Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04- 01/07-474; 
Katanga and Chui, Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788, 22 
January 2010; Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-320.32 33
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Therefore the Court’s position that victims are to remain neutral is incorrect as they 
have an interest in determining the culpability of the accused. Instead, it is the 
judges who have to be neutral and balance the interests before them.
64. On the final evidential modality, the Court can call a witness or victim on the VLRs’ 
behalf on the condition that it will provide ‘important information’ and a ‘genuine 
contribution to the ascertainment of the truth’ which the other parties have not 
addressed.194 Trial Chamber II has also set out some criteria for evaluating the VLRs’ 
applications for victims to testify, namely: has the matter already been addressed 
by the prosecution so as to avoid repetitions; is it closely related to the charges; is 
it typical of the experiences of a larger group of victims or is the victim uniquely 
apt to give evidence; and will it bring to light new information to the Chamber?195 
Collective participation
65. Given the increasing number of victims participating in cases before the ICC, the 
Court has tried to streamline the application and representation of victims to 
minimize the impact such organisation and oversight has on proceedings. The 
Rules and jurisprudence of the ICC recognise that collectivizing victims’ voices can 
be detrimental to certain groups. The Court requires that as far as possible victims’ 
distinct interests should to be represented and any conflicts of interest to be 
avoided,196 in particular for victims of sexual or gender violence or violence against 
children.197 In the Bemba case, Trial Chamber III grouped victims geographically. 
This allowed victims of the same family and community to be represented together 
and facilitated contact between them and their legal representative.198 Women’s 
Initiatives for Gender Justice (WIGJ) warned the Court that organisation of victims 
into geographical groups, especially considering their numbers, may not protect 
victims’ distinct interests, such as those who suffered sexual violence.199 Instead, 
WIGJ proposed that victim representation should be organised on the nature of 
the crimes committed against them so as to reduce conflicting interests, but there 
can be remaining difficulties where victims are displaced. 
66. Where a conflict in interests arises between victims under one VLR, the Court can 
split the group and order the OPCV to represent the separate group of victims.200 
However, defining what constitutes a conflict of interest requiring separate 
representation remains difficult,201 but Trial Chamber IV indicates that a ‘conflict of 
interest may arise when the situation or the specificity of the victims is so different 
194 In accordance with Articles 64(4)(d) and 69(3); Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07- 1665, paras.45–48.
195 Ibid., para.30.
196 Prosecutor v Banda and Jerbo, Summary of Information relevant to the grouping of victims, ICC-
02/05-03/09-203-Anx2-Red, 25 August 2011, para.5.
197 Rule 90(4) RPE, as provided in Art. 68(1) ICCSt.
198 Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-1005, paras 18–20
199 Statement by the Women’s Initiatives at the opening of the Trial of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 22 
November 2010, p4.
200 Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-1328, para.16.
201 Hirst n.152, p.130.
61. In the Katanga and Chui case, victims’ legal representatives focused their 
questions on highlighting the suffering of victims, the context of victimisation, 
and the continuing hardship victims continue to face. 185Different Chambers of 
the Court have taken diverging approaches in balancing victims’ and defendants’ 
rights with regards to questions asked by VLRs. Trial Chamber II in the Katanga and 
Chui case has followed a more restrictive approach to questioning by limiting VLRs 
to factual points, so as to preserve the equality of arms between the prosecution 
and the defence.186 Trial Chamber II’s strict adherence to this approach can be seen 
where a VLR asked a witness on a meeting with Katanga whether he had any 
children as bodyguards with him. This was objected to by the defence as it was 
linked to the responsibility of the accused, and was instead modified into a more 
neutral question by the judges.187 Accordingly, the victims’ role was to voice their 
experiences and emotions on the harm they have suffered rather than presenting 
evidence on their interests in truth and justice.188 This is in contrast to Trial Chambers 
I and III which have allowed VLRs to question witnesses on factual and legal points 
that at times have been linked to the responsibility of the accused.189 Trial Chamber 
III in the Bemba case has taken this further, with the judges declaring that,
‘the interests of victims are not limited to the physical commission of the alleged 
crimes under consideration. Rather, their interests extend to the question of the 
person or persons who should be held liable for those crimes, whether physical 
perpetrators or others. In this respect, victims have a general interest in the 
proceedings and in their outcome. As such, they have an interest in making 
sure that all pertinent questions are put to witnesses.’190 
62. In the trial the VLR’s questions to a witness concentrated on the responsibility 
of the defendant by asking him about Bemba’s role in the chain of command 
and whether he was informed of the commission of crimes.191 This approach is 
consistent with a victim-orientated justice, which recognises victims’ interests in 
truth and justice, as well as their independent perspective from the prosecution.
63. The European Court of Human Rights has recognised that victims do not necessarily 
infringe the equality of arms as they ‘cannot be regarded as either the opponent – 
or for that matter necessarily the ally – of the prosecution, their roles and objectives 
being clearly different’.192 The ICC has also adopted such a position by stating that 
victim participation is supposed to provide victims with an independent voice, 
which is consistent with the intention of the drafters to ensure justice for victims.193 
185 For instance, Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-39-ENG, 21 November 2006, pp. 95 and 141.
186 Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-1665, paras 90–91; Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-2288, para. 112.
187 Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-141-Red-ENG, 14 May 2010, p.28–34.
188 Brianne McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal 
Proceedings, (Intersentia 2011), p300.
189 McGonigle n.188, p298-300.
190 Bemba, Decision (i) Ruling on Legal Representatives’ Applications to Question Witness 33 and (ii) 
Setting a Schedule for the Filing of Submissions in Relation to Future Applications to Question 
Witnesses, ICC-01/05-01/08-1729, 9 September 2011, para.15.
191 Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-T-160-Red-ENG, 13 September 2011.
192 Berger v France, App. no. 48221/99 (ECtHR, 21 May 2003), para.38.
193 Situation in DRC, ICC-01/04-101, para. 51; Prosecutor v Bemba, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the Supplemented Applications by the Legal Representatives of 
Victims to Present Evidence and the Views and Concerns of Victims, ICC-01/05-01/08-2138, ICC-01/05-
01/08-2140, 23 February 2012, para.25.34 35
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organised in to victim association or groups, which are then represented with 
other groups represented by a single lawyer.
68. Collective victim participation has become the norm in other international and 
hybrid criminal proceedings on international crimes. Probably the most developed 
of these other tribunals is the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC) which is mandated to address the crimes of the Khmer Rouge. Victim 
participation at the ECCC is somewhat different from the ICC.209 As a hybrid body, 
victim participation was established by judicial officers within the Court’s Internal 
Rules, rather than being in its statute. The ECCC Rules distinguish ‘victim’ as those 
natural persons or a legal entity that has suffered harm as a result of a crime within 
its jurisdiction, from a civil party as a victim whose application to participate has 
been declared admissible.210 Victim participation at the ECCC as a civil party draws 
from similar provisions for victims within Cambodia’s own criminal procedures. 
The ECCC requires the Court to ensure that victims are ‘kept informed and that 
their rights are respected throughout the proceedings’.211 The role of civil parties 
in the criminal proceedings includes ‘supporting the prosecution’ and seeking 
‘collective and moral reparations’.212 Civil parties can individually participate at the 
pre-trial stage, but beyond this at trial and later stages their participation can only 
be through a single, consolidated group ‘whose interests are represented by the 
Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers’.213 Civil parties can testify and provide statements of 
suffering, but they cannot represent themselves, nor directly address the Court 
other than through their representatives.214 
69. In the first case against Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, the civil parties were allowed 
to choose their own legal representative.215 Some 94 civil parties participated and 
were represented by four legal teams. A survey of some of the participants and 
victims found that only 14.6% of civil parties and 20.8% of civil party representatives 
attended live proceedings, with many of those not attending citing they did not 
know about the possibility of going in person to proceedings (39-42%) or not 
being invited or official asked (31.5-34%), with 16% unable to attend due to limited 
resources as money, transportation time and distance to the court.216 Yet in the 
second case, against Nuon Chea and Khieu Sampha, the Court amended the rules 
and organised participation through two Lead Co-Lawyers (one international and 
one Cambodian) who would coordinate with civil party representatives,217 due to 
over 4,000 civil parties wanting to participate in the case. This has limited civil 
parties’ rights to select and release their legal representatives, as well as their 
209 See Killean and Moffett n.151, p720-721.
210 Glossary, ECCC Internal Rules (Rev.8), 3 August 2011.
211 Rule 21(c), ECCC Internal Rules.
212 Rule 23(1), ECCC Internal Rules.
213 Rule 23(3), ECCC Internal Rules.
214 Decision of 1 July on the Civil Party’s Request to Address the Court in Person, Case 002 (002/ 19-09-
2007-ECCC/OCIJ), Pre-Trial Chamber, 3 July 2008.
215 ECCC Internal Rules, (Revision 1), 1 February 2008, Rule 23(7).
216 N. Kirchenbauer, M. Balthazard, L. Ky, P. Vinck, P. and N. Pham, Victims Participation before 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, (2013, Cambodian Human Rights and 
Development Association and Harvard Humanitarian Initiative), p35.
217 ECCC Internal Rules, (Revision 5), 5 February 2010, Rules 12ter, 23(5).
that their interests are irreconcilable.’202 In the Katanga and Chui, Trial Chamber 
II split the common legal representation between those victims who were former 
child soldiers and the larger group of those who had been attacked by the militias 
in Bogoro on 24 February 2003, due to the victims coming from different ethnic 
groups.203 In the Kenya cases, in which ethnicity was such a significant factor in 
the Post-Election Violence, the Registry considered at length whether this was 
a basis for separately representing victims. Ultimately it held that in each case 
the various ethnic groups among the victims did not have ‘clear and significant 
distinct interests’. Indeed, the Registry noted that intermediaries, lawyers and 
others working with victims had warned against separating victim groupings 
along ethnic lines, for fear that this would only serve to reinforce ethnic divisions.204 
In Banda and Jerbo that the fact that victims came from different countries and 
spoke different languages, was not enough to justify separate representation.205 
Yet in the Ongwen case victims are organised based on their choice of legal 
counsel between the OPCV (1,502 victims) and a team of external counsel (2,061 
victims), who cover the same crimes and locales.206 This reflects that lawyers can 
represent to an extent competing and diverse groups of victims, who will often 
not speak with one voice or completely agree. The role of the lawyer is to instead 
echo their views and concerns, and to ensure that each perspective is effective 
communicated and translated into legal actions within the Court.
67. There are advantages to collectivising victim representation and participation: it 
expedites proceedings, maximises the prospects of coherent strategy from victims, 
and is more financially efficient, being cheaper than constituting multiple teams of 
a smaller size.207 However there can also be dangers in collectivising participation, 
such as the dominance of certain victims’ views, the loss of individuals’ voices, 
the creation of further complexity, and if not properly regulated the causing of 
secondary victimisation.208 Introducing new levels of representation risks an 
additional person misrepresenting the interests of victims, such as victims being 
202 Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Trial Chamber 
IV, Decision on common legal representation, ICC-02/05-03/09-337, 25 May 2012, para.42.
203 Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-1328, para.12.
204 Prosecutor v Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Registry, Summary of information 
relevant to the grouping of victims, ICC-01/09-01/11-243-Anx2, 1 August 2011, paras 7–11; ICC, Prosecutor 
v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammad Hussein Ali, Registry, Summary 
of information relevant to the grouping of victims, ICC-01/09-02/11-214-Anx2, 5 August 2011, paras 8–12. 
ICC, Banda and Jerbo, Registry, Summary of Information Relevant to the Grouping of Victims, ICC-
02/05-03/09-203-Anx2-Red, 25 August 2011, para 8; ICC, Banda and Jerbo, Trial Chamber IV, Decision 
on common legal representation, ICC-02/05-03/09-337, 25 May 2012, para 34.
205 Banda and Jerbo, Registry, Summary of Information Relevant to the Grouping of Victims, ICC-02/05-
03/09-203-Anx2-Red, 25 August 2011, para.8; and Decision on common legal representation, ICC-02/05-
03/09-337, 25 May 2012, para.34.
206 A total of 4,107 victims are participating with the counsel for the remaining four victims to be decided 
at a later date. See Ongwen, Updated Consolidated List of Victims Admitted to Participate in the 
Proceedings, (ICC-02/04-01/15-652), 13 January 2017.
207 Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammad Hussein Ali, Proposal 
for the common legal representation of victims, ICC-01/09-01/11-243, 1 August 2011, para 9; Registry, 
Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Proposal for the common legal representation of 
victims, ICC-02/11-01/11-120, 16 May 2012, para.9; ICC, Katanga and Chui, Order on the organisation of 
common legal representation of victims, ICC-01/04-01/07-1328, 22 July 2009, para 10; STL, Prosecutor v. 
Ayyash et al., Pre-Trial Judge, Decision on Victims’ Participation in the Proceedings, STL11-01/T/PTJ, 8 
May 2012, para.120.
208 See Prosecutor v Gbagbo, Observations on the Practical Implications of the Registry’s Proposal on a 
partly Collective Application Form for Victims’ Participation, ICC-02/11-01/11-66, 19 March 2012.36 37
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victims were able to participate and the prosecutor did not engage with victims 
for an impact statement on sentencing.226 
72. Common across our engagement with legal representatives for victims in domestic, 
hybrid and international criminal proceedings has been the lack of funding which 
has inhibited their ability to engage regularly with victims. At the Ugandan ICD 
while victims could appoint their own lawyer where they could afford it, all are 
impoverished and dependent on legal aid and so were not consulted on which 
counsel they preferred as the two appointed in the Kwoyelo case are funded by 
the state.227 Even upon being appointed, these legal counsel have other cases, as 
money has been slow in being paid from the Registry of the ICD, meaning that one 
of the victim lawyers who lives a few miles away from the community only sees 
them every six months.228 Similar problems of sufficient legal aid was a problem for 
victims in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which noted 
that a limited budget and tariffs that were lower than normal, discouraged higher 
skilled lawyers from representing victims.229 
Participation in person
73. Some victims have participated in person at the ICC to present their personal 
views and concerns to the Court. In the Lubanga and the Katanga and Chui 
cases the Court required victims to testify under oath so that their testimony 
would be used as evidence, giving them the status of witnesses. These victims 
were allowed to discuss at length their victimisation, other crimes that occurred, 
and the responsibility of the accused.230 The Court has found victims personally 
voicing their views and concerns should ideally only be made through their legal 
representatives, in order to protect the defendant who can only cross-examine 
witnesses.231 In the Lubanga case, Trial Chamber I decided that the purpose of 
victims presenting their views and concerns was not part of the evidence, but to 
provide the judges with a contextual understanding of the facts before the Court.232 
The Court has used this discretion on the grounds that it is empowered to find and 
determine the truth.
74. In the Bemba case, Trial Chamber III allowed three victims to express their views and 
concerns through live video link, on the basis of their harm being representative of 
a larger group of victims before the Court.233 Despite opposition from the defence 
and the prosecution, the judges allowed these three victims to speak in their own 
226 Uganda v Kamoga Siraje & 13 Ors (Criminal Session Case No. HCT - 00 - ICD - CR - SC - No. 004 OF 
2015) [2017] UGHCICD 1 (21 August 2017).
227 Section 46, ICD Rules; and Bako, n. 224.
228 Interview UG15, July 2018, Gulu, Uganda.
229 TRC Final Report, Vol. V, p117.
230 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-225-RED, p. 31.
231 Article 67(1)(e); Prosecutor v Lubanga, Order Issuing Public Redacted Version of the ‘Decision on 
the Request by Victims a/0225/06, a/0229/06 and a/0270/07 to Express their Views and Concerns in 
Person and to Present Evidence during the Trial’, ICC- 01/04-01/06-2032-Anx, 9 July 2009, paras 25–26; 
Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07- 1788tENG, paras 86–89.
232 ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx, para.25.
233 Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-2138, paras 39–51; Victims a/0542/08, a/0394/08, and a/0511/08; see Bemba, 
Transcripts 25–26 July 2012, ICC-01/05-01/08-T-227- Red-ENG and ICC-01/05-01/08-T-228-Red-ENG.
proximity to counsel and the court, which has impacted upon their agency and 
inclusion in proceedings.218 
70. In other tribunals legal representation has been organised differently from the ICC 
and ECCC. At the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) victims are unable to arrange 
their own legal representation before the STL and must await the designation of 
a legal representative by the Registrar after being granted participation status. 
The Tribunal does not formally recognise any legal representation, which may be 
privately arranged by victims during the application stage.219 The Extraordinary 
African Chambers (EAC) were organised on the basis of civil law tradition and 
Senegalese law, whereby victims participated as civil parties. At the Extraordinary 
African Chambers in the Habré case, victims could form civil parties to participate 
or join together as a group represented by a joint legal representative. Some 4,500 
victims participated as civil parties in the Habré case, represented by three victim 
associations.220 The Kosovo Specialist Chambers only allows legal representation 
through a victims’ counsel provided through the Registry’s Victims Participation 
Office.221 At the Extraordinary African Chambers in the Habré case, victims could 
form civil parties to participate or join together as a group represented by a joint 
legal representative. The Chambers could offer the victims or a group of victims the 
choice of having one or more joint representatives, but if they are unable to select 
one or more within the allotted time, the Administrator of the EAC can appoint 
one or several representatives.222 The Kosovo Specialist Chambers only allows legal 
representation through a victims’ counsel provided through the Registry’s Victims 
Participation Office.223
71. While the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is focused exclusively on the 14 February 
2005 bombing that killed Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 21 others, there are over 70 
victims participating through three legal counsel, one international lead co-lawyer 
with international criminal law experience with two Lebanese counsel who have 
an existing relationship with the victims.224 In the International Crimes Division in 
Uganda, two victim legal representatives have been appointed to represent 98 
victims in the Kwoyelo case, with a similar arrangement for the Mukulu case.225 Yet 
in its first decision on the Kampala bombing against members of Al-Shabaab, no 
218 Killean and Moffett n.151, p721.
219 See STL Directive on Victims’ Legal Representation.
220 The Association of Victims of Crime and Political Repression (AVCRP); The Association of Victims 
of Crimes of the Habré regime (AVCRHH); and The Network of Human Rights in Chad (RADHT). 
See Christoph Sperfeldt The trial against Hissène Habré: networked justice and reparations at the 
Extraordinary African Chambers, The International Journal of Human Rights, 21(9) (2017), 1243-1260, 
p1248.
221 Article 22(5).
222 Article 14, EAC Statute
223 Article 22(5).
224 Appointed on the basis of include notably the views or preferences expressed by the participating 
victims, the nature and complexity of the case, the skills, experience and personal attributes of 
the legal representative, including language skills, previous experience in international criminal 
proceedings, and/or familiarity with Lebanon and/or Lebanese law, and any existing relationship 
between the victims who are to be represented and the legal representative.’ Designation of Victims’ 
Legal Representation, STL-11-01/PT/PTJ 16 May 2012, para.9; and Article 19(c), STL Directive on Victims’ 
Legal Representation.
225 Jane Patricia Bako, One Step Forward, One Step Back: The Fate of Victims Before the International 
Crimes Division of Uganda, International Justice Monitor, 27 June 2018.38 39
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Protection and Psychological support
76. The protection and support of victims appearing before international criminal 
justice bodies has been an institutional challenge, especially where there is 
ongoing insecurity or perpetrators remain at large or in power. That said a number 
of practices have emerged from these courts and tribunals that aim to minimise 
secondary victimisation of victims who engage with them. The ad hoc tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) were under an obligation 
to protect victims and witnesses, with specific measures for survivors of sexual 
violence.243 Both tribunals had Witness Support Sections for witnesses and victims 
coming forward to testify to provide them with a safe and dignified environment, 
so as to avoid causing them trauma in proceedings.244 The tribunals provided 
protective measures including confidentiality measures in proceedings (private 
hearings and voice/face distortion), anonymity and relocation. The ICTY adopted 
protective measures in 38% of cases, where at the ICTR this was 95%.245 Despite 
these provisions at least 9 witnesses were killed in one case at the ICTY,246 and 99 
witnesses and victims were killed in the months running up to the setting up of 
the Witness and Victim Support Section of the ICTR. Many others were stigmatised, 
ostracised from their family or community, harassed, and even violently attacked.247 
In proceedings of the ICTY and ICTR, victims appearing as witnesses also suffered 
from some defendants who verbally attacked them, such as Milošević calling one 
a “murderer and robber”,248 and Karadžić saying another was “not a victim” despite 
surviving a mass execution in Srebrenica.249 The criminal nature of proceedings 
meant that the chambers and parties were more interested in establishing facts and 
individual criminal responsibility, than hearing victims’ voices. These experiences of 
secondary victimisation negatively impacted upon victims’ willingness to engage 
with the tribunals and also shaped their expectations and perceptions of justice.250 
77. At the ICC the treatment of victims is similar to the ad hoc tribunals, with a Victims 
and Witnesses Unit (VWU) in the Registry providing protection measures, security, 
counselling and other appropriate measures for victims and witnesses who 
appear before the Court.251 The Court also operates the Initial Response System 
(IRS) in countries under investigation, which allows victims or witnesses to seek 
243 Article 22, ICTY; Article 21, ICTR; and Rule 96.
244 Antonio Cassese, Annual Report of the ICTY to the UN General Assembly, A/50/365, para.108-110.
245 Göran Sluiter, The ICTR and the Protection of Witnesses, Journal of International Criminal Justice 3(4) 
(2005) 962–976, p967.
246 The Haradinaj case, see Merdijana Sadović and Aleksandar Roknic, Serbian Anger at Haradinaj 
Acquittal, IWPR, 14 April 2008.
247 Eric Stover, The Witnesses (University of Pennsylvania Press 2005), p98; Chris Mahony, The Justice 
Sector Afterthought: Witness Protection in Africa, (Institute for Security Studies 2001), p59; and More 
Can Be Done to Protect ICTR Witnesses, Hirondelle News Agency, 17 December 2004.
248 Stover ibid., p99.
249 Prosecutor v Radovan Karadžić, IT-95-5/18-I, Transcript, 21 April 2010, p. 1330.
250 See Marie-Bénédicte Dembour and Emily Haslam, Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War 
Crimes Trials, European Journal of International Law 15(1) (2004) 151–177.
251 Article 43(6), Rome Statute.
right, not as witnesses. This was justified on the grounds that victims needed to 
narrate in their own words the factual background to the charges which their views 
and concerns arose from. In addition, it would be impossible for victims, particularly 
those who suffer from sexual violence, to be able to present their views and 
concerns in an abstract general way devoid of the facts and their lived experience 
of what occurred.234 As they were not being sworn in as witnesses, they could not 
be cross-examined by the prosecution or defence, and as a result the judges would 
not consider victims’ views and concerns as part of their final determination of 
evidence.235 As such, the direct participation of victims is only used to give a very 
selective contextual background. The victims’ oral statements to the Court discuss 
their experience of violence by Mr Bemba’s troops and the consequential harm 
they continue to face.236 Although the victims expressed satisfaction and some 
form of relief by testifying before the Court, they only stated this when prompted 
by the judges. An area of concern of such testimony was the victims’ unmitigated 
expectations of the ICC, with one looking to obtain funds from the Trust Fund for 
Victims (TFV) and another looking for a new artificial leg. While such opportunities 
may help to provide a ‘human perspective’ to a court,237 the long-term benefit to 
victims is questionable, particularly in light of the collapse of the Bemba case in 
June 2018.
75. In order to protect the rights of the defendant, victims who participate anonymously 
are limited to making opening and closing statements, accessing public 
documents, and participation in public hearings.238 In the Lubanga case, the Court 
held that while there is a need to protect the accused from anonymous accusation, 
victim participation would be undermined if they had to give up the protection 
of anonymity in order to participate.239 Accordingly, ‘[t]he greater the extent and 
the significance of the proposed participation, the more likely it will be that the 
Chamber will require the victim to identify himself or herself’.240 As an additional 
safeguard, the Chamber emphasised that it will always know the identity of the 
victim and will be in the best position to judge the extent of his/her participation. 
In contrast, the Bemba case the judges found that there is no distinction in 
the way in which anonymous and non-anonymous victims can participate.241 In 
practice this issue may be moot, as anonymous and non-anonymous victims are 
commonly represented by the same legal representatives.242 
234 Bemba, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the Supplemented 
Applications by the Legal Representatives of Victims to Present Evidence and the Views and Concerns 
of Victims, ICC-01/05-01/08-2138, ICC-01/05-01/08-2140, 23 February 2012, p21-22.
235 Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-T-227-Red-ENG, 25 July 2012, p19-22.
236 See Moffett n.30, p106-108.
237 Carsten Stahn, Hector Olásolo, and Kate Gibson, Participating of Victims in Pre-trial Proceedings of 
the ICC, Journal of International Criminal Justice 4(2) (2006) 219–238, p221.
238 Lubanga, Decision on the Arrangements for Participation of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06, and 
a/0003/06 at the Confirmation Hearing, ICC-01/04-01/06-462, 22 September 2006, pp. 6–7; Lubanga, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, paras 130–131; Lubanga, Decision on the Defence and Prosecution Requests for 
Leave to Appeal the Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1191, 26 
February 2008, para.36; Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-474, para. 184; Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-
807, paras 61–69.
239 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, para. 130; Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1191, para. 36; Katanga and Chui, 
ICC-01/04-01/07-474, para. 182.
240 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, para. 131.
241 Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-320, para. 99.
242 McGonigle n.188, p285.40 41
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79. For vulnerable victims or witnesses, they can be provided with special measures 
that include a support person in proceedings, shielding devices, video conferencing 
technology, and sensitive questioning.258 Judges have also played a key role in 
keeping defendants and defence counsel’s questioning of victims in check, and 
they are obliged to do so under the rules of the Court as are counsel under their 
code of conduct.259 Judges have incorporated some good practice of procedural 
justice by allowing victims to testify by first ‘telling their story’ in narrative form, 
without interruptions or leading questions.260 In addition, judges have been 
empathetic and respectful to victims, thanking them for attending and helping 
the Court to determine the truth, as well as wishing them the best of health.261 
80. Despite these protective measures in Kenya, witnesses and victims were identified 
on social media by Kenyan journalists and other actors, intimidated by threats, the 
use of bribery, and the exertion of social pressure, with some being killed.262 As a 
result, the proceedings against the president, vice-president and other indicted 
persons collapsed.263 Together the experience of international criminal justice 
bodies in protecting victims and witnesses who come before them in post-conflict 
societies is problematic, which is not helped by distance of such courts or risk of 
individuals being identified in close-knit communities.
258 Rule 88. See Moffett n.30, p130-141.
259 Rule 88(5), ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence; and Article 24, Code of Professional Conduct for 
counsel, Resolution ICC-ASP/4/Res.1, 2 December 2005.
260 McGonigle n.188, p. 322, fn. 610.
261 See for example the two victims that testified in the Katanga and Chui trial, Witness DRCV19- P-0002, 
ICC-01/04-01/07-T-233-Red-ENG, 23 February 2011, p. 53 lines 7–19, and Witness DRC-V19-P-0004, ICC-
01/04-01/07-T-235-Red-ENG, 25 February 2011, p. 45 lines 19–25.
262 See Prosecutor v Ruto and Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11-896-Corr-Red, 5 September 2013; and Warrant of 
Arrest for Walter Osapiri Barasa, ICC-01/09-01/13-1-Red2, 2 August 2013.
263 Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, following an 
application seeking an adjournment of the provisional trial date, 19 December 2013.
264 Article 77(1), Rome Statute.
International standards 
on sentencing for 
international crimes
81. There is no specific obligation on states under international human rights law 
or international criminal law to provide a required or particular penalty for those 
responsible for international crimes (crimes against humanity, genocide or 
war crimes). The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court provides a 
maximum sentence of 30 years, and life sentences in cases of extreme gravity,264 
assistance at any time they believe they or their families are in danger.252 If any calls 
are received, a local partner extracts the individual(s) and places them in a safe 
location before the need for further measures of protection are assessed. However, 
this system relies on local police forces, who may be corrupt or the crimes may 
involve the government, and could result in further harm to the individual. The 
VWU also has a protection programme which can relocate victims and witnesses if 
need be in or out of the country. The VWU also offers 24 hour ‘psychological, social 
assistance and advice’ to victims, witnesses, and their families, as well as in-court 
support assistants to ‘attend to [their] emotional and physical needs’.253 
78. The ICC includes a range of protective measures to enable victims and witnesses 
to participate in proceedings by minimising their risk in doing so. Such measures 
can include closed hearings (in camera), pseudonyms, voice and facial distortion, 
public non-disclosure, and redaction of identity or identifying information from 
the record.254 The Court has varied the use of these measures depending on the 
stage of proceedings and in striking the correct balance between the rights of the 
defendant to confront their accuser and the protection and safety of victims. For 
instance, judges have redacted most of the information on victims in the pre-trial 
stage, as they do not impact the rights of the defendant until the trial stage.255 
While cost effective when the Court does not have a substantial presence on the 
ground, redactions can also limit victims’ ability to participate, as in balancing 
with the rights of the defendant, if victims want more participatory rights, such as 
questioning witnesses or the defendant, they need to forgo their anonymity.256 The 
most extreme measure the Court can use is relocation, but it is often reluctant to 
use it, as noted by the Appeals Chamber, relocation is a
‘serious matter that can . . . have a ‘dramatic impact’ and ‘serious effect’ upon 
the life of an individual, particularly in terms of removing a witness from their 
normal surroundings and family ties and re-settling that person into a new 
environment. It may well have long-term consequences for the individual who 
is relocated – including potentially placing an individual at increased risk by 
highlighting his or her involvement with the Court and making it more difficult 
for that individual to move back to the place from which he or she was relocated, 
even in circumstances where it was intended that the relocation should be only 
provisional. Where relocation occurs, it is likely to involve careful and possibly 
long-term planning for the safety and well-being of the witness concerned.’257 
252 Regulations 93 and 95 Registry Regulations; Report of the Court on the Kampala Field Office: 
Activities, Challenges and Review of Staffing Levels; On Memoranda of Understanding with Situation 
Countries, ICC-ASP/9/11, 2011, p2; Silvana Arbia, The International Criminal Court: Witness and Victim 
Protection and Support, Legal Aid and Family Visits, Commonwealth Law Bulletin 36(3) (2010) 519–528, 
p522.
253 Article 68(2), Rule 87(3), and Regulation 94, Registry Regulations.
254 Article 68(2), Rule 87(3), and Regulation 94, Registry Regulations.
255 Kony et al., ICC-02/04-01/05-134, para. 21; Situation in DRC, ICC-01/04-374, para. 28; Katanga and Chui, 
ICC-01/04-01/07-579.
256 See Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG, paras. 92–93.
257 Prosecutor v Katanga and Chui, On the Appeal of the Prosecutor against the ‘Decision on Evidentiary 
Scope of the Confirmation Hearing, Preventive Relocation and Disclosure under Article 67(2) of the 
Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules’ of Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC- 01/04-01/07-776, 26 November 2008, 
para.66; endorsing ICC-01/04-01/07-585; a Special Relocation Fund amongst State Parties has been 
established to sponsor relocations.42 43
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is used by the ICC.271 The Inter-American Court has stated that the rule of 
proportionality requires that States,
‘impose penalties that truly contribute to prevent impunity, taking into account 
various factors such as the characteristics of the offense, and the participation 
and guilt of the accused.’272 
84. In the Rochela Massacre case, the Court stated in relation to the Justice and Peace 
Law proceedings that 
‘punishment which the State assigns to the perpetrator of illicit conduct should 
be proportional to the rights recognized by law and the culpability with which 
the perpetrated acted, which in turn should be established as a function of 
the nature and gravity of the events. The punishment should be the result of a 
judgment issued by a judicial authority. Moreover, in identifying the appropriate 
punishment, the reasons for the punishment should be determined. With regard 
to the principle of lenity based upon the existence of an earlier more lenient 
law, this principle should be harmonized with the principle of proportionality 
of punishment, such that criminal justice does not become illusory. Every 
element which determines the severity of the punishment should correspond 
to a clearly identifiable objective and be compatible with the Convention.’273 
85. The European Court of Human Rights has similarly found that, 
‘just and proportionate punishment are the subject of rational debate and 
civilised disagreement. Accordingly, Contracting States must be allowed 
a margin of appreciation in deciding on the appropriate length of prison 
sentences for particular crimes.’274 
86. Proportionality in international criminal law is a key consideration in international 
criminal justice bodies sentencing, but such assessments are based on the gravity 
of the crime, and mitigating and aggravating factors.275
Sentence mitigation and guilty pleas
87. International criminal justice has traditionally since the Second World War 
permitted sentence mitigation as not to ‘reduce the degree of the crime …[but] 
271 Under Article 81(2)(a), Rome Statute, and Rule 145(1)(a) of the RPE. See Lubanga Sentencing Decision, 
10 July 2012, para. 93; Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3484-tENG-Corr, para.39; and Al Mahdi, Judgment and 
Sentence ICC-01/12-01/15-171 27 September 2016, para.67.
272 Heliodoro Portugal v Panamá, Judgement (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) (12 
August 2008), para. 203. See also Caso Raxcacó Reyes v Guatemala, para.133 ; Manuel Cepeda Vargas 
v Colombia, para.150 and 153.
273 Rochela Massacre para.196.
274 Vinter and Others v. The United Kingdom, Application Nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, Judgment 
(Merits and Just Satisfaction), 9 July 2013, para.105.
275 Proportionality is used in a range of other international law areas including international 
humanitarian law, arbitration, and constitutional law. See Thomas Cottier, Roberto Echandi, Rachel 
Liechti-McKee, Tetyana Payosova and Charlotte Sieber, The Principle of Proportionality in International 
Law: Foundations and Variations, The Journal of World Investment and Trade 18(4) (2017), 628–672.
but in the first few convictions before the Court the average has been 13.25 years.265 
In terms of complementarity, the ICC only foresees sentencing being an issue 
where such provisions are intended to shield a person from criminal responsibility 
or proceedings were not conducted independently or impartially in light of 
international due process norm, which are inconsistent with an intent to bring the 
person concerned to justice.266 To date the ICC has not made a case admissible 
on the basis of ineffective sentencing, though there are two cases where indicted 
suspects wanted by the Court, have been prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned, 
to then receive a pardon some months later.267 It would be hard for international 
judges to determine that reduced sentences brokered under a peace agreement 
and approved by a national legislature are best decided before the Court.
82. International fair trial and access to justice norms include mitigating in sentencing, 
amnesties and pardons. While there has been a growing body of jurisprudence 
recognising victims’ right to justice, it is an obligation of means and not outcome 
upon a state. In other words, victims do not have a right to demand a particular 
person is convicted or a specific sentence or sanction.268 The rest of this section 
outlines the issue of sentence mitigation for international crimes, as well as the 
use of amnesties and pardons to facilitate accountability, truth and reconciliation. 
These principles and jurisprudence can be instructive in providing a customary 
international law basis for decision-making on alternative sanctions.
Sentencing and proportionality 
83. Sentencing for gross human rights violations and international crimes should 
impose appropriate penalties proportionate to the gravity of the violation.269 The 
ICTY has followed such a proportionate retributive approach, characterised by its 
determination of ‘just deserts’, with sentences ‘having to be proportional to the 
gravity of the crime and the moral guilt of the convicted.’270 A similar calculation 
265 Lubanga was sentenced to 14 years for using child soldiers, Katanga was sentenced to 12 years for his 
role in the Bogoro massacre, Bemba was convicted on the grounds of command responsibility for 
killing, raping and looting of his troop in CAR and sentenced to 18 years (later acquitted), and Al Mahdi 
was sentenced to 9 years after a guilty plea.
266 Article 17(1)(c) and Article 20(3), Rome Statute. See Hector Olasolo, Complementarity Analysis 
of National Sentencing, in R Haveman and O Olusanya (eds), Sentencing and Sanctioning in 
Supranational Criminal Law, (Antwerp/Oxford, Intersentia, 2006) 37-66.
267 Simone Gbagbo in Cote d’Ivoire and Saif Gaddafi in Libya. These proceedings are ongoing at the ICC, 
but remain admissible due to earlier decisions on the characterisation of the charges against them in 
domestic proceedings. For individuals prosecuted in domestic proceedings the ICC can only consider 
them admissible where such proceedings are shielding the individual, unjustifiably delayed, or not 
conducted impartially or independently.
268 Budayeva and Others v. Russia 15339/02 11673/02 15343/02... | Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction) | 
Court (First Section) | 20/03/2008, para.144.
269 Article 4(2), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment; and Manuel Cepeda Vargas v Colombia Judgement 26 May 2010 (Preliminary 
objections, merits, reparations and Costs), para.150 and fn.210; Rochela Massacre v. Colombia, 
Judgment 11 May 2007 (Merits, Reparations, and Costs), para.193
270 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, IT-96-22-T (29 November 1996, para.64; Prosecutor v. 
Dragan Nikolić, IT-94-2-S, 18 December 2003, para.245.44 45
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reconciliation process, cooperation with a court, behaviour after the crime, and 
conduct towards victims including any efforts to compensate them.284 
90. The cessation of violence and involvement of perpetrators in peace negotiations 
is an important mitigating factor at the ICTY and ICC.285 Such efforts are required 
to be ‘genuine and concrete’.286 In the Katanga case the ICC considered that the 
convicted person’s ‘personal and active support to the process of disarming and 
demobilising child soldiers,’287 assistance in the release of hostages, and protection 
of civilians within his own community,288 could not play a determinate role due to 
his crimes committed against member of the other civilian community in Ituri the 
Hema. Such efforts need to be ‘both palpable and genuine, without the need to 
demand results’,289 with evidence based on a balance of probabilities.290 Convicted 
persons need to show that their peace and reconciliatory efforts are sincere, 
genuine and implemented. The ICC held in the Bemba case that the accused 
writing a book on peace was insufficient.291 Efforts to contribute to peace in other 
countries and not in country the individual was convicted of crimes in, has limited 
value in mitigation.292 
91. Similar findings were considered by the ICTY and ICTR in that contrition or 
contribution to peace or reconciliation can be weighty mitigating factors where 
they recognise victims’ suffering, acknowledge their responsibility, apologise, and 
actively promote and negotiate peace.293 However such efforts by convicted person 
could not be judged by their acts to protect civilians within their own community.294 
Statements of remorse and apologies by convicted persons is considered to also 
contribution to reconciliation by being part of a proportionate sentence, in that 
it is not too lenient or harsh,295 but judges have recognised that punishment in 
284 The ICTY included a range of mitigating factors: (1) co-operation with the Prosecution; (2) the 
admission of guilt or a guilty plea; (3) the expression of remorse; (4) voluntary surrender; (5) good 
character with no prior criminal convictions; (6) comportment in detention; (7) personal and family 
circumstances; (8) the character of the accused subsequent to the conflict; (9) duress and indirect 
participation;(10) diminished mental responsibility; (11) age; and (12) assistance to detainees or 
victims. Poor health is to be considered only in exceptional or rare cases. – Prosecutor v. Blaškić, 
Appeal Judgement, IT-95-14-A, 29 July 2004, para.696; and Prosecutor v. Milan Babić, Judgement on 
Sentencing Appeal, IT-03-72-A, 18 July 2005, para.43.
285 Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic Trial Judgement, IT-02-60, 7 January 2005, paras. 858-860), and 
Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement, IT-00-39&40/1, 27 February 2003, paras. 85-94 
and 110.
286 Bemba, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, ICC-01/05-01/08-3399, 21 June 2016, 
para.72.
287 Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3484-tENG-Corr, para.144.
288 Ibid, para 88 and 92.
289 Katanga, Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/07-3484-tENG-Corr, 
23-10-2015, para.91
290 Lubanga, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/06-2901 10-07-2012, 
para.34.
291 Bemba, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, ICC-01/05-01/08-3399, 21 June 2016, 
para.73.
292 Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-3399, 21 June 2016, para.76.
293 Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement, 27 February 2003, IT-00-39&40/1, para.73-94; and Omar Serushago, 
ICTR-98-39, 5 February 1999, para.38.
294 Babić, para.60.
295 Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, Sentencing Judgement, IT-94-2-S, 18 December 2003, para.245; Al 
Mahdi Judgment and Sentence ICC-01/12-01/15-171 27 September 2016, para.67 and 100.
more a matter of grace than of defense’.276 Mitigation of sentence and early 
release have a number of factors that will decrease the number of years a person 
responsible for international crimes will stay in prison. 
88. The ICC in early release decisions takes into account the ‘genuine dissociation’ of 
a sentenced person from their crime, the prospects of them being resocialised or 
successful resettlement back into society, whether their release would give rise to 
‘significant social instability’, any ‘significant’ action by the sentence person for the 
benefit of victims and the impact of their release on victims and their families, and 
their individual circumstances, such as worsening health or advanced age.277
89. The UN Principles to Combat Impunity foresee the role of confessions, disclosure 
and repentance as a legitimate justification for reduction of sentence, but not an 
exemption from criminal or other responsibility.278 This reflects that most criminal 
justice systems allow reduced sentences with guilty pleas, but the Impunity 
Principles provide no guidance on the scope of such reduction or whether it 
can be automatic.279 The Convention on Enforced Disappearances also suggests 
that State Parties establish mitigating circumstances for individuals involved in 
disappearances who effectively clarify the fate, whereabouts or identity of the 
victim(s).280 However, imposing small suspended fines on state forces responsible 
for killing civilians can make punishment derisory and fail to ensure the protection 
of individuals’ right to life. In an effective criminal justice system, there needs to 
be an acknowledgement of responsibility for serious human rights violations with 
appropriate sanctions.281 In addition, leniency can be viewed as unwarranted, such 
as the case of domestic violence being justified on grounds of ‘custom, tradition or 
honour’.282 There has to be consistency and certainty that leniency or pardons apply 
to state and non-state actors equally, those provided to state actors responsible 
for violations alone will be seen as incompatible with human rights obligations, 
especially where they have faced no disciplinary sanctions.283 Relevant for our 
analysis are mitigating factors on a convicted person’s contribution to a peace or 
276 United States of America vs. Wilhelm List et al. (Hostage Case), 19 February 1948, XI Trial of War 
Criminals, p1317.
277 Rule 223, Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
278 Principle 28, Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through 
action to combat impunity, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1.
279 Christopher Gosnell, Principle 28 Restrictions on the Effects of Legislation on Disclosure or 
Repentance, in F. Haldemann and T. Unger, The United Nations Principles to Combat Impunity: A 
Commentary, 305-314, p307.
280 Article 7(2)(a), 2007 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance.
281 Öneryildiz v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 30 November 2004, 
para.116-117.
282 Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 9 June 2009, para.103.
283 Kepa Urra Guridi v. Spain, CAT/C/34/D/212/2002, 17 May 2005, para.6.6.46 47
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al.307 The weight that assisting victims and civilians is judged against the gravity 
of the offences the individual is convicted of, such as saving a family from another 
community when involved in killing hundreds of civilians.308 The ICC has been 
explicit that assistance to victims and civilians in general should be given more 
weight as a mitigating factor, than selective assistance.309 Expressing statements 
of remorse, including apologises, are considered a significant factor.310 However, 
expressing sympathy or empathy to victims is given less weight, as the convicted 
person is not renouncing their wrongful actions.311 Despite these considerations, 
aggravating factors of the convicted person’s seniority and gravity of offences, in 
particular genocide, can outweigh such efforts towards victims.312 
95. In the Katanga case at the ICC the convicted person provided a recorded video 
where he apologies to the victims of the Bogoro massacre, as part of an assessment 
for reducing his sentence. However, the victims participating in the case rejected 
his apology. While the defence counsel did meet with the victims in Bogoro to 
discuss the apology and sentence reduction, the victims remained unhappy with 
some feeling further traumatised by the meeting. There was a feeling amongst 
the victims that Mr Katanga’s apology was not sincere and would not have been 
forthcoming without him benefiting through a reduced sentence. The legal 
representative of the victims further presented testimony from a community 
leader in Bogoro on the traditional settlement of disputes by the Hema as,
“According to our custom, when there is a conflict between two people they 
can sit down to discuss it; the first thing that we do is seek to make amends. 
The second stage is to bring people together to try to find a solution. Where 
Katanga is concerned, it is as if he is reversing the process. Personally, I do not 
agree with this back-to-front approach. People should first sit down, make 
amends, and then apologise. If someone has been hurt, the wound must be 
treated and, once the person is cured, forgiveness can be sought.”313 
 As a result, despite Mr Katanga offering to meet with victims to give a personal 
apology, it was rejected as insufficient to benefit the victims.314 
96. Similarly in the Al Mahdi case the convicted individual plead guilty and apologised 
to the victims and the community in Timbuktu for the destruction of the World 
Heritage site.315 He also called upon others to not engage in such destruction of 
cultural property and vowed to never commit atrocities again.316 Yet the victims felt 
307 Barbora Holá, Alette Smeulers and Catrien Bijleveld, International Sentencing Facts and Figures 
Sentencing Practice at the ICTY and ICTR, Journal of International Criminal Justice 9 (2011), 411-439, 
p433.
308 See Prosecutor v. Paul Bisengimana, Case No. ICTR 00-60-T Judgement, 13 April 2006, para.125.
309 Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-3399, 21 June 2016, para.72.
310 Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, para.105.
311 Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3484, para.117.
312 See Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, para. 2273.
313 Legal Representative’s observations on the reduction of sentence of Germain Katanga, 18 September 
2015, ICC-01/04-01/07-3597-tENG, para.54.
314 Decision on the review concerning reduction of sentence of Mr Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-
3615, 13 November 2015, paras.91-103.
315 Transcript of Hearing, 22 August 2016, ICC-01/12-01/15-T-4-Red-ENG, page 8, lines 13-16.
316 Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence ICC-01/12-01/15-171 27 September 2016, para.103-104.
itself can only make a limited contribution in post-conflict societies.296 Statements 
of remorse and apologies can be mitigating factors where they are genuine and 
sincere.297 There seems to be a need for the convicted person to reflect on their 
actions and have an awareness of their wrongdoing by trying to make amends for 
the actions during the war in securing peace and reconciliation.298 
92. The Special Court for Sierra Leone considered that the convicted persons acting 
out of civic duty in fighting to reinstate democracy in the Fofana and Kondewa 
case,299 but that,
‘the crimes for which the Accused were tried and convicted remain very serious 
crimes, and both Fofana and Kondewa will bear the stigma of a conviction after 
we have pronounced their sentences. The Chamber hopes that this Judgement 
will send a message to future pro-democracy armed forces or militia groups 
that notwithstanding the justness or propriety of their cause, they must 
observe the laws of war in pursuing or defending legitimate causes, and that 
they must not recruit or use children as agents or instruments of war. It will, in 
addition, remind them of their obligation to protect civilians who are unarmed 
and not participating in hostilities, and whose aspiration is only to protection, 
regardless of their perceived affiliation.’300 
93. However in the AFRC case, a good service record in the army was not considered a 
mitigating factor, but ‘merely ... duty’.301 Providing a guilty plea has been noted as a 
mitigating factor, in that it saves the Court time and relieves witnesses and victims 
the stress of testifying,302 but it is given more weight were convicted persons are 
willing to provide testimony in other cases. However, in a number of cases in the 
early years of the ICTR, while a number of high level of suspects did plead guilty, the 
tribunal imposed long sentences due to the gravity of the charges of genocide.303 
Most ICTR defendants were keen to receive reduced sentences, but they were not 
willing to plead guilty to genocide to receive it, due to many of them viewing the 
violence as part of a conflict between the Rwandan Hutu government and Uganda 
Tutsi rebels.304 
94. Contributing reparations or assisting victims can be considered a substantial 
mitigating factor of sentence. The ICC mitigating factors in sentencing explicitly 
recognise the defendant’s conduct in providing compensation to victims.305 There 
are similar provisions in the Ugandan ICD.306 Giving assistance to victims featured 
in 38-42.5% of sentencing decisions at the ICTY and ICTR examined by Hola et 
296 Nikolić, para.245.
297 Blaškić, Appeal Judgement, para. 705.
298 Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-3399, 21 June 2016, para.76.
299 Judgement on the Sentencing of Moinina Fofana and Allied Kondewa, Case No.SCSL-04-14-T 9 
October 2007, para.94-95.
300 Ibid. para.96.
301 AFRC Sentencing Judgement, Brima, Kamara, and Kanu, 19 July 2007, para.134.
302 Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, 27 September 2016, para.100.
303 Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda, ICTR 97-23-S, 4 September 1998, para.50-56.
304 Combs n.106, p97.
305 Rule 145(2)(a)(ii), and also Rule 223(d) for sentence reduction/early release.
306 See also Section 47(3)(a)(ii), The Judicature (High Court) (International Crimes Division) Rules, 2015.48 49
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in hostilities, has recently been limited by regional325 and national courts to exclude 
international crimes, as going beyond the act of rebellion or waging war.326 
99. Regional human rights courts have developed a body of jurisprudence around 
the permissibility of amnesties in delivering national goals. The European Court 
of Human Rights has held that obligations to prosecute and punish individuals 
can, exceptionally, be set aside for a ‘reconciliation process and/or a form of 
compensation to the victims’.327 In particular it has stated that,
‘even in such fundamental areas of the protection of human rights as the right 
to life, the State is justified in enacting, in the context of its criminal policy, any 
amnesty laws it might consider necessary, with the proviso, however, that a 
balance is maintained between the legitimate interests of the State and the 
interests of individual members of the public.’328 
100. Blanket amnesties are seen as problematic and in violation of international human 
rights law, not just in the extent they allow impunity, but in how they deny victims’ 
right to an effective remedy.329 This has also been recognised by the ECCC.330 
The Inter-American Court has a long jurisprudence on such issues.331 Recently in 
relation to the Ugandan Amnesty Act 2000, the African Commission of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights stated that states, 
‘should ensure that such amnesties comply with both procedural and 
substantive conditions. In procedural terms, conditional amnesties should be 
formulated with the participation of affected communities including victim 
groups. Substantively speaking, amnesties should not totally exclude the right 
of victims for remedy, particularly remedies taking the form of getting the truth 
and reparations. They should also facilitate a measure of reconciliation with 
perpetrators acknowledging responsibility and victims getting a hearing about 
and receiving acknowledgment for the violations they suffered.’332 
101. As such, trade-offs with punishment must ensure that there is an effective 
investigation that can lead to the identification of those responsible, some form 
of accountability of such individuals and appropriate and adequate reparations 
325 Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Inter-Am. ct. H.R. (ser. c) No. 252/83 (2012), 
para.285.
326 B.M. Katureebe, Uganda v. Kwoyelo, (Constitutional Appeal No. 01 of 2012) [2015] UGSC 5 (8 April 2015), 
p62.
327 Margus v. Croatia, 2014, para.139. See also Ould Dah v. France, App no 13113/03 (ECtHR, 17 March 2009).
328 Tarbuk v. Croatia, App no. 31360/10, 11 December 2012, para.50. See also Dujardin and others v. France, 
App. No. 16734/90; 72 D.R. 236.
329 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, Communication 245/02, 15 May 2006, para.215; Mouvement ivoirien des droits humains (MIDH) 
v. Cote d’Ivoire, Communication 246/02, 29 July 2008, para.98; and Thomas Kwoyelo v. Uganda, 
Communication 431/12, 17 October 2018, paras. 291-293.
330 Decision on Ieng Sary’s Rule 89 Preliminary Objections (Ne Bis In Idem and Amnesty and Pardon), 
Case File/Dossier No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCCffC, 3 November 2011, para.54
331 Barrios Altos v. Peru, IACtHR, (Ser. c) No 83, (2001); La Cantuta v. Perú, Judgment, IACtHR,(Ser. c) No. 
162 (2006); Gomes Lund v Brazil Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. ct. H.R. Ser. c No. 219 (2010); Gelman v. Uruguay Merits and Reparations, Judgments, Inter-
Am. ct. H.R. (Ser. c) No. 221 (2011); and Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Inter-
Am. ct. H.R. (ser. c) No. 252/83 (2012).
332 Thomas Kwoyelo v. Uganda, 431/12 Communication, 17 October 2018, para. 293.
it was insufficient. While some were willing to accept the apology, as forgiveness is 
a tenet of Islam, others were concerned that they could not forgive Mr Al Mahdi by 
only his words, but by his deeds, as they were concerned that accepting his apology 
may forego their claims for reparation.317 As stated by their legal representative, 
‘Apologies alone, as sincere as they may be, cannot make amends for the harm 
suffered and allow the victims to return to their previous lives and regain their 
dignity.’318 Despite these interventions, the Court held that Mr Al Mahdi’s apology 
was a ‘significant’ mitigating factor.319 
97. In comparison at the ECCC in Case 001, while the Duch made a number of 
public apologies and expressed remorse to the victims, the Chambers found it 
was undermined by his failure to offer a full and unequivocal admission of his 
responsibility, particularly as he requested an acquittal in his closing statement, 
which was held to diminish his remorse.320 In the subsequent Case 002/01 
Nuon Chea did apologise to the public and victims, but the Court found it was 
undermined by ‘his failure to accept responsibility for his own wrongdoing’, as 
he minimised his own responsibility for the Khmer Rouge’s lack of control over 
‘traitors’ who committed the crimes against humanity and genocide of which he 
was convicted.321 Accordingly, a range of conducts by defendants, in particular 
in contributing to peace and victims’ needs, is considered a sufficient and 
proportionate factor in reducing sentences for international crimes. However, the 
failure to acknowledge responsibility seems to be a clear ground to distinguish 
the proportion of punishment in sentencing. Similar issues are factored into the 
provision of certain amnesties and pardons in post-conflict societies.
Amnesty and pardons
98. Amnesty extinguishes or prevents criminal and civil liability, whereas a pardon ends 
the ‘execution of a penalty, though in other respects the effects of the conviction 
remain in being.’322 Pardons are seen as more acceptable, due to them being the 
prerogative of the executive and after the pronouncement of a person’s guilt and 
sentence, provided they are made on justifiable grounds.323 For the ICRC, amnesty 
was a way to ‘encourage gestures of reconciliation which can contribute to re-
establishing normal relations in the life of a nation which has been divided.’324 Article 
6(5) of Additional Protocol II, while providing a broad amnesty to those taking part 
317 Al Mahdi, Public redacted version of “Submissions of the Legal Representative of Victims on the 
principles and forms of the right to reparation” dated 2 December 2016 (ICC-01/12-01/15-190-Conf), 3 
January 2017, para.43-46.
318 Ibid. para.45.
319 Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, para.105.
320 His statements of apology were combined in a document and used as a form of symbolic reparation 
by the Court after requests by civil parties, but the victims’ statements to go alongside his apologies 
was rejected by the chamber. Judgment, Case File/Dossier No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 26 July 2010, 
paras. 610 and 668.
321 Case 002/01, Judgement, 7 August 2014, para.1092-1093.
322 AP II 1987 Commentary, at 4617.
323 See Lexa v. Slovakia (Application no. 54334/00), 23 December 2008, para.88-95; and Zimbabwe 
Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
Communication 245/02, 15 May 2006, para.196-198.
324 AP II 1987 Commentary, at 4618.50 51
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intended that informants who have committed crimes against humanity, while not 
eligible for an amnesty, will be able to benefit from reduced sentences where they 
cooperate.341 In South Africa, the amnesty and truth exchanged for perpetrators of 
gross human rights violations to facilitate the work of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, did not absolve the person’s moral responsibility in such violations so 
as to allow them rewrite history or ‘muzzle the truth’.342 
105. Pardons can also play an important part in incentivising individuals to express 
remorse or contribute to repairing the harm caused to victims. This issue is gaining 
increasing attention at the ICC343 as well as the Inter-American Court, in relation to 
the release of former Peruvian president Fujimori. On Fujimori’s release from prison 
in Peru on humanitarian grounds, the IACtHR declared that punishments cannot 
be unduly affected or rendered illusory, given that they are integral to victims’ right 
to justice.344 Where sentences are reduced for serious human rights violations it 
must be a reduction that is the least restrictive to victims’ right to justice, and 
applied in extreme cases and for a prevailing need (such as emergency medical 
care).345 Again this is a question of proportionality in achieving the wider public 
goal, for instance release on medical grounds for better treatment, is less restrictive 
of victims’ right to justice, than extinguishing a sentence through pardon.346 That 
said the executive has discretion to show mercy in punishment, subject to judicial 
oversight, drawing from international criminal law on mitigation of sentence 
and early release, paying civil compensation, clarifying the truth, recognising 
the seriousness of the crimes they have perpetrated, their rehabilitation, and the 
effect of their release on society and victims.347 In line with amnesties and sentence 
reduction, pardons and other measures are increasingly being seen as legitimate 
provided there are clear legal boundaries on their extent and conditionality. In 
other words, provided there is a legitimate public interest (reconciliation, remedy 
to victims) and they allow the investigation and attachment of responsibility, 
alternative sanctions can be crafted under international law that do not run afoul 
of being blanket amnesties or self-serving pardons.
341 Mission Report of the Agja-Wayamo Delegation to the Gambia: Meeting Expectations on the Road 
to Justice: Achieving Accountability in The Gambia, The Africa Group for Justice and Accountability 
(Agja) and The Wayamo Foundation, p11.
342 Citizen v. McBride, Case CCT 23/10, Judgment of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, [2011] ZACC 
11.
343 In the cases involving Simone Gbagbo in Cote d’Ivoire and Saif Gaddafi in Libya.
344 Caso Barrios Altos y Caso La Cantuta vs. Perú, Supervisión de Cumplimiento de Sentencia Obligación 
de Investigar, Juzgar y, de Ser el Caso, Sancionar, Resolución de la Corte Interamericana De Derechos 
Humanos, 30 May 2018, para.47.
345 Ibid. para.53.
346 Ibid. paras.53 and 56.
347 Ibid. para.57.
to victims. This is to ensure that society knows the facts of what happened and 
prevents their occurrence or any appearance of state tolerance or collusion in such 
unlawful acts.333 
102. The Juba peace agreement between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the 
Ugandan government stipulated a number of accountability mechanisms to 
address the conflict. Lower ranking combatants would be subject to traditional 
justice, and state forces would be judged through existing accountability 
mechanisms. For senior LRA suspects, a cooperative system was proposed 
before the International Crimes Division, where suspects who make a confession, 
disclosure or other relevant information, would in turn benefit for the purposes of 
sentencing.334 Cooperation in providing relevant information would have included 
the individual’s conduct during the conflict, details assisting in establishing 
the fate of persons missing during the conflict, the location of land mines or 
unexploded ordnances of other munitions, and any other relevant information.335 
Such individuals who cooperated would have expected to benefit from alternative 
penalties and sanction, which were to 
‘reflect the gravity of the crimes or violations; promote reconciliation between 
individuals and within communities; promote the rehabilitation of offenders; 
take into account an individual’s admissions or other cooperation with 
proceedings; and, require perpetrators to make reparations to victims.’336 
103. Similarly, in the Central African Republic the Special Criminal Court for high level 
perpetrators of international crimes is supported by a justice, truth, reparations 
and reconciliation commission with branches at the local level. Its mission is to 
identify and investigate crimes and abuses, with perpetrators to be divided into 
two categories: ‘Those whose perpetrators must be brought to justice; [and those] 
that may be subject to reparations through the payment of compensation or the 
performance of community service, in order to promote a spirit of contrition and 
inter-community reconciliation.’337 It is worth noting that in Uganda the peace 
agreement fell apart and so the issue of alternative sanctions did not arise, and in 
CAR violence remains ongoing, with suspects in both contexts being transferred 
to the International Criminal Court.
104. Amnesties and sentence mitigation have been used in a number of contexts to 
incentivise ex-combatants and perpetrators to fulfil the wider political goals of the 
transition.338 The Gambian Truth Reconciliation and Reparations Commission can 
provide an amnesty to those who report before it and give a ‘full disclosure’ and 
express ‘remorse for their acts or conduct’.339 This amnesty excludes those who 
were involved in any acts that formed part of a crime against humanity.340 It is 
333 Jelić v. Croatia, Application no. 57856/11,12 June 2014, para.94.
334 Clause 3.5-3.6, Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, 29 June 2007.
335 Clause 15, Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation 19 February 2008.
336 Clause 6.4, Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, 29 June 2007.
337 Republican Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation and Reconstruction in the Central African 
Republic, p4.
338 Mallinder n.96, p160-163.
339 Section 19(1), Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission Act 2017.
340 Section 19(3).52 53
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108. Holding the individuals most responsible for the actions of the group in committing 
international crimes is a ‘legal fiction’, especially where such crimes are carried out 
on a collective basis with individual participation deeply conformist or complicit.355 
Members of an armed group agree with the group’s principles, purpose, or aims, 
and by themselves in a normal society would not agree to such actions, but for 
the group. Moreover, as members of an armed group expressing approval of 
the organisation’s action and benefitting from membership of the group, they 
should be collectively responsible for the acts of the group and contributing as 
far as possible to the ‘cost’ of reparation. The collective behaviour of members in 
an organisation reflects the collective pressure, organisation, and culture through 
discipline and orders which conditions individuals to collectively act as an armed 
group, thus lending itself to organisational responsibility and collectively seeking 
reparations from members of a group, rather than just individuals.356 Imposing 
collective responsibility on the membership of an organisation is not collective 
punishment,357 but recognition that members have an obligation to make good 
the harm they are responsible for or face individual criminal prosecution. As such 
reparations and ex-combatants contributions to them, are not intended to be 
punitive, but an attempt to rebalance the harm caused.358 
109. For instance, a large car bomb exploded in Omagh in western Northern Ireland 
in 1998, killing 29 civilians and two unborn twins. While no individual has yet been 
prosecuted for this bombing, some of the victims’ families brought civil litigation 
against the dissident republicans they identified as responsible. In 2009, Belfast 
High Court upheld their claim against four individuals, including Liam Campbell, 
a senior Real IRA leader was held to be a representative of the RIRA Army Council 
that sanctioned the bombing, and ordered them to make reparations.359 Therefore 
the court not only held those individuals who carried out the bombing responsible, 
but also those commanding the organisation, reflecting that this sort of atrocity 
was not the act of individuals, but a concerted organised effort by an armed group 
involving different responsible actors. For the victims suing for compensation, 
their efforts were hoped to ensure some form of accountability and deter such 
groups from committing violence in the future.360 In other contexts, armed groups 
have agreed to provide reparations as part of a peace agreement and transitional 
justice processes.361 
355 Drumbl n.10, p24; and Erin Kelly, Reparative Justice, in T. Isaacs and R. Vernon (eds), Accountability for 
Collective Wrongdoing, (Cambridge University Press 2011) 193–209, p. 201.
356 Jann K. Kleffner, The collective accountability of organized armed groups for system crimes, in H. Wilt 
and A. Nollkaemper (eds.) System criminality in international law, (Cambridge University Press 2009) 
238-269, p.244.
357 Drumbl n.10, p25.
358 Kleffner n.355, p.265.
359 Breslin & Ors v Seamus McKenna & Ors [2009] NIQB 50, paras.83-86
360 The families hoped that the litigation would be ‘a vehicle for putting as much information as possible 
into the public domain about the bombing and the men they claim were involved.’ Real IRA founder 
loses Omagh civil case appeal, The Guardian, 7 July 2011.
361 For instance in Uganda under Clauses 6.4, 8.1, and 9, Juba Peace Agreement on Accountability and 
Reconciliation, 29 June 2007.
Alternative sanctions, 
reparations and accountability
348 Combs n.106, p19.
349 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga, Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be applied to 
Reparations, ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, 7 August 2012, para.179.
350 Brandon Hamber, Narrowing the Micro and Macro: A Psychological Perspective on Reparations in 
Societies in Transition, in P. de Greiff (ed.), The Handbook of Reparations, (Oxford University Press 
2006) 560–588, p.566.
351 Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean? University of Chicago Law Review 63(2) (1996), 
591-653, p592.
352 See Moffett n.30, p147-150.
353 See Principle 15, UN Basic Principles 2005.
354 Louise Mallinder and Kieran McEvoy, Rethinking amnesties: atrocity, accountability and impunity in 
post-conflict societies, Contemporary Social Science: Journal of the Academy of Social Sciences, 6(1)
(2011), 107-128, p109-111.
106. Reparations are measures to remedy and alleviate victims’ suffering, but they also 
serve an expressive function in validating victims’ harm as wrongful and obliging 
those responsible to repair their wrong.348 For victims, such accountability is evinced 
by identifying those parties responsible, holding them to account for their actions, 
issuing a judgment on their liability, and requiring them to provide reparations.349 
Attaching responsibility for reparations to perpetrators, whether individual, state, 
or organisational, can fulfil an important psychological function for victims in 
appropriately directing blame at those who committed the atrocity against them 
and relieving their guilt.350 Reparations made by the responsible perpetrator can 
also help to symbolise their commitment to remedying the past and to be held 
to account for their actions. However, compensation paid to victim without any 
acknowledgement of responsibility can be seen as perpetuating impunity by 
‘buying them off’. Alternative sanctions are often not widely supported by the 
public as they ‘fail to express condemnation as dramatically and unequivocally as 
imprisonment.’351 Thus, responsibility for reparations distinguishes such measures 
from charity or humanitarian assistance by achieving some form of accountability.352 
107. Responsibility in international law has traditionally been the domain of states. 
However the increasing occurrence of non-international armed conflicts and non-
state armed groups controlling territory has meant that such groups can act like 
de facto authorities in the area they control. This gives rise to certain human rights 
obligations in particular circumstances, including the obligation to remedy gross 
violations of human rights and grave breaches of international humanitarian law.353 
Accountability can be broadly understood as the constraint of power, but can be 
narrowly defined as its ‘operationalisation’ with common characteristics including, 
‘(1) there is an individual or institution that is capable of being held to account 
for their decisions, actions or omissions; (2) there is an individual or institution 
that is empowered to hold the decision-maker accountable; (3) that there 
is a process by which the decision-maker is required to disclose and explain 
their decision; and (4) that there is an enforcement process, in which the 
accountability actor can impose sanctions on decision-makers who violated 
their duties.’354 
54 55
A
lt
er
n
at
iv
e 
sa
n
ct
io
n
s,
 r
ep
ar
at
io
n
s 
an
d
 a
cc
ou
n
ta
b
ili
ty
A
ltern
ative san
ction
s, rep
aration
s an
d
 accou
n
tab
ility
approved the Trust Fund’s implementation of economic development, including 
compensation to directly affected victims.370 
112. International criminal justice bodies have increasingly used the language of 
‘collective’ reparations, which is often absent in the conceptualisation and 
operation of many domestic reparation programmes, the jurisprudence of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the 2005 UN Basic Principles on 
Reparations.371 On the ground, victims may not distinguish collective reparations 
from assistance where they are delivered in the same form, i.e. monetary awards 
or collective development. Reparations carry a strong symbolic component that 
brings them into the ‘politics of recognition’ of who is seen as deserving of publicly 
acknowledged redress.372 Contreras-Garduño suggests that collective reparations 
should be complemented with symbolic measures, such as apologies and 
memorials, to more clearly associate such reparations as a measure of justice.373 
As such collective reparations have to be carefully crafted to ensure that they are 
‘aimed at conferring official recognition upon victims, and assisting to restore 
dignity and preserve the collective memory’.374 
113. Collective reparations are meant to provide ‘benefits conferred on collectives in 
order to undo the collective harm that has been caused as a consequence of a 
violation of international law.’375 This reflects that with international crimes harm 
is not limited to individuals, but causes collective harm, as it is committed in a 
discriminatory way or through indiscriminate attacks against groups or civilian 
populations, such as crimes against humanity and genocide.376 Necessarily 
individual harm is bound up with collective harm, due to their membership of 
the group.377 The ICC in Katanga defined reparations to a collective as ‘a group 
or category of persons that may be bound by a shared identity or experience, but 
also by victimization by dint of the same violation or the same crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.’378 Together with measures of satisfaction such collective 
reparations measures can vindicate the ‘moral status’379 of victims as human 
beings who have suffered unlawful harm, which they did not deserve, can collective 
reparations send important moral messages about the wrongfulness of their 
370 Decision on the Updated Implementation Plan from the Trust Fund for Victims, ICC-01/12-01/15-324-
Red, 4 March 2019.
371 See some exceptions Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Legal Costs, IACtHR, 
1 July 2006, para. 354 and 397; and ICTJ, Rapport de la Conférence de Rabat, Le Concept et Les Défis 
Des Réparations Collectives, February 2009.
372 Peter J. Dixon, Reparations and the Politics of Recognition, in C. Stahn, C. de Vos and S. Kendall (eds.), 
Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions, (CUP, 2015), 
326-351.
373 Diana Contreras-Garduño, Defining Beneficiaries of Collective Reparations: The experience of the 
IACtHR, Amsterdam Law Forum 4(3) (2012) 40-57, p48.
374 Duch, ECCC Trial Chamber, Judgment, Case File 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, E188, 26 July 2010, para.661.
375 Friedrich Rosenfeld, Collective reparation for victims of armed conflict, International Review of the 
Red Cross 92(879), September 2010, 731-746, p732.
376 Moffett n.30, p11-12.
377 Christoph Sperfeldt, Collective Reparations at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 
International Criminal Law Review 12 (2012) 457–489, p472-475.
378 ICC-01/04-01/07-3728-tENG 17-08-2017, para.274.
379 Conor McCarthy, Reparations under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and 
Reparative Justice Theory, International Journal of Transitional Justice 3(2) (2009) 250–271, p. 271. Luke 
Moffett, Transitional Justice and Reparations, in C. Lawther, L. Moffett and D. Jacobs (eds.), Research 
Handbook on Transitional Justice Edward Elgar, (2017), 377–400.
Reparations in international criminal 
justice bodies
110. Since the creation of the International Criminal Court, reparations have been 
awarded against those convicted before the Court. As discussed in the previous 
section, providing reparations to victims is considered a mitigating factor in 
international criminal justice sentencing. At the ICC, the Court has the discretion 
to award a fine against convicted persons as well as reparations.362 To date, this 
has only been ordered against Mr Bemba for his conviction of witness tampering. 
Reparations at the ICC have only been awarded in three cases at the Court, with all 
of the convicted persons being indigent, meaning that their financial contribution 
is offset to the future. Ongoing insecurity and their incarceration has prevented 
those convicted from directly contributing symbolic measures to victims. In the 
Lubanga case the Court declined to order compensation given his lack of financial 
resources, but also because awarding monetary awards to the victims who were 
child soldiers may cause community resentment and social tensions.363 While 
initially the Court in the Lubanga case awarded community based reparations 
to affected communities, this was later rejected on appeal on the grounds that 
reparations had to be aimed to victims harmed by the crimes of which the 
accused is convicted.364 Instead the Chamber approved the Trust Fund’s later 
implementation plan of collective reparations that included symbolic measures 
of construction of community centres and a mobile programme to reduce 
stigma and discrimination against former child soldiers, along with service-based 
collective measures through physical and psychological rehabilitation, vocational 
training and income generating activities.365 
111. In the subsequent Katanga case victims of a massacre in Bogoro, Ituri (DRC) 
demanded monetary measures to alleviate their suffering and rejected collective 
symbolic measures such as apologies and memorials as unsuitable, pointless 
or had the potential to cause unrest.366 Instead the Chamber awarded $250 to 
the victims, as a way to provide a ‘personal and symbolic acknowledgement’ 
and to help them to regain their ‘self-sufficiency and to make decisions for 
themselves on the basis of their needs.’367 The Court also approved the Trust 
Fund’s implementation plan for services such as housing assistance, education 
assistance, income-generating activities, and psychological rehabilitation, to be 
provided to victims.368 Similar in the Al Mahdi case involving the destruction of the 
world heritage site at Timbuktu, the victims rejected the TFV proposed symbolic 
measures of memorialisation, use of Mr Al Mahdi’s apology and a re-sanctification 
of the buildings, as inappropriate.369 Taking these concerns on-board the Court 
362 Article 77(2)(a), Rome Statute.
363 ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, para.231; and ICC-01/04-01/06-3129-AnxA, para.67(ii).
364 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, para.274; and ICC-01/04-01/06-3129, 03-03-2015, para.214.
365 Order approving the proposed plan of the Trust Fund for Victims in relation to symbolic collective 
reparations, 21 October 2016, ICC-01/04-01/06-3251; and Order approving the proposed programmatic 
framework for collective service-based reparations submitted by the Trust Fund for Victims, 6 April 
2017, ICC-01/04-01/06-3289.
366 ICC-01/04-01/07-3728-tENG, para.301.
367 ICC-01/04-01/07-3728-tENG 17-08-2017, para.285.
368 ICC-01/04-01/07-3728-tENG, paras.302-304.
369 ICC-01/12-01/15-291-Red2, para.157-167.56 57
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Cambodian government to enforce implementation.386 In Case 001 against Kaing 
Guek Eav (aka Duch) involving the torture site of S-21, the Court only awarded 
reparations that include a declaration that all the civil parties admitted in the case 
had suffered harm as a result of the Duch crimes, along with a compilation of all 
statements of apology and acknowledgement made by him during the trial.387 In 
Case 002/01 against the two most senior remaining leaders of the Khmer Rouge 
Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, focused on crimes against humanity related to 
the forced displacement of civilians and execution of soldiers. The ECCC approved 
in Case 002/01 eleven out of thirteen proposed measures ranging from a national 
remembrance day for victims, psychological therapy and self-help groups, inclusion 
of material on the Khmer Rouge in the national curriculum, publication of the 
judgement and inclusion of civil parties’ names on the ECCC website.388 These 
measures were supported by the ECCC as they had receiving funding from donors 
and provides ‘support to the victims, keeps their memory alive, acknowledges 
their suffering and awakens public awareness to avoid repetition of acts such as 
those that occurred.’389 Two measures on creating public memorials in Cambodia 
and Paris were not approved as they failed to receive funding. Civil parties in Case 
001 had proposed a national remembrance day, but the Court rejected this as it 
required action by the state, which only consented in Case 002/01 as no funding 
was required to implement it. 
116. The subsequent Case 002/02 against Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan examined a 
broader category of crimes that included genocide against the Cham and ethnic 
Vietnamese communities in Cambodia, forced marriage and rape, executions, 
torture and enforced disappearances. The lead co-lawyers proposed 18 reparation 
projects ranging from mental health support, legal and civil education for minority 
groups, a song-writing competition, dance production on forced marriage, and 
a photo exhibition on genocide of Cham and ethnic Vietnamese.390 The ECCC 
refused to approve five projects as they had not received funding from donors. 
Notably the ECCC rejected part of project 13 involving mental health support 
and livelihood support to elderly civil parties, given that the latter part looked 
like monetary reparation, rather than collective and moral measures. Project 15 
involving acknowledgement of discrimination and persecution of indigenous 
minorities in Ratanakiri and Mondulkiri provinces was rejected as the accused 
were not charged or convicted of these crimes.391 As such the ECCC reparation 
process is a means for donor funded programmes to receive official approval for 
specific projects that aim to address some of victims’ needs, but without a national 
reparation programme the measures do not adequately remedy their harm. For 
instance the ethnic Vietnamese continue to be denied rights as citizens, causing 
many to living on floating villages on the Tonlé Sap river, as they are unable to 
own land legally or send their children to school. Due to controversy amongst 
other civil parties who wanted the ethnic Vietnamese excluded from the ECCC, 
their reparations was diluted down from assisting them attaining citizenship to 
386 Renée Jeffery, Beyond Repair? Collective and Moral Reparations at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 
Journal of Human Rights 13(1) (2014) 103-119.
387 Trial Judgment, paras.682-683.
388 Trial Judgment, 7 August 2014, paras.1126-1162.
389 Trial Judgment, 7 August 2014, para.1164.
390 See Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers’ Final Claim for Reparation in Case 002/02, E457/6/2/1 30 May 2017.
391 See Trial Summary Judgment.
continuing suffering. Collective and moral reparations can provide recognition to 
groups of victims that acknowledges their lived reality, but also benefit society 
in reaffirming the legal order and awakening public consciousness about such 
victimisation to prevent its reoccurrence.380 
114. The International Criminal Court is unique compared to other international 
criminal bodies, as a Trust Fund for Victims was created alongside it that had 
been fundraising for a number of years before a reparations decision was reached. 
The Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC) ordered compensation against the 
convicted person amounting to $139 million (USD) in the Hissène Habré case, 
but as none of his assets had been identified a trust fund has been established 
to provide compensation to victims.381 The EAC rejected collective and symbolic 
reparations as they lacked specificity of their cost, location and programme 
operation. In addition, as the EAC did not have jurisdiction over Chad it could not 
find it responsible nor order it to implement collective measures. In domestic 
Chadian proceedings against 20 of Habré’s associates, a court awarded $125 million 
(USD) after their conviction for torture, including the seizure of their assets and half 
liability of the state, due to the convicted person’s official position at the time of the 
violations. The trust fund established by the African Union in 2018, is intended to 
facilitate compensation through identifying assets stolen by Habré and his cadres 
as well as contribution from donors, but also has powers to award collective and 
moral reparations in collaboration with the Chadian government, as well as with 
other states, inter-governmental organisations and civil society groups.382 One civil 
party group (AVCRHH) had requested the chamber for 30% of funds designated 
for compensation to be used to fund collective reparations to benefit communities 
affected by the crimes. These measures included income-generating development 
projects, creation of monuments in memory to the victims, commemorating 30 
May as a day against impunity, educational materials in school curricula, and socio-
professional training facilities for indirect, women and children victims.383 
115. At the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia explicitly excludes 
compensation or other monetary measures of reparations, by only permitting 
claims for ‘collective and moral’ measures.384 As such the purpose of such 
reparations before the ECCC are to ‘acknowledge the harm’ suffered by the victims 
before the Court as a result of a crime the accused is convicted and ‘provide 
benefits’ which address their harm.385 This narrow scope of reparations reflects 
the legal and political situation the ECCC operates within, in that it does not have 
a trust fund, has millions of potential victims and has no jurisdiction over the 
380 Luke Moffett, Transitional Justice and Reparations, in C. Lawther, L. Moffett and D. Jacobs (eds.), 
Research Handbook on Transitional Justice Edward Elgar, (2017), 377–400.
381 The Prosecutor v. Hissène Habré, Appeals Chamber of the Extraordinary African Chambers, dispositif, 
p225-227.
382 Article 7(c)-(d), Statute of the Trust Fund for Victims of Hissène Habré’s Crimes, EX.CL/1040(XXXI). See 
Nader Diab, Challenges in the Implementation of the Reparation Award against Hissein Habré: Can 
the Spell of Unenforceable Awards across the Globe be Broken? Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, 16(1) (2018) 141-163.
383 Judgment on Reparations, Hissène Habré, EAC, First Instance Chamber, 29 July 2016, para.59-68. See 
Diab ibid., p144-145.
384 Internal Rule 23 quinquies.
385 Internal Rule 23 quinquies 1(a)-(b).58 59
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efforts at resistance during their time in German concentration camps, Levi hints 
at a belief that through their ‘failure’ to ‘resist’, he and fellow prisoners were also 
complicit in the atrocities that took place. In doing so, Levi implicates all humans 
in the acts of others, encompassing not only deeds of depravity, but also the failure 
to act to prevent such deeds:
‘What guilt? When all was over, the awareness emerged that we had no done 
anything or not enough, against the system into which we had been absorbed…
on a rational plane, there should not have been much to be ashamed of, but 
shame persisted nonetheless, especially for the few, bright examples of those 
who had the strength and possibility to resist.’397 
120. For Erin Baines, the term perpetrator includes bystanders, collaborators, 
informants, forced perpetrators, forced combatants, victims turned-perpetrators, 
and perpetrators-turned-victims.398 The following example provides a way into this 
complexity: ‘A student watches his parents being harassed by secret police; the 
student joins protest or freedom-fighting groups and then is arrested; the student 
emerges willing to use terrorist tactics against the secret police, and sets off bombs 
that kill civilians’.399 In this example, the student has been a victim, combatant and 
bystander. Equally, as Claire Moon notes, the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission required South Africans to be designated as either ‘victims’ or 
‘perpetrators’, but in respect to perpetrators, did not distinguish between the kinds 
of acts committed, the reasons why they were committed, their consequences 
or their context, or between individuals who committed just one act and those 
whose entire operation and purpose was the commission of such acts.400 Some of 
those who came before the TRC could not easily be accommodated within these 
categories of ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’. One controversial figure (Robert McBride) 
who applied for and was granted amnesty for his actions during the liberation 
struggle (including planting a bomb at a bar, which caused the deaths of 3 people 
and injured a further 69) declared that he too had been a victim of the white 
Apartheid regime and that it was his determination to fight against that system 
that led to his involvement in armed struggle.401
121. The most obvious example of perpetrators who can also be thought of as victims 
are child soldiers and female combatants.402 The use of child soldiers – those under 
the age of 15 who are conscripted or enlisted into armed groups and/or used to 
actively participate in hostilities is ubiquitous. For example, between 30,000-60,000 
children were abducted to fill the ranks of the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army, 
while an estimated 7,500 children were recruited by all parties to the Colombian 
conflict – guerrilla organisations, the military and state-aligned paramilitary groups. 
Writing in respect to child soldiers in the Lord’s Resistance Army, Baines notes the 
397 Ibid. p56-57.
398 Erin Baines, Spirits and Social Reconstruction after Mass Violence: Rethinking Transitional Justice, 
African Affairs, 109(436) (2010) 409-430.
399 Minow n.2, p63.
400 Clare Moon, Healing past violence: traumatic assumptions and therapeutic interventions in war and 
reconciliation’, Journal of Human Rights, 8(1) (2009) 71-91.
401 See McEvoy and McConnachie n.156; and Du Bois-Pendain n.86, p213.
402 See for example: Kirsten Fisher, Transitional Justice for Child Soldiers: Accountability and Social 
Reconstruction in Post-Conflict Contexts. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan (2013); Seema Shekhawat, 
Female Combatants in Conflict and Peace: Challenging Gender in Violence and Post-Conflict 
Reintegration. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan (2015).
legal and civic education. Similarly the Cham community who had their religious 
leader killed and tens of thousands of their members killed during the genocide, 
lost some of their cultural heritage and wanted educational scholarships so that 
the next generation could reconnect with their cultural legacy, instead before the 
ECCC they received a photo exhibition and awareness raising activities.392 
117. Ultimately the challenges of reparations before international criminal justice bodies 
is that they are dealing with asymmetrical justice, in that they holding individuals 
liable for crimes which affected thousands of victims, with no recourse to call upon 
the state or other responsible organisations to support such reparation measures 
within a large administrative scheme. It also reflects that international criminal 
justice bodies cannot provide comprehensive reparations like state administrative 
programmes, as they lack the resources and capacity. However, such courts can 
provide a form of reparations, at least at the minimalist end, of measures that 
acknowledge and seek to remedy the moral harm suffered by victims. That said 
there is emerging practice of ex-combatants, in particular former non-state 
armed groups, to provide reparations, not as a punishment, but through being 
incentivised to voluntarily contribute to the remedy of victims’ harm.
Complex Political Victims
118. The final area we wish to address in this report is that of ‘complex political 
victims’ – those victims who simultaneously or successively experienced harm 
and participated in systems of oppression and political violence.393 One caveat is 
essential. Arguing for the acknowledgement of complex identities is not to imply a 
collectivisation of guilt or to suggest that all perpetrators are victims or vice versa. 
Moreover, it is not meant to deny the victim status of individuals, especially since 
discourses of blaming and silencing victims are often instrumental to political 
violence.394 However, it is necessary to recognise the messy reality of conflict in 
which individual identities cannot be neatly accommodated into strict categories 
of ‘innocent victims’ and ‘guilty perpetrators’. Former vice Chair of the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission Alex Boraine takes up this point: 
‘To think of the perpetrators as victims is not to condone their actions or their 
deeds, nor is it to turn away from the many victims whose lives they destroyed 
by their activities. It is simply to try to understand something of the ambiguity, 
the contradictions, of war, of conflict, of prejudice.’395 
119. Holocaust survivor Primo Levi offers perhaps the most generous insight into the 
complexity of victimhood, arguing that even in the horror of the concentration 
camps, the complex network of human relations could not always be reduced to 
‘two blocs’ of victims and persecutors’.396 Reflecting on his and others’ ‘inadequate’ 
392 See Rachel Killean and Luke Moffett, What’s in a name? The Discourse and Practice of Reparations at 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, (forthcoming 2019).
393 Erica Bouris, Complex Political Victims. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian (2007).
394 Julie Bernath, ‘Complex Political Victims’ in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity: Reflections on the Khmer 
Roouge Tribunal in Cambodia, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 10(1) (2016) 44-66.
395 Alex Boraine, A Country Unmasked: Inside South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
Oxford University Press (2000).
396 Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, Abacus, (1986) p23.60 61
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‘recognizing these perpetrators as victims is quite critical, because if we do not see 
them as victims, we are unlikely to understand the true horror of [the context]’.412 
Contribution of ex-combatants 
and organisations
123. There is growing practice that ex-combatants can make a useful contribution to 
securing the peace and assisting transitional justice mechanisms. Their role is not 
just instrumental in these mechanisms, but ex-combatants can in engaging in 
such acts rehabilitate their image as not just fighters, but citizens trying to amend 
for past wrongs. In turn this can to an extent help to reintegrate and resocialise 
them into society by their public deeds. It is worth keeping in mind that such 
individuals are not simply perpetrators or combatants, but can be representatives, 
leaders and mediators in their own communities, to some they are defenders of 
victimised or marginalised communities, and even victims themselves. In Nepal 
we interviewed a number of former child soldiers who joined up with Maoist 
guerrillas after their family members were disappeared by the army, and in Uganda 
and Guatemala civilians who have been abducted and forced to join armed and 
paramilitary armed groups.
124. There are experiences elsewhere of ex-combatants making important contributions 
to reparations. In the Philippines, the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission Bangsamoro recommended that the Philippine army and national 
police contribute to symbolic reparations, such as formal apologies for their role 
in human rights and humanitarian law violation, as well as to provide ‘material 
reparations’, including ‘rebuilding homes, mosques, madrasahs, and other 
community infrastructure in affected Bangsamoro communities.’ The Commission 
also recommended that the archives of such organisations should be accessible 
and protected by them. 413
125. The contribution of assets by ex-combatants to reparations can provide a symbolic 
token to offsetting the cost of reparations borne by the state to all victims, but it is 
likely that any such remaining assets within a group will have been substantially 
reduced during the conflict. In the Solomon Islands, while amnesty excluded 
international crimes, the amnesty was conditioned on individuals returning ‘all 
weapons and ammunition and stolen property’ possessed by militant groups.414 
In Sierra Leone subsistence support to ex-combatants to assist their reintegration 
where weapons were exchanged for compensation, was perceived as only assisting 
those who fought in the war rather than the suffering of victims, inhibiting 
reconciliation and reintegration. It also meant that some vulnerable groups of 
women and children remained dependent on former commanders, ‘reinforcing 
loyalties and preventing their return to local communities.’415 
412 Bouris n.393, p67.
413 Report of the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission Bangsamoro, (2016), p87.
414 Section 3(3), Amnesty Act 2001. See also the amnesty in Section 5, Northern Ireland Arms 
Decommissioning Act 1997,
415 W. Andy Knight Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in 
Africa: An Overview, African Security, 1(1) (2008), 24-52, p42.
‘choiceless decisions’ child soldiers are forced to make in order to navigate complex, 
violent terrains, but which simultaneously, leaves emotional and physical scars as 
a result as their abduction, captivity and the harms they perpetrated.403 Similarly, 
in South Africa, it is arguable that young Afrikaner soldiers and policemen can be 
viewed as victims of an authoritarian, masculinized militarized society in which 
they were forced to go through a cadet system at school, were conscripted into 
the army and were subjected to daily state propaganda.404 In such contexts, the 
question of perpetrator agency and the role of larger structural factors must be 
considered when probing questions of victimization. 
122. In other instances, the complex identity of victim–perpetrators refers to individuals 
who are members of non-state armed, paramilitary or terrorist groups, or state 
forces who commit human rights abuses but have also been victimized405 through 
identifiable international crimes, such as disappearances, extrajudicial killings, 
sexual violence, torture, serious injury or ill-treatment caused by other actors.406 
The circularity in such claims-making – of people who become involved in violence 
because of their own or their communities’ experience of violence – has been a 
constant refrain repeated to one of the authors in literally hundreds of interviews 
with combatants and ex-combatants over the years. Equally, many ex-combatants 
continue to suffer as a result of their militarized histories and involvement in 
violent conflict.407 Sources of trauma among former combatants in South Africa 
include the brutalization of South African Defence Force (SADF) conscripts in 
training; the conditions under which Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) members lived in 
exile; the resulting paranoia that comes from a culture of infiltration; government 
security-force harassment of liberation fighters’ families and the consequences of 
witnessing and participating in violent acts.408 In Northern Ireland, 45.3% of former 
republican and loyalist combatants are reported to have experienced moderate 
or severe physical injuries, while 53.1% have been psychologically harmed.409 The 
same survey revealed that 68.8% of respondents engaged in hazardous levels of 
alcohol abuse, while 32.6% had received prescription medication for depression 
in the previous year – a prevalence rate that is 5 times higher than the Northern 
Ireland average for men.410 Given that at least 15,000 people were incarcerated 
during the conflict, the effect of the unresolved past on individuals and the knock-
on effect onto extended families cannot be underestimated.411 As Bouris explains, 
403 Erin Baines, Complex Political Perpetrators: Reflections on Dominic Ongwen, The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 47(2) 162-191.
404 Tristan A. Borer, A Taxonomy of Victims and Perpetrators: Human Rights and Reconciliation in South 
Africa, Human Rights Quarterly, 25(4) (2003) 1088-1116.
405 There are also shades of grey between ‘volunteering’ to join armed groups or being physically or 
economically forced to do so.
406 Luke Moffett, Reparations for ‘Guilty Victims’: Navigating Complex Identities of Victim-Perpetrators in 
Reparation Mechanisms, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 10(1) (2016) 146-167.
407 Sasha Gear, Wishing Us Away: Challenges Facing Ex-Combatants in the ‘New’ South Africa, Violence 
and Transition Series, 8, Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (2002).
408 Ibid.
409 Ruth Jamieson, Peter Shirlow, and Adrian Grounds, Ageing and Social Exclusion among Former 
Politically Motivated Prisoners in Northern Ireland. Belfast: Changing Age Partnership (2010).
410 Ibid.
411 Cheryl Lawther, Haunting and Transitional Justice: On Lives, Landscapes and Unresolved Pasts 
in Northern Ireland.in K. Wale, P. Gobodo-Madikizela, y J. Prager,. (eds). Post-Conflict Hauntings: 
Transforming Collective Memories of Historical Trauma. Palgrave. Forthcoming (2019).62 63
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appropriately crafted for victims. When coming from ex-combatants, apologies 
can also contribute to a shift within their own political community to self-reflect on 
their own actions and justification of the past and violence. Victim participation in 
developing what an apology should include in terms of language and scope can 
help to make it more effective and meaningful, but this will need to be carefully 
constructed that it does not alienate former comrades or supportive communities.
128. Ex-combatants can also play an important role in the clarification of facts, especially 
in the confusion of war; information can be misrepresented, misunderstood 
or misperceived. In Northern Ireland, republican and loyalists have carried out 
internal investigations into murders to determine and clarify facts. These have in 
some cases resulted in apologies, especially for those identified as informers.423 
Use immunities have also been used in a number of public inquiries, such as the 
Bloody Sunday massacre, whereby any oral or written statement could not be used 
in criminal or civil proceedings. This enabled members of state forces and the IRA 
to speak opening about their own involvement in the events leading up to and 
after the massacre.424 Similarly for individuals who had their amnesty application 
rejected by the South African TRC, their disclosure was not be used against them 
in any future prosecution.425 As discussed above in relation to Northern Ireland, ex-
combatants have provided key information, which has facilitated the recovery of 
some of ‘the disappeared’. 
129. Legal representation can assist ex-combatants to fill in relevant forms and 
understand their rights. The experience of the Amnesty Commission of the South 
African TRC found that applications made by amnesty applicants were very scant, 
due to them most of them being unable to afford legal representation or for those 
that could their lawyers advised their client to divulge as little as information as 
possible.426 The dependence on legal staff to act as judges, lawyers and advocates 
in the proceedings of the amnesty committee made it largely a ‘court room model’, 
marginalising victims to ‘an audience in a legal show’ between lawyers.427 Legal 
representatives of amnesty applicants acted to protect their clients from self-
incrimination causing them to be ‘a buffer, gatekeeper and silence in what should 
have been a space for open and extensive disclosure.’428 
130. There is clear role for responsible organisations to cooperate in the administration 
of fact clarification by furnishing corroborating information to investigators to verify 
statements and information provided by individual members or victims.429 This can 
help minimise delay, but resources may be needed to help build the organisation’s 
capacity to expedite such information gathering. Impartial verification with 
sources outside such organisations should also be used to corroborate information 
on events to avoid a one sided version of the past. The South African TRC Amnesty 
Committee recommended that one of lessons from its experience was to have 
423 See Dudai n.74.
424 See Kieran McEvoy, Luke Moffett, Louise Mallinder and Gordon Anthony, The Historical Use of 
Amnesties, Immunities, and Sentence Reductions in Northern Ireland, Queen’s University Belfast 
(March 2015) p11-12.
425 SATRC Vol. 6, p14.
426 Vol. 6, p34.
427 Fullard and Rousseau n.90, p202.
428 Ibid.
429 See SATRC, Vol. 6, p35.
126. While there is some practice of the assets of suspected international war criminals 
being seized, it requires a team of investigators, cooperation of other states and 
forensic accountants to identify, freeze and seize such resources.416 How long 
should such obligations be imposed and balanced with an ex-combatant’s 
reintegration and ability to support themselves and their family? This issue has 
been raised at the International Criminal Court, with judges in the Katanga case 
finding that long term imposition of a debt on a convicted person is based on his 
obligation to repair the harm caused, rather than consideration of punishment or 
his reintegration in society.417 However in the subsequent decision in Al Mahdi, the 
Chamber recognised that the convicted person’s financial circumstances affected 
implementation, such as instalments, but it did not want to ‘impose hardships’ 
on Mr Al Mahdi that would ‘make it impossible for him to reintegrate into society 
upon his release.’418 Ultimately the state has a subsidiarity responsibility to all 
victims to provide reparations for gross violations of human rights no matter who 
is the responsible actor, leaving non-state armed groups the space to indemnify 
the state.419 
127. Reparations do not always have to be financial, especially where armed groups 
are demobilised and disarmed. Ex-combatants and their organisations can make 
important expressive messages to victims and society in acknowledging their role 
in the violence of the past and making expressions of remorse. Acknowledgements 
of responsibility should be sincere and genuine, those that are rushed or rote 
statements of responsibility can ‘make survivors feel that reparations are being 
used to buy their silence and put a stop to their continuing quest for truth 
and justice.’420 Apologies can be distinguished from acknowledgements of 
responsibility by their remorseful framing and gestures of such statements.421 
There are a number of factors that can make an apology successful in that it 
mainly satisfies victims: timeliness, explicit statements of apology and regret, an 
acceptance of personal responsibility, the avoidance of offensive explanations 
or excuses, sincerity, willingness to make amends and promises to avoid future 
transgressions.422 As discussed above in relation to apologies made at the ICC and 
ECCC, such measures are often seen as insufficient or premature without other 
measures of reparations being made to victims first. Accordingly, apologies and 
acknowledgement of responsibility can carry symbolic messages of recognition 
of the wrongfulness of victims’ suffering but needed to be properly timed and 
416 Three of the convicted individuals before the ICC have been declared indigent. See also the Kenyatta 
case, Decision on the implementation of the request to freeze assets, ICC-01/09-02/11-931 8 July 2014. 
There are only 25 enforced sentences resulting from Colombian Law 975/2005 proceedings, with only 
13 compensations ordered being paid out to date.
417 ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, 9 March 2018, paras.178-186.
418 ICC-01/12-01/15-236, para.114.
419 Principle 15 and 16, UN Basic Principles on Reparation 2005.
420 Brandon Hamber and Richard Wilson, (2002) Symbolic closure through memory, reparation and 
revenge in post-conflict societies, Journal of Human Rights, 1 (1), 35-53, p46.
421 Federico Lenzerini, Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: International and Comparative Perspectives 
Oxford University Press, (2008), p119.
422 See C. Ancarno, ‘Press Representations of Successful Public Apologies in Britain and France,’ 
3 University of Reading Language Studies Working Papers (2011) 38; J. B. Hatch, Race and 
Reconciliation: Redressing Wounds of Injustice (Lexington Books, Plymouth, 2010), p189; M.R. Marrus, 
‘Official apologies and the quest for historical justice’ 6 Journal of Human Rights (2007) 75; N Tavuchis, 
Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation, (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1991), p17; 
and M. Cunningham, Saying sorry: the politics of apology, 70 The Political Quarterly (1999) 285.64 65
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also corresponds to wider issues within DDR, that challenges to reintegration are 
not so apparent within communities where shaming is caused not usually because 
of an individual’s role in conflict, but because of their affiliation to the faction or 
group’s reputation.438 Thus having former armed group involved as a collective 
organisation, can serve not only to maximise its ability to deliver on demobilisation, 
but also use its membership to crowd-source information within the organisation. 
It can also assist in the reincorporation of ex-combatants as not ordinary criminals, 
but responsible agents still struggling to improve or protect their society. Individual 
leadership within an organisation to catalyse such behaviour is key. Moreover, 
given their position within their own community, such groups can act as strategic 
mediators to minimise future violence and guaranteeing non-recurrence through 
their organic legitimacy. 
Challenges
133. There are a number of challenges for ex-combatants in respect to engaging with 
past focused mechanisms. Personal feelings of blame, shame, stigma may hinder 
their reintegration or willingness to speak opening about their past. The change 
of identity from combatant to civilian, may still belie continuing notions of loyalty 
or social bonds to the organisation or state, or having to confront their underlying 
justification for violence in contrast with the consequences of their action and 
victimisation.439 This may be further complicated masculinity, complex victimhood, 
or continuing psychological trauma and the re-opening of old wounds by talking 
about the past. Ex-combatants, who may be willing to speak about their own 
involvement in conflict, may be reluctant to implicate others. This was apparent in 
the Saville Inquiry into the events on Bloody Sunday massacre of 13 civilians in 1974. 
When called to give evidence, and despite the provision of a use immunity, the 
former Sinn Fein Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness and formerly second in 
command of the IRA, referred to a ‘code of honour’ that prevented him from fully 
revealing all information that would breach the trust and confidence of members 
of his organisation and its supportive community,
“I feel I cannot answer that question because there is a Republican code of 
honour. The people who would have allowed us to use their houses, such as 
the two occasions that you have identified to me, are people who would have 
placed great faith in those IRA members who were using the house. For me to 
identify who those people are would be a betrayal, in my view…I have a duty, 
in my view, stretching back 30 years, to those people and I am not prepared to 
break my word to them under any circumstances.”440 
 Similarly, Miroslav Bralo at the ICTY cooperated in providing information on the 
location of disappeared victims that led to the recovery of some of their bodies, but 
438 Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, Demobilization and Reintegration, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 51(4) (2007) 531-567, p548.
439 See Cheryl Lawther, The Truth about Loyalty: Emotions, Ex-Combatants and Transitioning from the 
Past, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 2017, 11, 484–504.
440 Testimony of Martin McGuinness to the Saville Inquiry, 4th and 5th November 2003, available at; http://
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101103103930/http://report.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/evidence-
index/
application forms that require individuals to provide a narrative summary of both 
the incident and the role of the applicant.430 In addition, proceedings should only 
occur where facts are in dispute between the parties, thereby allowing where the 
parties agree to submit evidence or information into the factual record without 
a public hearing, so as to expedite the process and minimise costs.431 Applicants 
for amnesty had to make a ‘full disclosure’ to be eligible, with those who were 
untruthful on a ‘material aspect’ being refused. However, such a full disclosure only 
had to be on ‘relevant facts’ as to the incidents raised in the amnesty application.432 
The leadership of the ANC made an organisational submission to the TRC covering 
37 leaders, and although their application did not detail individual acts as required 
for the amnesty, it was awarded collectively. This was subsequently heavily criticised 
as a ‘blanket amnesty’.433 
131. There should be consideration of how military or government actors can contribute 
to alternative sanctions, such as losing or reducing military privileges, such as them 
contributing some of their pensions or tax breaks to supporting victims. In the 
case of former Guatemalan president Rios Montt, he was not given a state funeral, 
but a private military funeral. While this was not part of reparations to victims or 
penalty for his earlier conviction of genocide (though later overturned), it reflects 
the inappropriate use of state funds to commemorate individuals who grossly 
violated the rights of citizens.
132. In processes were ex-combatants have contributed information or other 
material, trust, patience, informed expectations, and in particular the leadership 
of ex-combatants has been key to their success. These restorative processes in 
Northern Ireland, discussed above, aimed to maximize information exchange, 
dialogue and mutual consent.434 Reintegration and engagement with transitional 
justice mechanisms by ex-combatants has to be carefully crafted. The use of 
the language of rehabilitation, shame or punishment for being a combatant, 
may sit uncomfortably with those who were struggling for a better country or 
fulfilling their duty as defenders of the state, and neglects their experience of 
victimisation or the structural causes of their belligerency.435 Instead, viewing them 
as peacebuilding agents can harness the potential of ex-combatants to provide 
moral, political and organisational leadership to processes dedicated to the past, 
as well as ‘credibility, respect and legitimacy’, at least within their own political 
communities.436 The organisational structure of an armed group means that 
former members have a shared experience and history, with bonds of loyalty and 
a command structure. These bonds can be used to mobilise them collectively to 
contribute information on the past including location of those disappeared.437 This 
430 SATRC, Vol. 6, p87.
431 SATRC, Vol. 6, p89.
432 SATRC, Vol. 6, p10.
433 Louise Mallinder, Indemnity, Amnesty, Pardon and Prosecution Guidelines in South Africa, Working 
Paper No. 2 From Beyond Legalism: Amnesties, Transition and Conflict Transformation, (2009), p78.
434 McEvoy and Mika n.69, p367.
435 Kieran McEvoy and Peter Shirlow, Re-imagining DDR Ex-combatants, leadership and moral agency in 
conflict transformation, Theoretical Criminology 13(1) (2009) 31–59, p33-34.
436 McEvoy and Shirlow ibid., p41.
437 Clare D. Dwyer, Expanding DDR: The Transformative Role of Former Prisoners in Community-Based 
Reintegration in Northern Ireland, International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 6, 2012, 274–295, 
p283.66 67
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bargain for the other charges [of genocide].”450 She went on to indicate that her 
side did nothing wrong during the conflict and the victims deserved what they 
got.451 Making such reduced sentences or alternative penalties conditional on 
individuals renouncing violence, along with monitoring of their compliance post 
release, may help to mitigate such situations.
Monitoring of Sanction and Reintegration
136. In Northern Ireland, early release for prisoners was a key issue in the peace 
negotiation and 1998 agreement.452 Under the subsequent law, a person in a 
non-state armed group (prescribed organisation) who is convicted of a schedule 
offence can obtain a reduced sentence of two years, including murder, gross bodily 
harm and rape. The sentence reduction does not absolve the individual of their 
criminal responsibility and it does not expunge their criminal record.453 Instead, 
their sentence would be suspended unless they breached the conditions of their 
release. This consideration for release is centred on applicants upon being let out 
of prison on the grounds of them not being a supporter or likely to become a 
supporter of a specified organisation which is opposed to the peace process (i.e. 
on ceasefire and decommissioned); likely to become involved in acts of terrorism 
connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland; or if a life sentence prisoner, be a 
danger to the public.454 This process has been very successful with 488 prisoners 
being released and only 23 being returned to prison in a 20 year period,455 
reflecting the political nature and motivation of such violence, but also the role of 
organisations in transforming their members from conflict to peace. Local police 
and prosecution service provided monitoring when people came before them on 
charges or in court, with the panel for sentence reduction only having to meet to 
determine new cases as they arose. Despite this, individuals released under the 
scheme and other ex-prisoners continue to face barriers to employment that allow 
them to fully reintegrate into society as civilians.456 
450 Jelena Subotic, The Cruelty of False Remorse: Biljana Plavšić at the Hague, 36 Southeastern Europe 
(2012) 39-51, p48.
451 S. Dana, The Limits of Judicial Idealism: Should the International Criminal Court Engage with 
Consequentialist Aspirations?, Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs, (2014), p.98–99.
452 In the UK - Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998; and in the Republic of Ireland - the Criminal Justice 
(Release of Prisoners) Act 1998.
453 See Kieran McEvoy, Prisoners, the Agreement, and the Political Character of the Northern Ireland 
Conflict, Fordham International Law Journal (1999) 26(1) 145-181.
454 Section 9, Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998.
455 Sentence Review Commissioners Annual Report 2017/18, HMSO HC 1241 (2018) p19.
456 See OFMDFM, Recruiting People with Conflict Related Convictions: Employers’ Guidance (OFMDFM, 
2007).
refused to cooperate with the prosecution in implicating other former comrades 
in fear of retaliation against his family.441 
134. Trust is an important part of engaging in such difficult processes in confronting the 
past. Trust was central in the experience in Northern Ireland in ex-combatant’s role 
in the recovery of the disappeared.442 Ex-combatants grew confident in the ICVLR’s 
commissioners and investigators in respect to the values they followed and how 
treated them, the ‘quiet’ nature of the process and the provision of immunity from 
prosecution. Moreover, there was a political impetus on republicans to address 
this dark chapter of their past, given that the victims came from within their own 
community and their families had been effective in public advocating for action 
around the peace negotiations.443 Trust is linked to expected outcomes of processes 
and perceptions of impartiality of the laws, actors and processes involved.444 
Where unrealistic claims and commitments are made that cannot be met by a 
commission it can contribute to mistrust and disengagement by participants.445 
This underlines the importance of informing victims at the outset and throughout 
the process of the likely long period of time it would take to identify the remains 
and being realistic that there may not be a satisfactory outcome no matter the 
amount of contribution of ex-combatants. 
135. The sincerity of ex-combatants is a further point of consideration when they 
engage in such processes. In Rwanda apologies before the gacaca courts were 
judged by how ‘complete and sincere’ they were, which in practice contained 
a detailed description of the crimes committed, the names of the victims, 
accomplices, locations, and, if relevant, the property that was damaged.’446 Local 
judges determined how fulsome an apology was by its sincerity and the extent 
to which it corresponded to the truth presented by all the participants involved 
in the incident. The ICC has held that mere expressions of ‘sympathy or genuine 
compassion for the victims’ is given less weight in mitigation than an expression of 
remorse.447 The ICTY judged the sincerity of statements of remorse and apologies on 
‘not only the accused’s statements but also of his behaviour (voluntary surrender, 
guilty plea).’448 This is not an infallible process, as can be seen in the case of former 
Republika Srpska president Biljana Plavšić, who received a mitigated sentence 
of 11 years following her crimes against humanity conviction for contributing to 
local reconciliation through an apology, making a remorseful admission and her 
positive impact on the reconciliatory process.449 She declared “I sacrificed myself. I 
have done nothing wrong. I pleaded guilty to crimes against humanity so I could 
441 Combs n.106, p83-84.
442 See Lauren Dempster, Transitional Justice and the Disappeared of Northern Ireland: Silence, 
Memory, and the Construction of the Past, Routledge (2019).
443 See Lauren Dempster, ‘Quiet’ Transitional Justice: ‘Publicness,’ Trust and Legitimacy in the Search for 
the ‘Disappeared’, Social and Legal Studies (2019).
444 Morton Deutsch, Trust and Suspicion, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2(4), (1958), 265-279.
445 QUB Human Rights Centre, Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland’s Past: The Human Rights 
Dimension, October 2018, p15-16.
446 Penal Reform International, Eight Years On ... A Record of Gacaca Monitoring in Rwanda (2010), p35.
447 Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3484-tENG-Corr, para.117.
448 Blaškić, Trial Judgement, IT-95-14-T, 3 March 2000, para.775.
449 The Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, IT-00-39&40/1-S, (27 February 2003), para. 
71–81.68 69
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Recommendations
457 Sullo n.48, p267.
458 Therese Abrahamsen & Hugo van der Merwe, Reconciliation through Amnesty? Amnesty Applicants’ 
Views of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, CSVR 2005, p9.
459 PRI, The contribution of the Gacaca jurisdictions to resolving cases arising from the genocide 
Contributions, limitations and expectations of the post-Gacaca phase, 2010, p17-18.
460 Fullard and Rosseau n.90, p223.
461 Paul Gready, The Era of Transitional Justice: The Aftermath of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa and Beyond, Routledge (2011), p111.
462 In the gacaca the de facto exclusion of crimes of the RPF. Sullo n.48, p268.
Below are some indicative recommendations that are not exhaustive on learning form 
the lessons in other context that may be useful for the JEP:
Restorative justice
139. Engaging in restorative justice at the community level can help to rebuild the 
social fabric in how communities resolve disputes amongst themselves, which 
can assist in developing communal bonds and social resilience. For victims it 
can allow them greater ownership of proceedings, enabling them to ‘tell their 
story’ by narrating events on their own terms,457 rather than answering questions 
in criminal proceedings, and provides the possibility of directly engaging with 
those responsible. Protracted conflicts involve a complex web of responsibility 
and victimisation, creating a process that only seeks to mediate between victims 
and perpetrators, could potentially neglect the role of the state in victimising 
perpetrators or the structural causes of violence. Attention needs to be paid to the 
gender dynamics of violence and responses to it, to ensure that women and girls 
can effectively contribute and shape processes to their needs and interests. Similar 
thought needs to be given to how disabled or elderly victims and perpetrators can 
engage in and benefit from such processes.
140. There are some common experiences of challenges in these informal settings 
that the JEP should make an effort to avoid such as: apprehension of participants 
(victim and perpetrator) in seeing the other participant(s),458 due to fear of reprisals 
or being falsely denounced;459 a lack of sincerity; strategic non-engagement by 
victims to not participate due to time commitments or security risks; silence in the 
public forum (may encourage more private meetings);460 pressure on participants 
to fulfil external or state goals for the process (such as reconciliation);461 selective 
framing of the context;462 and neglect of a gender perspective, gender-based 
crimes and sexual violence.
141. Informing expectations and providing some legal certainty on the restorative 
approach of the JEP is important, but boundaries need to be clear on what a 
process can and cannot provide. Having complementary processes in place to 
address other needs (such as the Victims Unit and the truth commission (CEV)) 
and signposting participants to support services can help improve understanding 
and satisfaction. Restoration for victims cannot be provided through perpetrators 
Conclusion - Alternative 
Sanctions
137. The JEP sits in a unique position to recalibrate justice that mediates the concerns 
and needs of victims with the responsibility of perpetrators. This report has sought 
to highlight some of the international and national jurisprudence and practices 
in responding to international crimes. There are no simple answers or perfect 
solutions to follow. However there are good practices and lessons to be learnt, as 
well as international obligations to ensure victims’ and perpetrators’ right to steer 
such a process.
138. International human rights law and international criminal law do not specify 
particular penalties or punishments for international crimes. Although blanket 
amnesties are generally considered illegal, conditional amnesties are in principle 
acceptable, where individuals contribute information, reparations or other 
efforts to reconciliation and peace. Alternative sanctions sit somewhere between 
punishment and amnesty, in that they ensure that individuals are held responsible 
for their wrongful actions under international human rights and international 
criminal law, but their punishment is attenuated by the broad political goal of 
reconciliation. In particular the attention to shift justice from being retributive, to 
being more sensitive to delivering victims’ rights to truth and reparations. A criminal 
court can never full satisfy victims’ right to reparation or truth, it is why it needs to 
be completed by bodies specialised in delivering these broad goals. Nonetheless, 
it can facilitate perpetrators to confront their wrongdoing and incentivise them to 
make some measure of repair and acknowledgement to victims.
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individuals who will face the higher threshold of 8 years should be left for those 
who served in higher positions when international crimes were committed, 
thus reflecting the gravity of their crimes and superior responsibility. Seeing the 
harm collectively caused by different armed groups and armed forces – there is a 
collective and individual responsibility to acknowledge and remedy victims’ harm 
by the organisation and individuals involved.
145. For individual perpetrators, it may be worth them to make individual contributions 
to truth and acknowledgement, such as testimony on particular dates and events, 
but also letters of apology or information to victims. Organisations can provide a 
more corporate view of the collective responsibility of the group, but also make use 
of their organisation to collect information and for senior leaders to provide wider 
apologies and acknowledgements of responsibility. Protracted conflicts involve a 
web of responsible and victimised actors. Consideration should also be made for 
ex-combatants who have also been victimised by other actors to seek some form 
of remedy. For instance consideration should be made as to whether victimised 
FARC members by the state or by their own organisation should receive an apology 
or reparations from those responsible actors before the JEP, even though they are 
excluded from reparations through the Victims Unit. This speaks to reparations 
reaffirming the dignity and human rights of individuals no matter their background, 
even when they might be responsible for victimising others. It may not mean that 
victimised FARC members should be awarded compensation, but should receive 
some form of symbolic reparation through apologies and acknowledgements of 
responsibility.465 To be truly restorative, it requires seeing the conflict beyond binary 
black-and-white terms. If one group only carries out restoration to another in a 
unilateral way, it misses a deeper problem of the complex multidirectional nature 
of violence and the role of the state and society that allowed and justified violence 
to be committed with impunity.
Victim Participation
146. In a system built on the foundations of restorative justice, victims’ direct and 
indirect participation is essential to restoring relations and helping victims and 
perpetrators move forward. Victims need to understand and feel that they play a 
central role in this system. This can also demonstrate respect and reaffirm victims’ 
dignity by treating them as right-holders and participants with a valuable role in 
the JEP.
147. It would be important for the JEP to make a list of the various opportunities that its 
proceedings allow victims to participate in the process, either directly or through 
their legal representatives or other intermediaries. It should be borne in mind the 
potential for victims to enhance justice and/or to benefit from such participation, 
and determine which of those constitute the best opportunities for participation. 
The JEP already contains various opportunities for victims to participate through 
presenting reports, using remedies, or attending some hearings. However, 
participation in such opportunities is of a different nature. Reports are written by 
a few and do not allow a direct contact between victims and the system. Provision 
could continue to be made throughout the process for other mediums of 
submitting information, such as audio recordings or videos, particularly for those 
465 See Moffett n.405.
alone, and requires a comprehensive reparations programme to deliver a more 
integrated package of remedies to victims. This reflects that reparations encompass 
a range of services, awards and symbolic measures, but at its minimalist end is 
about officially acknowledging and recognising victims’ moral harm. Likewise, 
perpetrators through their engagement with a restorative process will need some 
form of financial or educational support and other reintegration programmes 
to support their socio-economic transition back into society. As such restorative 
justice processes can potentially provide an interface, in a safe and supportive 
environment for victims, perpetrators and the community to probe the past.
142. The traditional and rituals practices in different contexts are cultural rooted in 
their experience and identity as a community. Rediscovery of traditions, usually 
tasked to deal with petty crime, can risk them being used by elites to achieve their 
political goals, instrumentalising victims and the local community or undermining 
their ability to effectively participate or benefit, due lack of capacity.463 Care 
must be taken in returning to a ‘traditional’ or informal form of justice through 
restoration, that indigenous practices are not appropriated without consent or 
used in a manner that insidiously extends state power in a neo-colonial manner. In 
Colombia there are a range of existing traditional responses to crimes within Afro-
Colombian communities and indigenous peoples. There are many places where 
conflict took place and impacted through gross human rights violations where 
‘the tradition’ does not really exist or has been disrupted by displacement and 
violence. There may be a role for religious institutions to play in bringing parties 
together or providing a neutral space to meet on common principles of respect 
and forgiveness.
143. Taking a restorative justice approach can help to humanise perpetrators and 
victims, allowing them to participate and develop a sense of ownership of the 
transitional process.464 Yet when addressing gross violations of human rights or 
international crimes, the inhumanity of war that created such victims cannot be 
forgotten. Indeed, a restorative process should be concerned with the victim, but 
also in reaffirming the wrongfulness of such acts that victimised them and the 
broader structural causes of violence that perpetuated/continue to perpetuate 
violence. There is value in recognising the modest contribution a restorative 
process in the JEP involving victims and ex-combatants can make to peace and 
dealing with the past. Such processes need to coordinate with other transitional 
justice mechanisms, and where available, processes and interactions beyond the 
state. Victim participation should not be framed as only forgiveness, it may need to 
be slowly introduced or in a staged process, as it may take time for the participants 
to trust the system and each other. 
Sentencing and alternative sanctions
144. In line with human rights and international criminal law, sentences should be 
proportional, with the imposition of 5-8 years sanction being conditional on 
individuals complying with their commitment to peace and reconciliation. Those 
463 McEvoy and Mallinder n.19, p432.
464 Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor, Transitional Justice from Below: An Agenda for Research, Policy 
and Praxis, in K. McEvoy and L. McGregor (eds.) Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots Activism 
and the Struggle for Change, Hart (2008), p5.72 73
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149. The JEP should avoid using or instrumentalising victims without their consent. 
In particular, victims should not be rolled out in front of the media in order to 
capture them having their first meeting with a perpetrator. The experience of 
the South African TRC was that these encounters worked best in private. The 
‘big’ acknowledgment moment by a responsible organisation should be carefully 
choreographed with victims to ensure that it is with their consent and has a 
reparative benefit for them, and is not just about legitimising the judicial work.
150. Victim participation can help to pinpoint and correct whether or not such 
acknowledgments and other outcomes measures would be useful. Victims should 
have a choice, and be able to change this over time as far as possible. While the 
process can be framed as restorative, it is important to inform victims of their 
rights and availability of services, such as representation, counselling, protection 
and financial support to attend hearings. Representation should include a range 
of options, including in person, through a victim or community organisation 
designated by victims, or legal representatives. Legal aid should be provided to 
allow victims to avail of their legal rights. Having an internal institutional body, such 
as OPCV at the ICC, helps to provide general information of victims’ rights and 
signpost them to relevant victim associations, funding for participation in person, 
or other bodies, such as for reparations. Providing financial support to allow victims 
attend, both in terms of transport and childcare, can ensure a better engagement 
by those who work and have family commitments, so as not to exclude the voices 
of those impoverished or a gender perspective.
151. Given that the JEP will have macro-cases, and that not all victims of the atrocities 
will be able to participate before it, it is important that through its Secretary, the 
JEP takes important measures to keep all other victims informed and to create 
spaces where they can also feel, even if less directly, that they are also part of the 
process. For example, by being able to see, from abroad the acknowledgment of 
responsibility of perpetrators, or by having a say in relation to the types of sanciones 
propias that could be imposed on the perpetrators.
152. Psychosocial support for victims is vital to support them participating directly 
at the JEP. This should include a support person to accompany them when 
testifying or sharing their views and concerns, a briefing and debriefing before 
doing so, allowing them to take breaks when needed, and changing the format 
of the chamber to be more private or comfortable (i.e. removal of gowns) when 
dealing with vulnerable victims, such as traumatised or children victims. It may 
be that victims feel more comfortable speaking to staff within their own victim 
association, so provision should be made to hold workshops and training for victim 
groups to build their capacity and therefore reach of psychological support. Ideally 
counsellors and psychological supports staff in victim groups should be funded 
by the state to allow for the professionalization of such service provision. Relatedly, 
it would be important to monitor the way victims experience participation and 
restorative justice at the JEP, by doing surveys and other assessments in a periodic 
manner so as to be able to correct, in a timely manner, areas that are seen by victims 
as problematic. Such monitoring should be cognizant of victims’ expectations. 
As with reparations, the JEP should closely manage expectations in relation to 
participation to ensure that victims’ understandings of their rights to participation 
are in line with the JEP’s organizational practices.
victims who are illiterate, disabled or elderly. Hearings are more immediate and 
permit victims to feel part of the system. However, the JEP should ensure that 
victims feel part of the justice process and that they are taken seriously and not 
as a validation mechanism of the system. The JEP should also adopt all necessary 
measures to consult victims and not to impose participation. They should be given 
the opportunity to say if they wish to participate, and they should be briefed on 
what to expect from such a process. Victims’ direct participation should not be 
limited to appearing at the hearing of acknowledgment of responsibility (at the 
Chamber of recognition of responsibility) or at the hearing where the Tribunal 
reads its resolution with its conclusions. Participation, in person, should precede 
these hearings and will help the JEP tailor justice to those most affected by these 
crimes, improving victim satisfaction.
148. There are a number of ways to allow victims to participate at the JEP. Restorative 
justice speaks of affected parties coming together in a safe environment to resolve 
the consequence of the crime through agreement.466 Such participation at the ICC 
has not been restorative given the number of victims, the position of the Court in 
the Hague and victim participation through lawyers. That said there are lessons 
to be learned from the ICC and restorative justice in terms of victim participation. 
Respect victims’ agency: allow them choice in how they want to be represented 
as far as possible, be innovative in means for them to contribute to the JEP, their 
engagement may be staggered to build trust and confidence that can lead up 
to direct engagement with perpetrators, such as written letters, recorded video 
statements, video-links, revealed/hidden identity and one-to-one meetings with 
support persons. The formality of the courtroom may not be the best space to enable 
victims to voice their views and concerns. The experience in other contexts, such as 
the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry in Northern Ireland, some victims found 
that appearing in a courtroom was quite formal, causing them to be nervous and 
not effectively articulate their views and concerns, whereas the Acknowledgement 
Forum, a more informal space where victims could tell their story, while helpful, 
made some victims feel that they were being infantilised instead of having their 
rights satisfied. Victim testimony can be impacted by malnutrition impairing 
their memory and its cogency and completeness.467 As a result of trauma, victims 
may have difficulties in recollecting a full and detailed account of events.468 This 
is connected to the discussion above on procedural justice, in directly engaging 
and testifying before a court, victims need to ‘telling their stories to an engaged 
listener and to receive formal and informal acknowledgement’.469 Accordingly, 
victims appearing as witnesses to only testify and respond to questions may be 
counterintuitive in ensuring their views and concerns are effectively represented 
and heard. Victims should be able to present their voices in narrative form without 
interruption, before then questions being introduced; as far as possible these 
questions should be submitted to them beforehand to alleviate any stress on them 
or being ‘ambushed’ through cross-examination.
466 Principles 2 and 3, UN Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal 
Matters.
467 Ellie Smith, Victims in the Witness Stand: Socio-Cultural and Psychological Challenges in Eliciting 
Victim Testimony, in K. Tibori-Szabó and M. Hirst (eds.), Victim Participation in International Criminal 
Justice, Asser (2017), 315-340, p319.
468 Ibid, p324.
469 Ibid, p332.74 75
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shaping or enhancing the design of transitional justice programmes.’471 As such 
consultations are not PR exercises and are distinct from outreach, which aim 
to sensitise affected communities. Once institutions are legislated for, set up 
and operational, outreach to affected communities is key. The United Nations 
Secretary General notes the importance of outreach in ensuring the impact and 
sustainability of transitional justice institutions so that they are clearly understood 
and coherently communicated.472 Effective consultation also can contribute to the 
collective dimension of the right to truth for society and not just victims to be 
aware of the consequences of the conflict and the need to redress the suffering of 
those most affected.473 
157. Inclusion of victims requires effective outreach and even identifying and locating 
them, as well as consideration of those who do not want to participate and 
the impact their non-engagement will have on other victims, society and ex-
combatants. The mix of individual and collective efforts to engage and provide 
information to victims and other bodies such as the truth commission, alongside 
community service may help to bridge this gap. 
Coordination and Partnerships
158. The JEP should establish processes and principles of internal coordination as well 
as take full advantage of its place within the Sistema integral de Verdad, Justicia, 
Reparación y no Repetición (SIVJRR) through regular and systematic coordination 
with the institutions of the SIVJRR and, to a more limited extent, the institutions of 
the broader victims’ policy in Colombia. Colombia’s implementation of justice, truth 
and reparation processes simultaneously through different state institutions gives 
it a unique place in the history of transitional justice processes. The comprehensive 
nature of the system gives the opportunity to provide Colombians with a holistic 
experience of multiple dimensions of the transitional justice “toolkit”. At the same 
time, it presents the risk of an uncoordinated and ad-hoc implementation at the 
territorial level. Victims should not be expected themselves to understand the 
various institutional identities and organizational realities of the different parts 
of the system, but rather should be presented with a holistic and coordinated 
response, to the extent possible. This will require coordination at multiple levels. 
For example, vertical coordination is necessary to streamline the JEP’s work and 
communication between its base in Bogotá and staff in the territories. At the same 
time, horizontal coordination is necessary for alignment and cooperation between 
organizations. Both will require specific organizational mechanisms to facilitate 
cooperation, communication and information sharing, such as the proposed 
Committee of Inter-Institutional Coordination. In addition, the JEP should take 
full advantage of civil society to extend its reach to the territories and multiply its 
symbolic and operational presence. At the same time, experience with the ICC 
has shown that civil society can feel taken advantage-of if not duly sensitised as to 
their expected roles and place in a transitional system.
471 National consultations on transitional justice, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States, (2009), p3.
472 Guidance Note of the Secretary-General, United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice, March 2010, 
p10.
473 See Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, (Application No. 48135/06), 25 June 2013; and Magyar 
Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary, (Application No. 18030/11, 8 November 2016.
Strategic Principles of Participation and Reparation
153. To facilitate the monitoring of victims’ experience of the JEP’s restorative justice 
system, the JEP should establish strategic principles and benchmarks according 
to which processes can be designed and victims’ experiences measured. These 
principles should be of a general nature and should include both process and 
output/outcome-oriented indicators. Process indicators may include, for example, 
principles on outreach, including when to communicate with victims at various 
stages of the JEP’s proceedings; what types of information should be provided; 
when to consult with victims on various aspects of the JEP’s work, including 
alternative sanctions. Process indicators should also include when and how to 
coordinate with civil society. Having such clear indicators and principles can help 
to give victim participation at the JEP more coherence and clarity to victims and 
the public on what is to be expected.
154. Output/outcome indicators should identify the general impact which the JEP 
hopes to achieve if such processes work as planned. These may include both 
objective indicators, such as a number or percentage of victims who participate 
at various stages, as well as subjective indicators, such as the “feeling of being 
repaired”, victims’ satisfaction, and the successful management of expectations. 
Such principles will facilitate the JEP’s monitoring of its work and help keep it 
accountable to its various stakeholders, most importantly victims of the armed 
conflict. These principles should also enable internal coordination and planning 
within the organization and across its various units and offices and facilitate the 
public identify “One JEP” in communities.
Outreach
155. To increase awareness of victims’ rights to participation and reparation, the 
JEP should develop outreach strategies and mechanisms that will facilitate its 
communication with victims and communities at the territorial level. This will 
support the organizational processes through which victims can access the 
JEP and bolster its key pedagogical role within the Sistema integral de Verdad, 
Justicia, Reparación y no Repetición. Furthermore, providing clear and objective 
information about its activities and victims’ rights at various stages, will also 
provide a valuable counterweight to external accounts that seek to politicize and/
or weaken the JEP’s standing. Outreach materials should be simple and accessible 
and provide a realistic understanding of the SIVJRR, the JEP’s place within it, how 
the JEP works as an organization and how its various stages and processes are 
organized, and how victims can access it, while always taking care not to raise 
unrealistic expectations.
156. Outreach engagement with victims should be a ‘two-way communication … to 
conduct interactive activities, to listen to victims and respond to what they are 
saying, and to take into account victims’ concerns’.470 The Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights as stated that ‘national consultations are a form 
of vigorous and respectful dialogue whereby the consulted parties are given 
the space to express themselves freely, in a secure environment, with a view to 
470 ICC Strategy in Relation to Victims 2009, ICC-ASP/8/45, para.22.76 77
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162. Sending individual letters of acknowledgement or apology from ex-combatants or 
in a compiled report by the JEP to each victim can provide symbolic recognition.474 
The JEP can contribute a very specific form of redress to victims, but this is part of a 
comprehensive system. Without implementation of reparations to victims through 
the Unidad Victimas, victims may feel that the engagement with ex-combatants 
in the JEP process, while providing an opportunity for clarification of facts, apology 
or location of remains, may be superficial in redressing their harm and alleviate 
their daily consequences of the conflict and just a process to facilitate the sentence 
reduction and reintegration of ex-combatants. 
163. The JEP could also modestly contribute more broadly to the reparation system in 
Colombia, by supporting perpetrators to transfer assets and ensuring that they 
go to the Reparation Fund to provide reparation to victims under the Victims and 
Land Restitution Law/Peace Agreement. At the same time, the JEP should take 
care not to set expectations too high in areas outside of its control and jurisdiction, 
understanding that unmet expectations can have a significantly detrimental effect 
on its broader reception in the territories. It should though make links and reach 
memorandums of understanding with other transitional justice organisations in 
how best to coordinate and complement each other on reparations and alternative 
sanctions. 
474 Report by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of 
non-recurrence, Pablo de Greiff, A/69/518, 8 October 2014, para 33.
Reparations and community service
159. Consideration needs to be made in how community service can be conducted by 
ex-combatants in communities affected by the conflict, which is connected to wider 
development programmes, without undermining employment opportunities for 
victims or members of the community. Specialist tasks like demining provide 
employment opportunities for ex-combatants, victims and other Colombians, but 
in itself is not reparations unless it has reparative value to victims in acknowledging 
and remedying their harm. It may be a stretch to think of demining as a guarantee 
of non-repetition. As a form of community service, demining is risky work and may 
be one measure of alternative sanctions. In terms of reintegration, such demining 
work may not provide transferrable skills to another job once it is completed in 
a zone, but this should be the concern of the reintegration bodies that the JEP 
should coordinate with.
160. The Special Jurisdiction for Peace should not order reparation against perpetrators 
in the form of compensation. This point appears to be also settled by the decision 
of the Constitutional Court C-080/18. Reparations are a continuum, where at 
its minimalist end is about providing acknowledgement for moral harm by a 
responsible actor and its maximalist end is having a comprehensive reparation 
programme in place. The JEP is not a reparation programme and cannot replicate 
the work of the Unidad Victimas, nor should it. The JEP can signpost victims to 
other avenues for reparations and truth recovery (CEV). The JEP should learn from 
the lessons of the ICC, EAC and ECCC that criminal courts cannot deliver large-
scale reparations. Instead the JEP needs to be modest and capitalise on its unique 
position of bringing for perpetrators to confront their wrongdoing to victims and 
society, and make community service efforts to repair some of the harm. The 
JEP can engage with other forms of reparation, or contribute with actions that 
have a reparatory effect on victims and the wider society. For example, the JEP 
should consider how best to use satisfaction as a form of reparation in the form 
of apologies or other similar acts of recognition of responsibility to dignify victims. 
Such acts could also be seen as acts of restitution of dignity for victims. There may 
also be connections between alternative sanctions and reparations in perpetrators 
building monuments or memorial gardens for victims with their consent.
161. The sanciones propias equally offer an important opportunity for the JEP to 
consider its reparatory dimension where it is directed to victimised individuals 
or groups. While stricto sensu they are sanctions and their primary aim is to 
punish the perpetrators for their wrongdoing, they could still have a reparatory 
dimension in particular for victimised communities, by showing atonement from 
perpetrators, but also demonstrate how ex-combatants can contribute to repair of 
some of victims’ harm, by for example building a school, a road or demining.
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